It is expected that Chinese President Xi Jinping will also attend the 18th BRICS Summit, which will be hosted by New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026.[i] This will be Xi’s first visit to India after a seven-year interval. This highly anticipated visit may contribute to accelerating the recent softening observed in diplomatic relations between the two Asian giants. The first signs of this softening actually emerged in 2025, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Leaders’ Summit in China and met with President Xi Jinping. To recall the changes that occurred in the geopolitics of that period; particularly the tariff crisis with the United States (US) and the increasing atmosphere of mistrust pushed India toward a more compatible relationship with China again. Indeed, Modi’s visit to China in 2025 also took place after approximately seven years.[ii]
When examining the geopolitical balances between India, Russia, and China between 2018 and 2022, the following points can be mentioned: Immediately before Russia’s attacks in Ukraine began in 2022, a series of intensive diplomatic contacts had been established between Russia, China, and India, particularly based on resolving border issues and developing cooperation in Eurasia. Before 2022, Putin was acting with the desire to establish an important partnership-alliance in Eurasia by attempting to mediate between India and China. Significant progress had been achieved in this regard. However, Putin’s move in Ukraine led to certain changes in both India’s and China’s approaches toward Russia.
As a result of Russia remaining in the background, border disputes between India and China were reignited, and tensions continued to increase. From this point onward, the nature of relations between India, China, and Russia began to change, and the focus of discussions became the issue of ending the war in Ukraine. These geopolitical balances remained unchanged for a long period of time. One of the significant breaking points in this trilateral balance occurred in 2025 with Donald Trump assuming the presidency in the United States. Following Trump’s return to office, the New Delhi administration, like many other countries, began to face difficulties in managing its relations with Washington. Thus, after 2025, India’s search for alignment with Russia and China in Eurasia accelerated.
After establishing this background, it should be emphasized that India has been seeking to develop its cooperation with Russia and China within the framework of both the SCO and BRICS over the past two years. For example, at the end of August 2026, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met in Beijing with Chinese Vice President Han Zheng and Foreign Minister Wang Yi; meanwhile, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar held meetings in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin and First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov.[iii] India’s search for “normalization” in its relations with China and its elevation of relations with Russia to the level of a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership”[iv] are undoubtedly closely related to geopolitical developments in West Asia and Central Asia.
The Mecca Defense Agreement between Türkiye–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan has caused India to fall one step further behind in West Asian geopolitics. When the uncertainties caused by the Strait of Hormuz and the war in Iran are added to this, India’s ongoing geopolitical partnerships with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Armenia, and Israel have also remained extremely weakened/in the background. A similar geopolitical setback for New Delhi is also occurring in terms of the Caspian and Central Asian regions. On the one hand, Central Asian countries are taking important steps toward establishing connections between Azerbaijan and China within the framework of the Middle Corridor; on the other hand, Pakistan’s acceleration of efforts to advance the Trans-Afghan Railway Project together with Uzbekistan can be listed as negative developments from the perspective of India’s regional interests. In addition, the continuation of the war in Iran remains one of the most important factors limiting India’s access to West and Central Asia. Therefore, India, which is experiencing geopolitical pressure/encirclement from all of its western and northern peripheries, is noticeably attempting to reintegrate with China and Russia in a renewed and stronger manner as a way out.
In summary, the increase in China’s economic, technological, and military capacity in the east; Russia’s being pushed into a different geopolitical position due to the war in Ukraine in the north; Pakistan’s institutionalization of its relations with Türkiye and Saudi Arabia in the west; and the instability centered around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz further west threatening India’s access channels are narrowing New Delhi’s room for maneuver. Therefore, it is insufficient to view the recent normalization trend in India’s relations with Russia and China merely as a consequence of problems experienced with Washington. The most important point here is that India is attempting to reorganize its strategic environment within the changing Eurasian geopolitics. For New Delhi, Russia is not only a balancing actor against China but also an important diplomatic gateway opening toward Central Asia and Eurasia. Although China continues to remain one of India’s long-term strategic rivals, it is not an actor that can be completely excluded due to regional economic and geopolitical realities.
India’s ultimate objective is to strengthen its relations with Russia and China once again in order to increase its own strategic options and preserve its room for maneuver in global power competition without becoming excessively dependent on the US-centered alliance system. Ultimately, the regional integration and solidarity observed recently in West Asia, the South Caucasus, the Caspian region, and Central Asia represent an explicit challenge to the US-centered alliance system and point toward a restructuring process within a multipolar system. India also appears likely to chart its own course within this geopolitical realignment process. This approach is highly consistent with India’s historical positioning as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1955. India is seeking to utilize the multi-centered distribution of power in Eurasia in order to reinforce its own strategic autonomy. Therefore, India’s rapprochement with Russia and China can also be interpreted as an effort to preserve its bargaining power within the multipolar system.
[i] “Xi’s India visit could give fresh momentum to India-China business ties as diplomacy improves”, First Post, hthttps://www.firstpost.com/business/xi-india-visit-india-china-business-ties-14044647.html, (Date of Access: 10.09.2026).
[ii] “Avrasya’da İşbirliği Bağlamında Hindistan’ın Batı’dan Uzaklaşması Mümkün mü?”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/anka-analizler/avrasyada-isbirligi-baglaminda-hindistanin-batidan-uzaklasmasi-mumkun-mu/, (Date of Access: 10.09.2026).
[iii] “New Delhi in the context of India-China thaw, Russia, US, Canada”, Asia Times, https://asiatimes.com/2026/08/new-delhi-in-the-context-of-india-china-thaw-russia-us-canada/, (Date of Access: 10.09.2026).
[iv] “Hindistan-Rusya İlişkilerinde “Ayrıcalıklı Stratejik Ortaklık” Dönemi”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/anka-analizler/hindistan-rusya-iliskilerinde-ayricalikli-stratejik-ortaklik-donemi/, (Date of Access: 10.09.2026).
