On September 9, 2025, former President of the Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik paid a visit to Russia and met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. It should be recalled that Dodik had previously stated he would try to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to support his intentions and plans to hold an independence referendum. This meeting, which took place shortly thereafter, along with Lavrov’s stance of “standing by Dodik,” indicates that the political crisis in the Balkans could evolve into a front of geopolitical confrontation.
The integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established under the 1995 Dayton Agreement through a power-sharing system and political compromise, has in recent years been tested by the separatist policies and rhetoric of Serb leader Dodik. By taking steps to block the central government’s legislative and budgetary decisions, Dodik has not only sought to restrict the functionality of the central authority but has also claimed that the central government does not represent the Serb people, thereby advancing measures for the Republika Srpska to implement its own laws and strengthen its internal governance.
On February 27, 2025, the lawmakers of the Republika Srpska passed legislation aimed at eliminating the authority of state institutions over the judiciary and law enforcement. Subsequently, the Republika Srpska initiated legislative efforts to establish its own border police and intelligence agency, as well as to draft a new constitution, measures that would effectively sever its ties with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s core state institutions.[i]
In contrast, the process that began on February 26, 2025, when the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina sentenced Dodik to one year in prison and imposed a six-year political ban for refusing to recognize the decisions of High Representative Christian Schmidt, continued on August 6, 2025, with the Election Commission’s decision to remove Dodik from office.[ii] Under Dodik’s leadership, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska rejected the Election Commission’s decision and resolved to hold a referendum scheduled for October 25, 2025.[iii]
The ongoing developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina are significant both for the country’s political structure and for the approaches of international actors. In this context, regarding whether the decision taken by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Dodik is lawful, and whether the referendum planned for October 25 violates the Dayton Agreement, it should first be noted that the establishment and legitimacy of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina have long been subjects of debate. Under Dodik’s leadership, the Republika Srpska deems the court illegitimate on the grounds that no such institution was envisioned in the Dayton Agreement and views it as an entity imposed by the West.
However, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in 2000 through a regulation issued by the Office of the High Representative and gained legitimacy by being approved by the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is recognized in the Dayton Agreement as the highest legislative authority. As the court responsible for implementing constitutional decisions created under the Dayton Agreement, its rulings are considered binding by both the international community and the Bosniak and Croat groups. Therefore, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the competent authority to issue a decision determining that Dodik’s remaining in public office would harm the legal order.
Moreover, the decision by the Republika Srpska under Dodik’s leadership to hold a referendum is an illegal measure that violates the Dayton Agreement. According to the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a single sovereign state, and any decision that could affect its sovereignty or territorial integrity through a referendum can only be made by the state’s competent authorities. Therefore, the decision taken by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska without the approval of the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not legally binding.
However, Dodik’s decision to hold a referendum is a move with potential political repercussions. First, through this initiative, Dodik aims to influence public opinion in the Republika Srpska and strengthen ethnic nationalist rhetoric. By creating a crisis environment ready to escalate if his demands are not met, he uses the referendum as a strategic bargaining tool. Second, he seeks to reinforce his political position by sending a message to groups in the Balkans that embrace separatist ideologies or demand autonomy, as well as to the states that support them. Third, by taking the referendum decision as an act of resistance against the West, Dodik aims to strengthen relations with Russia and, to some extent, China. In particular, he seeks to involve Russia more in the Balkans to send the West the message that “the Republika Srpska is not alone.”
Indeed, through the Lavrov-Dodik meeting, Dodik gained an opportunity to strengthen his domestic legitimacy while increasing his negotiating leverage with the West. During the meeting, Lavrov and Dodik criticized the EU and the US for what they described as interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s internal affairs and referred to Schmidt as a High Representative appointed through unlawful means. At the same time, Dodik presented Russia as a guarantor of the Dayton Agreement, and Lavrov indicated that they would act in coordination, noting that Russia would assume the Council presidency in October and would raise the issue of Bosnia on the agenda.[iv] These statements indicate that the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina is likely to gain greater prominence in the coming days and will form a part of the broader West-Russia confrontation. Cooperation with Dodik provides Russia with a platform to expand its influence in the Balkans and challenge the West.
In light of all these developments, the referendum decision effectively amounts to a refusal to recognize the Dayton Agreement and poses a threat to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the referendum results in Dodik’s favor, he would declare victory in domestic politics, while the legitimacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions would be called into question. At the same time, reactions from Bosniaks and Croats could intensify, leading to renewed ethnic polarization and potentially long-term damage to the state’s unity. Such a development could signal the end of the Dayton framework and trigger a new Balkan crisis through the possible division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this context, to preserve the existing system, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Office of the High Representative could annul the referendum. The annulment would serve as a reminder of the limits of Republika Srpska’s authority. While this option might be considered safer from the West’s perspective, Russia could portray it as “evidence of Western tutelage” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, using it to reinforce the Serbs’ mistrust of the West.
In conclusion, the option of holding a referendum in response to Dodik’s removal from office highlights the fragile nature of the Dayton system. Dodik’s potential backing from Russia through the referendum signals that Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its ethnically and politically sensitive structure, could become a potential arena for geopolitical confrontation. This situation could encourage interference from major powers against groups advocating separatist ideologies, sending a message of defiance against the system and potentially triggering new crises in the Balkans, a region still marked by the bloody ethnic conflicts of the post Cold War era, the effects of which continue to be felt today.
[i] “Adnan Ćerimagić, A Dangerous Standoff: The Battle for Bosnia’s Institutions”, RUSI, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/dangerous-standoff-battle-bosnias-institutions, (Access Date: 11.09.2025).
[ii] “Lejla Biogradlija, Bosna Hersek Merkez Seçim Komisyonu, Bosnalı Sırp lider Dodik’i görevden aldı”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/bosna-hersek-merkez-secim-komisyonu-bosnali-sirp-lider-dodiki-gorevden-aldi/3651852, (Access Date: 11.09.2025).
[iii] “Dodik cumhurbaşkanı olarak kalacak, referandum 25 Ekim’de yapılacak”, Kosova Haber, https://kosovahaber.com/haber/dodik-cumhurbaskani-olarak-kalacak-referandum-25-ekimde-yapilacak-92751, (Access Date: 11.09.2025).
[iv] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, same place.
