The year 2025, when the global power struggle moved from Earth to space, signals a turning point in diplomatic history that redefines the concept of ‘soft power’ in space diplomacy. While the program led by the China National Space Administration and its commercial affiliates completed its busiest schedule through the launch frequency of the Long March series, it would be an incomplete analysis to interpret this activity as a mere technological show of strength or a reflection of existing competition with Washington. Beijing’s rise in space is the embodiment of its ‘Space Silk Road’ project, that it builds in the Global South and especially on the Africa.
In this context, the year 2025 has witnessed a quantative shift in Chinese space activities. Although it varies, depending on different counting methods, throughout the year, more than 80 orbital launchs has been attempted and this pace has brought China to the threshold of a new record. This process, where the launch pace progressed simultaneously with satellite services and joint production packages for Africa, marks the digital seal in the sky of the development protocols signed in the capitals.
While space activities in Africa have long been restricted between grant-based and symbolic gestures by Western powers, Beijing’s 2025 vision is radically altering this paradigm. From Cairo to Dakar, Addis Ababa to Abuja, Chinese-Backed satellites are now moving beyond the realm of ‘show-off’ to serve in the ‘implementation field, which directly impacts state capacity. In this new era, the definition of space capacity is becoming to change, and the following provocative question now takes part on the desks of international relations experts: ‘Is state capacity now being measured by budget or by data in the space?’
The essential breaking point in Beijing’s Africa strategy is its commitment to move beyond selling turnkey systems to African countries and instead develop the local capacity in the production of this technology and data analysis. The launch carried out on December 10, 2025, using the Lijian-1 Y11 rocket developed by CAS Space, which carried nine varying cargos into orbit, forms the backbone of this strategy. The successful separation and orbital deployment of Egypt’s SPNEX satellite is the latest example of Cairo increasing its local production capacity. This move allows Africa to place space technologies at the center of its national development plans rather than viewing them as a ‘prestigious item’. With this launch, while Egypt is reinforcing its position as a ‘producer’ on the continent, it also presents a more attractive partnership profile compared to its Western rivals by proving how open it is to Chinese technology transfer.
This technology transfer in question is producing concrete outcomes, particularly in addressing chronic food security and climate change issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. Throughout 2025, Chinese remote sensing satellites accelerated the decision cycle in mapping the drought risks and forecasting the crops, helping manage drought risks affecting the Sahel region. This data, enabling local governments to make crop forecasts, is replacing traditional methods of land surveying. Monitoring soil moisture, plant health and water resources from space has become much more functional for the modernization of the agriculture in Africa than tractors and fertilizers.
This technical cooperation on the field is finding its reflection in the diplomatic ground. The Beijing Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), adopted in September 2024 and covering the period 2025-2027, has transformed from a document into a functional mechanism as of 2025. The symposium (Post-FOCAC) held in November 2025 with the participation of African Union and Chinese officials has confirmed that space cooperation is at the center of this plan. This process, that has been embodied through ground station installations and data sharing protocols, reflects the Beijing’s aim of moving the continent away from a relationship of digital dependency into a shared technological ecosystem. Similarly, the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) participation protocol signed by Senegal in 2024 has gained an institutional visibility in 2025. This situation is a representation of partnership not being limited to Earth and going into space.
The most remarkable element of these intergovernmental protocols in terms of space diplomacy in 2025 is the emergence of Chinese commercial space companies in the African market in addition to the state-owned CNSA. Launch of the Lijian-1 Y11 proves that China is offering a ‘commercial space diplomacy’ to African countries by combining state capacity with the flexibility of the private sector. While Western space polices toward Africa generally involve slow bureaucratic processes revolving around grants and conditional loans, the ‘rapid supply-rapid deployment model’ offered by Chinese companies is considered more pragmatic by African leaders. Involving African experts in the design and production processes is shattering psychological barriers and strengthens the perception of ‘our satellite’. Such sense of belonging creates much more concrete foundation for the sustainability of relations than commercial agents.
Beyond the integration that çivil and commercial implementations provided with, the security reflections of space technologies are shifting the balances in African geopolitcs. Ocean surveillance satelleties serve as a strategic intelligence tool, especially in regions with high levels of piracy activity, such as the Gulf of Guinea and the Horn of Africa. Instant maritime traffic data provided by new generation satellites launched by China in 2025 is enhancing the operational capabilities of African navies and creating a multiplier effect in ensuring coastal security. Even though this cooperation is considered with concern in Western capitals, African leaders see it as a part of their quest of ‘strategic autonomy’. By providing this data, China is constructing a continuity producing dependency in Africa’s security architecture. The continuity of the data flow is reinforcing political consistency by increasing the cost of relations between Beijing and African capitals.
Beijing’s quiet advance in the continent remarks the emergence of a new competition arena between Washington and Brussels. The narrative developed by Western states around security concerns and data privacy remains weak in comparision to the urgency of concrete needs in African capitals. While the technology that China provided is offered as ‘a pragmatic package’, the Western approach highlights the norms and control. For African administrations in need of urgency and capacity, such pragmatic package is viewed as more functional. Essentially, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System’s signal coverage and integration efforts across Africa have visibly increased in 2025. This situation is preparing foundations for the continent’s digital infrastructure to be shaped by with respect to Chinese standards by expanding the range of options except GPS in some sectors. This expansion accelerates the race to generate influence through standards, beyond increasing technical options.
Ultimately, by the end of 2025, China’s space program has become one of the sharpest instruments of geopolitical competition on Earth, moving beyond the ideal of exploring space, the common heritage of humanity. The intense launch traffic in December, and deepening partnerships with Africa prove that space technologies are generating leverage effect in the continent’s development move. These projects ranging from agriculture to security, communication to disaster management, touching every aspect of life embody Chinese claim to be a superpower. We are in an era where state capacity is measured by the speed and accuracy of data flowing from orbit rather than by concrete buildings and large armies. China has understood this reality before anyone else and has begun constructing the world of the future through its silent alliance with Africa. The decisive matter in this picture is whether Africa will remain a data-consuming market or become an actor shaping data governance at a rule-setting level.
