America’s Sahel Move: Atallah’s Visit to Bamako and the East-West Chessboard
The deep security crisis that Mali is experiencing has ceased to be a domestic issue alone and has instead transformed into a geopolitical fault line with direct implications for regional stability. Following the 2021 coup, the Bamako administration suspended almost all ties with the West and turned rapidly to Russia, which filled the vacuum left by France’s termination of Operation Barkhane. The paramilitary activities of the Wagner Group became emblematic of this shift, signaling both on the ground and in the international arena that Mali was pivoting eastward. In this context, the United States’ (US) recent break from its silence regarding the Sahel region is particularly noteworthy. Rudy Atallah’s visit to Bamako, occurring amid this fragile setting, represents not just a diplomatic gesture but also a component of a much broader strategic maneuver.[1]
Rudy Atallah is more than a mere name, he is a significant figure in US security policy in Africa. Having served for many years on the National Security Council and worked as an advisor particularly on counterterrorism policies, Atallah has been closely involved with African affairs during both the Trump and Biden administrations.[2] Therefore, his visit to Mali from July 9 to 12, 2025, should not be viewed merely as a diplomatic representation, but rather as an act of intelligence assessment, a search for new ground in security cooperation, and a move toward establishing a new leg in the great power competition. The visit gained symbolic significance through his reception by Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye Diop, and became a clear indication of the US intent to open a new chapter in its policy toward Mali.[3]
Atallah’s visit included discussions on topics such as intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, revitalization of regional security mechanisms, and military training. For instance, the talks emphasized specific areas like Improvised Explosive Device (IED) training, logistical support, and intelligence cooperation.[4] However, what is critical here is not the content of these discussions, but the strategic orientation they aim to achieve. The visit clearly signals an attempt to offer an alternative to the security architecture currently shaped by Wagner’s influence in Mali. With this visit, the US is formally asserting its effort to reclaim its lost sphere of influence; trying to restore its image as a “global actor that does not retreat but can return when necessary.”
At this point, one unavoidable question arises: Is the US truly returning, or is Atallah’s visit merely a symbolic show of presence? The answer lies not in the nature of the visit itself but in the steps that follow it. After all, Atallah did not come alone. The message he brought with him was a new security partnership proposal presented to the Malian government. At the heart of this proposal lies a vision of “conditional but committed” cooperation. In other words, the US clearly expressed that it could once again stand by Mali militarily and in terms of intelligence, provided that certain norms regarding democratization and human rights are upheld. However, regarding recent threats such as the coordinated attacks by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in Niono, Molodo, and Sandaré on July 1, 2025, it remains debatable how well this approach aligns with on-the-field realities.
The timing of the visit is also critical in terms of regional developments. While the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) continues to impose sanctions on the military junta-led Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, these three countries have formalized their break from the West by forming a new bloc under the name “Alliance des États du Sahel (AES)”. The establishment of AES is not merely a diplomatic statement; it constitutes a declaration of an alternative security and governance framework countering Western influence. The US, through Atallah, re-engaging with Mali, the central actor in this bloc, can be interpreted as a move to reverse this divergence. Washington’s aim is not limited to re-engaging Mali but extends to the AES bloc as a whole.
However, this engagement is not without its challenges. Mali has long criticized the West’s “double standards.” After France’s interventionist policies were replaced by Russia’s more direct yet unconditional security assurances, the Malian administration began to regard its relationship with Moscow not just as strategic, but also ideological. In this context, the US model of engagement represents a more complex and responsibility-laden partnership for Mali. The conditions traditionally imposed by the US (democratic transition, freedom of expression, accountability) can be costly and exhausting in the short term. In contrast, Russia’s model “provide military support, do not interfere in domestic affairs” offers a more appealing alternative for transitional military regimes. Therefore, for Washington to effectively reinsert itself into this equation, it must offer more than security promises; it must also provide diplomatic flexibility, local legitimacy, and cultural sensitivity.
Moreover, Atallah’s visit is being closely observed not only in terms of the Washington-Bamako axis but also within the context of US-France relations. The US stepping into the field after France’s military withdrawal has prompted questions in some circles: “Is the US replacing France?”. However, the US approach fundamentally differs from France’s. While France, through its long-term presence, positioned itself as the ultimate authority, the US seeks to assume a more modular, flexible, and functional role. This could be more acceptable for local leaders. However, it is equally fragile, as such partnerships may be quickly destabilized by shifting dynamics on the field.
Looking ahead, three primary scenarios stand out. First, US-Mali relations may remain at a limited level of technical cooperation. In this scenario, the United States would provide training, equipment, and intelligence support, but would not be directly visible on the field. The second possibility is the establishment of a regional security architecture. Within the AES framework, a more organized, lasting, and operational partnership could be built between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the US. This would serve to weaken Russian influence on the field and provide the US with a renewed foothold in the Sahel. The third and less likely scenario is that the visit remains merely symbolic, with Mali deepening its ties with Russia and the US withdrawing entirely. This outcome would mark a significant rupture not only for the Sahel but for the West’s broader influence in Africa.
In this context, for the US to succeed in its strategy toward Mali, it must rely not solely on military tools, but also on integrated development models, civil society partnerships, humanitarian diplomacy, and cultural sensitivity. Otherwise, this security-centered comeback effort risks being reduced to a temporary diplomatic maneuver. The US must pursue not only the goal of counterbalancing Russia, but also the ambition of establishing more authentic, equitable, and multilateral relationships with African populations. Atallah’s visit may well be the beginning of this process, but how it unfolds will depend on the future choices of both Mali and the US.
In conclusion, the security dialogue Washington is attempting to reestablish with Mali marks a new phase in the great power competition over Africa. Atallah’s visit reveals that this competition has evolved into not only a military struggle, but also a diplomatic, ideological, and cultural one. If the US supports this process with sincere and sustainable initiatives, it can play a decisive role in recalibrating the geopolitical balance in the Sahel. However, this will only be possible not by building military bases, but by building trust, establishing direct relationships with local populations, and developing development-oriented strategies.
[1] “Lutte contre le terrorisme : Les Etats-Unis réaffirment leur engagement aux côtés du Mali”, Maliweb, 10 Temmuz 2025, https://www.maliweb.net/politique/diplomatie/lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-les-etats-unis-reaffirment-leur-engagement-aux-cotes-du-mali-3107104.html, (Date Accession: 15.07.2025).
[2] “Trump’s Africa team starts to take shape”, The Independent, https://www.independent.co.ug/trumps-africa-team-starts-to-take-shape/, (Date Accession: 15.07.2025).
[3] Mali Dışişleri Bakanı Abdoulaye Diop X Resmi Hesabı, 10 Temmuz 2025, https://x.com/abdoulayediop8/status/1943067497873182905?s=61, (Erişim Tarihi: 15.07.2025).
[4] AES Info X hesabı, 10 Temmuz 2025, https://x.com/aesinfos/status/1943741801065853198?s=61, (Date Accession: 15.07.2025).The deep security crisis that Mali is experiencing has ceased to be a domestic issue alone and has instead transformed into a geopolitical fault line with direct implications for regional stability. Following the 2021 coup, the Bamako administration suspended almost all ties with the West and turned rapidly to Russia, which filled the vacuum left by France’s termination of Operation Barkhane. The paramilitary activities of the Wagner Group became emblematic of this shift, signaling both on the ground and in the international arena that Mali was pivoting eastward. In this context, the United States’ (US) recent break from its silence regarding the Sahel region is particularly noteworthy. Rudy Atallah’s visit to Bamako, occurring amid this fragile setting, represents not just a diplomatic gesture but also a component of a much broader strategic maneuver.[1]
Rudy Atallah is more than a mere name, he is a significant figure in US security policy in Africa. Having served for many years on the National Security Council and worked as an advisor particularly on counterterrorism policies, Atallah has been closely involved with African affairs during both the Trump and Biden administrations.[2] Therefore, his visit to Mali from July 9 to 12, 2025, should not be viewed merely as a diplomatic representation, but rather as an act of intelligence assessment, a search for new ground in security cooperation, and a move toward establishing a new leg in the great power competition. The visit gained symbolic significance through his reception by Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye Diop, and became a clear indication of the US intent to open a new chapter in its policy toward Mali.[3]
Atallah’s visit included discussions on topics such as intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, revitalization of regional security mechanisms, and military training. For instance, the talks emphasized specific areas like Improvised Explosive Device (IED) training, logistical support, and intelligence cooperation.[4] However, what is critical here is not the content of these discussions, but the strategic orientation they aim to achieve. The visit clearly signals an attempt to offer an alternative to the security architecture currently shaped by Wagner’s influence in Mali. With this visit, the US is formally asserting its effort to reclaim its lost sphere of influence; trying to restore its image as a “global actor that does not retreat but can return when necessary.”
At this point, one unavoidable question arises: Is the US truly returning, or is Atallah’s visit merely a symbolic show of presence? The answer lies not in the nature of the visit itself but in the steps that follow it. After all, Atallah did not come alone. The message he brought with him was a new security partnership proposal presented to the Malian government. At the heart of this proposal lies a vision of “conditional but committed” cooperation. In other words, the US clearly expressed that it could once again stand by Mali militarily and in terms of intelligence, provided that certain norms regarding democratization and human rights are upheld. However, regarding recent threats such as the coordinated attacks by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in Niono, Molodo, and Sandaré on July 1, 2025, it remains debatable how well this approach aligns with on-the-field realities.
The timing of the visit is also critical in terms of regional developments. While the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) continues to impose sanctions on the military junta-led Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, these three countries have formalized their break from the West by forming a new bloc under the name “Alliance des États du Sahel (AES)”. The establishment of AES is not merely a diplomatic statement; it constitutes a declaration of an alternative security and governance framework countering Western influence. The US, through Atallah, re-engaging with Mali, the central actor in this bloc, can be interpreted as a move to reverse this divergence. Washington’s aim is not limited to re-engaging Mali but extends to the AES bloc as a whole.
However, this engagement is not without its challenges. Mali has long criticized the West’s “double standards.” After France’s interventionist policies were replaced by Russia’s more direct yet unconditional security assurances, the Malian administration began to regard its relationship with Moscow not just as strategic, but also ideological. In this context, the US model of engagement represents a more complex and responsibility-laden partnership for Mali. The conditions traditionally imposed by the US (democratic transition, freedom of expression, accountability) can be costly and exhausting in the short term. In contrast, Russia’s model “provide military support, do not interfere in domestic affairs” offers a more appealing alternative for transitional military regimes. Therefore, for Washington to effectively reinsert itself into this equation, it must offer more than security promises; it must also provide diplomatic flexibility, local legitimacy, and cultural sensitivity.
Moreover, Atallah’s visit is being closely observed not only in terms of the Washington-Bamako axis but also within the context of US-France relations. The US stepping into the field after France’s military withdrawal has prompted questions in some circles: “Is the US replacing France?”. However, the US approach fundamentally differs from France’s. While France, through its long-term presence, positioned itself as the ultimate authority, the US seeks to assume a more modular, flexible, and functional role. This could be more acceptable for local leaders. However, it is equally fragile, as such partnerships may be quickly destabilized by shifting dynamics on the field.
Looking ahead, three primary scenarios stand out. First, US-Mali relations may remain at a limited level of technical cooperation. In this scenario, the United States would provide training, equipment, and intelligence support, but would not be directly visible on the field. The second possibility is the establishment of a regional security architecture. Within the AES framework, a more organized, lasting, and operational partnership could be built between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the US. This would serve to weaken Russian influence on the field and provide the US with a renewed foothold in the Sahel. The third and less likely scenario is that the visit remains merely symbolic, with Mali deepening its ties with Russia and the US withdrawing entirely. This outcome would mark a significant rupture not only for the Sahel but for the West’s broader influence in Africa.
In this context, for the US to succeed in its strategy toward Mali, it must rely not solely on military tools, but also on integrated development models, civil society partnerships, humanitarian diplomacy, and cultural sensitivity. Otherwise, this security-centered comeback effort risks being reduced to a temporary diplomatic maneuver. The US must pursue not only the goal of counterbalancing Russia, but also the ambition of establishing more authentic, equitable, and multilateral relationships with African populations. Atallah’s visit may well be the beginning of this process, but how it unfolds will depend on the future choices of both Mali and the US.
In conclusion, the security dialogue Washington is attempting to reestablish with Mali marks a new phase in the great power competition over Africa. Atallah’s visit reveals that this competition has evolved into not only a military struggle, but also a diplomatic, ideological, and cultural one. If the US supports this process with sincere and sustainable initiatives, it can play a decisive role in recalibrating the geopolitical balance in the Sahel. However, this will only be possible not by building military bases, but by building trust, establishing direct relationships with local populations, and developing development-oriented strategies.
[1] “Lutte contre le terrorisme : Les Etats-Unis réaffirment leur engagement aux côtés du Mali”, Maliweb, 10 Temmuz 2025, https://www.maliweb.net/politique/diplomatie/lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-les-etats-unis-reaffirment-leur-engagement-aux-cotes-du-mali-3107104.html, (Date Accession: 15.07.2025).
[2] “Trump’s Africa team starts to take shape”, The Independent, https://www.independent.co.ug/trumps-africa-team-starts-to-take-shape/, (Date Accession: 15.07.2025).
[3] Mali Dışişleri Bakanı Abdoulaye Diop X Resmi Hesabı, 10 Temmuz 2025, https://x.com/abdoulayediop8/status/1943067497873182905?s=61, (Erişim Tarihi: 15.07.2025).
[4] AES Info X hesabı, 10 Temmuz 2025, https://x.com/aesinfos/status/1943741801065853198?s=61, (Date Accession: 15.07.2025).
