As of January 2026, Moscow’s pursuit of influence and strategic maneuvers in Africa have shifted from the secure atmosphere of diplomatic salons to the grey and calculated corridors of intelligence services. The recent move by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), accusing the Paris administration of executing ‘neocolonial coup engineering’ on the continent and planning the liquidation of ‘undesirable leaders,’ is the clearest declaration that the power struggle in Africa has transcended conventional boundaries.[i] This move has transformed the concrete military competition on the ground into a multi-layered psychological warfare waged through the memories and traumas of societies. The center of the war has shifted from physical geography to the mental maps of decision-makers and the public.
In the projection drawn by the SVR, the failed coup attempt in Burkina Faso on January 3rd or the sabotages targeting critical energy infrastructure in Mali are not viewed as isolated public order incidents. According to Moscow, these events are operational pieces reflected on the ground of the Elysee Palace’s ‘political revenge’ plan.[ii] At the center of these allegations lies the thesis that Paris has deployed even terrorist groups as proxy actors on the ground in a bid to regain its lost influence and strategic depth. This approach ceases to treat France as a geopolitical rival and instead relegates it to the status of an ‘architect of chaos’ undermining the stability of the region.
Across a vast line stretching from the Central African Republic to Madagascar, scenarios targeting the liquidation of leaders who align with the BRICS axis and break away from the Western orbit are allegedly being put forward. According to the SVR’s narrative, this picture is far from being a coincidental wave of violence. On the contrary, it points to a large-scale project centered on France, supported by instructors and unmanned aerial vehicles procured via Ukraine. The placement of Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso and Assimi Goïta in Mali on the target list is presented as the concrete objectives of this project. With these allegations, Moscow codes its presence on the continent not merely as a preference, but as a security necessity.
When the linguistic codes and semantic structure of the text are examined, one encounters an ideologically charged manifesto rather than a technical and cold intelligence report. Conceptual sets such as ‘parasitic metropolis,’ ‘patriotic forces,’ and ‘libertarian vanguard’ place the military regimes in the Sahel on a foundation of historical legitimacy while defining France as an ‘enemy of the people.’ This choice of terminology focuses on managing and reconstructing perceptions in minds rather than operational realities on the ground. By transforming the justified anger created by the colonial past into a diplomatic weapon, Moscow judges and condemns its rival on a moral and conscientious ground.
The fact that the allegations put forward lack concrete, independent, and verifiable evidence remains secondary in terms of Moscow’s strategic calculus. In modern information warfare and the post-truth era, the truth itself carries less significance than the climate of suspicion it creates. This aggressive approach, which rejects the burden of proof, keeps France in a constant defensive posture, preventing Paris from developing strategic initiatives and producing new policies. In this asymmetric equation, where one side accuses persistently and at a high pitch while the other is forced to constantly deny, the advantage of initiative shifts to the one whose voice is louder.
This picture implies that information warfare operates through a repertoire of accusations directed solely at the opposing side. Actors seeking to gain influence on the ground attempt to sway public opinion using social media networks, local influence channels, and targeted messaging, disseminating content to portray their rival as ‘illegitimate.’ Since such operations shift the debate from the axis of evidence to the axis of belonging and anger, they produce impact in the short term while deepening the crisis of trust in the long term. At this point, the SVR’s text is more than just a move to force France onto the defensive; it demonstrates that the information space in Africa has transformed into a ground for harsher and dirtier competition.
With this move, Russia is accelerating the process of positioning itself as Africa’s ‘anti-colonial patron’ and ‘security guarantor.’ This rhetorical shield provided to the military regimes in the Sahel belt makes it easier for the administrations in Bamako, Niamey, or Ouagadougou to consolidate domestic public opinion and suppress opposition.
By adding this type of soft power export to the hard security exports provided through the Africa Corps, Moscow is deepening its presence on the continent.[iii] This strategy prevents Russia’s military presence on the continent from being viewed as an occupation or expansionist move; on the contrary, it enables it to be presented as a historical ‘recipe for liberation.’
Russia’s claim of being a ‘security guarantor’ can only gain lasting legitimacy as long as its practices on the ground remain unquestioned. Discussions surrounding the security structure that has evolved from Wagner to Africa Corps—including issues such as civilian casualties, arbitrary detentions, shadow pressure on local economies, and a lack of accountability—weaken the ‘liberator’ image. This weakness transforms Moscow’s claim of anti-colonial ethical superiority from a powerful narrative into a promise that is constantly tested on the ground. Consequently, the SVR’s discourse cannot conceal the questions regarding Russia’s own performance.
For the Paris administration, parrying this asymmetric and multi-front assault is far more arduous and costly than managing a conventional military operation. Every rational diplomatic and bureaucratic response from France is lost in the heavy shadow of its colonial past and suffers from a credibility problem in the eyes of local populations. Russia corners its rival and narrows its room for maneuver by striking exactly at the ‘soft underbelly’ created by this historical baggage. Defining Russia as a ‘disinformation actor’ or a ‘destabilizing power’ in strategic documents is not enough to break this aggressive wave of discourse on the ground or to change local dynamics.
It would be inaccurate to interpret the reflection in continental capitals as a one-dimensional, romanticized admiration for Russia or unconditional surrender. Local actors and military elites utilize this intense competition between great powers as a pragmatic tool to expand their own room for maneuver and sustain their rule. The rising anti-French wave and the discursive support provided by Russia increase the chances for these countries to engage in multilateral bargaining in their security and economic policies. The SVR’s statement provides these capitals with a powerful normative and political justification to redefine, limit, or sever their relations with the West.
In the current conjuncture, the parallelism and fluidity between the Russia-Ukraine War and the tensions in Africa are striking. The SVR’s claim that France is conducting operations in Africa using unmanned aerial vehicles and training support procured via Ukraine is a strategic effort to unify two distinct fronts. This narrative serves the purpose of reframing the Ukraine War in the eyes of the Global South, moving away from the Western thesis of a Russian invasion and toward a problem of ‘Western imperialism.’ Thus, Moscow breaks the pressure of international isolation and opens a new, legitimate, and moral front for itself in Africa.
The shift in the regional security architecture points to a transformation so deep that it cannot be explained merely by the number of military personnel or the changing hands of bases. The vacuum created in areas from which France has withdrawn is being filled by the ‘liberator’ myth constructed by Russia rather than by Russian soldiers. The mortar used to build this myth, as seen in the SVR’s statement, is the disappointment created by the West’s colonial past and its current policies. While the West’s discourse on democracy and human rights remains abstract for the people of the Sahel who carry concerns for security and livelihood, Russia’s promise of ‘security and sovereignty’ finds a more concrete resonance.
This new and proactive role assumed by intelligence agencies in interstate communication is irreversibly changing the nature of diplomacy. These institutions, which were previously preferred to remain behind the scenes and advance silently, have today become primary actors in public diplomacy and psychological operations. As seen in the SVR example, the data provided or the allegations constructed by intelligence are transforming into displays of hard power that replace diplomatic notes. This method sets a dangerous precedent that allows states to wear down their rivals through ‘grey zone’ strategies without assuming official responsibility.
In the coming period, it is foreseeable that such intelligence-sourced statements and allegations will become more frequent as the intensity of the competition in Africa increases. The response of France and its Western allies to this new type of warfare will directly impact their presence on the continent and their position in the global balance of power. If Western capitals merely adopt a reactive stance by accusing Russia, they will face the risk of completely losing the initiative to Moscow. Unless a concrete, inclusive, and equitable policy addressing Africa’s needs is produced, such narratives generated by the SVR will continue to find an audience.
In conclusion, the noise of tanks and diplomatic courtesy in African geopolitics are giving way to a war of words and a duel between intelligence services. The SVR’s statement is the clearest and harshest evidence that the conflict on the continent has shifted from the physical field to the cognitive field. On this new front, the ammunition is not cannonballs or gunpowder, but anti-colonial narratives that trigger the fears and hopes embedded in the memories of societies. Unless France or the Western Bloc can balance this discursive superiority and narrative monopoly, the impact of their military or economic moves is destined to remain limited. On the African chessboard, Moscow has preferred to change the very ground of the board and the rules of the game rather than merely threatening the king.
[i] “France preparing neo-colonial coups in Africa — Russian intelligence service (SVR)”, TASS, 2 Şubat 2026, https://tass.com/politics/2080207, (Access Date: 03.02.2026).
[ii] “France is preparing neocolonial coups in Africa, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) says”, Sputnik Africa, 2 Şubat 2026, https://en.sputniknews.africa/20260202/1083049650.html, (Access Date: 03.02.2026).
[iii] “Russia’s repositioning in the Sahel: From Wagner to Africa Corps”, Timbuktu Institute, 29 Temmuz 2025, https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/1262-report-russia-s-repositioning-in-the-sahel-from-wagner-to-africa-corps, (Access Date: 03.02.2026).
