Donald Trump’s statements that the United States will “Keep, sell, or use the crude oil in its Strategic Reserves” the oil tankers and crude oil seized off the coast of Venezuela have qualitatively escalated the already high tensions between Washington and Caracas to a new level.[i] This move signifies not only a tightening of sanctions but also a strategic maneuver that directly intersects with multifaceted areas such as the boundaries of international law, energy security, military deterrence, and the discourse of regime change. The context of the statements and the actual steps taken indicate that the US policy towards Venezuela has evolved from the classic “economic pressure” approach to the use of coercive force at sea and potentially on land.
Trump’s statement in Florida, “We’re also seizing ships,” is particularly noteworthy.[ii] This discourse goes beyond the argument of preventing sanctions violations and explicitly speaks of the possibility of a de facto transfer of ownership. This situation has the potential to elevate Venezuela’s characterization of these actions as “piracy” from mere rhetoric to a concrete legal foundation. Therefore, the call for an emergency meeting of the United Nations (UN) Security Council at Caracas’ request is not merely symbolic, but a strategic step.
Venezuela’s oil sector, the backbone of its economy, has been at the center of US sanctions for years. Tankers that Washington has recently dubbed the “Venezuelan Dark Fleet,” accused of transporting oil by changing flags or turning off tracking systems, have become the de facto target of this sanctions architecture. The increased presence of the US Coast Guard and Navy in the Caribbean and Pacific aims not only to prevent illicit oil trade but also to make US maritime dominance visible.
However, there is a critical threshold here: there is a significant legal and political difference between seizing ships on the grounds of violating sanctions and discussing transferring the oil on board to the US’s own reserves. The former is compatible with the “coercive but temporary” nature of sanctions regimes; the latter implies permanent seizure and economic benefit. This distinction risks contradicting the US narrative of being the “guardian of the international order.”
Trump’s statement that Venezuela’s oil could be used in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve directly brings the energy security dimension into play. Given that the US is one of the world’s largest oil producers, this statement can be said to be more of a political message than an economic necessity. The message is clear: Venezuela’s oil is no longer just under sanctions, but could effectively fall under US control.
Trump’s implication of regime change, stating that it “would be wise for Maduro,” indicates that a policy pursued covertly in recent years is now being expressed more openly. Washington associates the Nicolas Maduro administration not only with authoritarianism and human rights violations, but also with illegal drug trafficking and terrorism. The designation of the Maduro government as a “foreign terrorist organization” (FTO) provides the legal basis for this discourse. The FTO designation in US law offers a broad framework that legitimizes not only sanctions but also military operations.
In this context, it would not be accurate to consider Trump’s statement, “we will launch the same program on land,” as merely a deterrent.[iii] This statement is a clear signal that interventions that began at sea could expand to land targets. Moreover, the recent attack by the US Southern Command in the Pacific, which resulted in one death, demonstrates that this rhetoric may have a practical manifestation. Despite increasing demands for oversight from Congress, the limited concrete evidence presented to the public makes the legitimacy of the US in this area questionable.
Venezuela’s call for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council aims to move the crisis from a bilateral dispute to a multilateral one. From the perspective of fundamental principles of international law, seizing and permanently confiscating ships on the high seas is only considered legitimate in very limited circumstances. Except for exceptions such as piracy, slave trade, unauthorized radio broadcasting, or sailing without a flag, such actions are subject to serious legal challenges.[iv]
The US linking Venezuelan oil to “drug trafficking financing” can be seen as part of an effort to broaden these exceptions. However, the insufficient evidence publicly available to date weakens Washington’s argument. This also creates tension with the US’s long-standing rhetoric of a “rules-based international order.” After all, bending the rules to counter an actor accused of violating them risks undermining normative supremacy.
These developments are unlikely to go unnoticed throughout Latin America. The Venezuelan example could set a precedent not only for Caracas but also for other energy producers in the region and governments with strained relations with the U.S. Increased use of force by the U.S. could reignite “sovereignty” debates in the region and deepen suspicions toward Washington. At the same time, it creates new ground for actors like Russia and China to strengthen their anti-U.S. rhetoric through Venezuela.
From an energy market perspective, while Venezuelan oil’s share of global supply is limited, such interventions can undermine market predictability. Beyond sanctions, the normalization of de facto seizures could increase the political risk premium in energy trade.
The Trump administration’s openly stated intention to seize Venezuelan oil tankers and use that oil for US interests signals a new and tougher phase in US-Venezuela relations. While these steps aim to weaken the Maduro government, they also raise serious questions about the limits of international law and the global legitimacy of the United States. The possibility of extending this pressure strategy, which began at sea, to land has the potential to escalate the crisis not only diplomatically but also militarily. The coming period will show how Washington manages this delicate balance between deterrence and legitimacy.
[i] Hagan, Rachel, “Trump Says US Will Keep or Sell Oil Seized from Venezuela.”, BBC News,
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c87lnn09yj8o, (Access Date: 28 Dec 2025).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
arts. 92, 99, 101, 105, 109, 110, United Nations,
www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, (Access Date: 28 Dec 2025).
