The overthrow of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by the United States (U.S.) in early January resonated across the region as a development that disrupted the balance of power in Latin America. However, one of the most direct and fragile repercussions of this development has been felt in Cuba, a country with exceptionally strong historical, ideological, and economic ties to Venezuela. Political discourse in Washington and the concrete economic measures adopted have shifted Cuba from being a merely indirect source of concern to a position increasingly resembling that of a potential target state. Nevertheless, there remain significant structural and political obstacles between the prospect of military intervention and any scenario involving regime collapse.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement immediately following the Venezuela operation—“If I were in Havana, I would be concerned”—indicates that Washington also views Cuba as a link in a broader chain of regional transformation.[i] Rubio’s Cuban heritage and his long-standing advocacy of regime change in Cuba throughout his political career suggest that these remarks are not merely an offhand assessment, but rather a reflection of a long-term ideological perspective. President Donald Trump’s statement that “Cuba appears ready to fall” further elevates this perspective to an explicit rhetoric of threat at the presidential level.[ii]
The concrete manifestation of this rhetoric emerged with the prohibition on the transfer of Venezuelan oil to Cuba. Given that Venezuela supplies approximately one third of Cuba’s oil demand, this decision constitutes not merely a foreign policy maneuver, but a strategic instrument of pressure directly targeting the regime’s economic foundations. The Cuban economy has already contracted by approximately 11 percent since 2020, entering a period of severe decline due to the U.S. embargo and internal governance challenges. Under these conditions, a disruption in energy supply poses the risk of a cascading collapse affecting production, transportation, and essential public services.
President Trump’s call on January 11, 2026, urging Cuba to “make a deal” carries an implicit threat when viewed through the lens of the Venezuelan precedent. Although the content of this call was not explicitly clarified, the visible willingness of the United States to employ military instruments following the overthrow of Maduro has, for Cuba, functioned less as a deterrent and more as a mechanism that intensifies pressure. In this context, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel’s statement that “no one can dictate to us what we should do” demonstrates that the regime is not prepared to retreat at the discursive level.[iii]
Nevertheless, Cuba sharing the same fate as Venezuela does not appear likely in the short term. The primary and fundamental reason for this lies in the far deeper and more institutionalized mechanisms of political control in Cuba compared to Venezuela. Cuba has long exhibited an authoritarian structure characterized by extremely limited political pluralism and the systematic exclusion of opposition forces from the political system. This configuration complicates the prospect of abrupt regime change and reduces the likelihood that external pressure will generate rapid internal political fragmentation.
A second key distinction lies in Cuba’s limited profile in terms of strategic natural resources. In the Venezuelan case, the oil sector constituted an attractive target for the United States both economically and geopolitically. In contrast, Cuba lacks a high-yield natural resource sector that U.S. companies could rapidly bring under control. This absence implies a lack of incentives that would render military intervention economically “rational.”
A third—and perhaps the most critical—constraint is the growing skepticism within U.S. public opinion toward external military interventions. A Reuters–Ipsos poll reveals that support for the Venezuela operation remained at only around one third. Similarly, an Associated Press–NORC survey indicates that 56 percent of Americans believe that Trump has “gone too far” in pursuing military interventions. These findings suggest that any potential military move against Cuba would generate a serious legitimacy problem in domestic politics.[iv]
In this context, it appears that the Trump administration currently prefers to deepen economic pressure on Cuba rather than pursue it as a military target. U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright’s statement that Mexico may continue selling fuel to Cuba indicates that Washington is pursuing a strategy of controlled attrition rather than one of “total strangulation.”[v] This approach aims to extract concessions through prolonged economic erosion, without forcing the regime into an abrupt collapse.
Although there are strong arguments suggesting that a direct U.S. military intervention against Cuba remains unlikely under current conditions, this assessment does not provide an absolute guarantee. Should the security threshold be crossed, Cuba could become a direct military target. While there are currently no nuclear weapons systems deployed on the island, Cuba’s close geographic proximity to the U.S. mainland renders it a potential space for hosting advanced military and intelligence capabilities.
The U.S. national security approach assesses threats not solely on the basis of their existing capabilities, but also in terms of their potential to generate threats in the short term. Within this framework, the emergence of early-warning systems, long-range radar installations, missile infrastructure, or strategic military deployments at distances measured in minutes from U.S. coastlines is defined by Washington as an unacceptable risk. Should such capacity-building occur, the Cuba issue could be reframed beyond ideological differences or regime debates and directly linked to U.S. national security. Under this scenario, Washington’s response would likely be shaped by a logic of preventive security rather than by public opinion trends or calculations of diplomatic cost, and the political and structural factors that have thus far constrained military intervention could largely lose their relevance.
It is observable that these strategies place the Cuban population under significant strain. Over the past year, the island’s population has faced large-scale power outages, and Cuba has encountered serious difficulties in ensuring energy supply. Under current conditions, a complete suspension of oil flows from Venezuela could force Cuba into a “survival economy.” Although the regime has weathered similar crises in the past, the international context has now evolved into a fundamentally different phase. In this situation, two potential scenarios may emerge for Cuba: seeking adaptation through limited engagement with the United States, or becoming subject to this process through intensified external pressure.
In conclusion, although claims that Cuba constitutes the “next target” for military intervention in the post-Venezuela period do not appear particularly likely in the near term, it remains prudent not to dismiss the possibility of military activity in the region should the United States elevate Cuba to the level of a “national security” concern. Ongoing tensions across the continent are pushing Cuba into one of the most fragile periods in its modern history. While this fragility may be perceived in Washington as an opportunity space, the emerging indicators point not toward direct military intervention, but rather toward a prolonged process characterized by sustained economic pressure and diplomatic isolation.
[i] Osborn, Catherine. “Trump’s Cuba Calculus”, Foreign Policy, foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/16/us-cuba-trump-rubio-maduro-venezuela-oil/, (Accessed: 01.25.2026).
[ii] Betz, Bradford. “Trump Says Cuba Is ‘Ready to Fall’ After Capture of Venezuela’s Maduro”, Fox News, www.foxnews.com/world/trump-says-cuba-ready-fall-after-capture-venezuelas-maduro, (Accessed: 01.25.2026).
[iii] Osborn, op.cit., (Accessed: 01.25.2026).
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Ibid.
