Central Asia has been at the focus of geopolitical and economic transformations since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The regional countries consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have sought to diversify their relations with external actors to ensure economic stability from the onset of their independence in 1991. While Russia’s traditional hegemony has gradually eroded throughout this process, China has emerged as a rapidly rising economic power. The fact that China became Central Asia’s largest trading partner in 2025 represents the pinnacle of this transformation. In 2025, the China-Central Asia trade volume reached 106.3 billion dollars, which shows a 12% increase compared to the previous year. China’s exports were recorded at 71.2 billion dollars while its imports stood at 35.1 billion dollars. These figures demonstrate China’s export superiority in machinery, electronics, and high-tech products. Furthermore, it is understood that China primarily imports chemicals, steel, and agricultural products from Central Asia.[i]
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 left Central Asian countries facing an economic vacuum. While the region remained under the dominance of Russia, trade volumes stayed limited throughout the 1990s and Russia’s economic influence was predominant. For example, while the China-Central Asia trade volume was at the level of 464 million dollars in 1992, Russia’s trade in the region was much higher. During this period, China focused on border security and internal threats, keeping economic expansion as a secondary priority. However, China’s expansion into Central Asia accelerated in the late 1990s along with its development strategy. This strategy triggered China’s orientation toward the region in order to meet its energy needs and diversify its trade routes.[ii]
The 2000s represent a period when China’s economic rise gained momentum. The trade volume reached 1.5 billion dollars in 2001 and climbed to 45.9 billion dollars by 2012. This increase is parallel to China securing access to hydrocarbon resources such as oil from Kazakhstan and natural gas from Turkmenistan. For example, China provided 900 million dollars in loans to Central Asian countries in 2004 and made investments worth 10 billion dollars in Kazakhstan in 2009 and 2012. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in 2001 and institutionalized China’s entry into the region. Although the SCO was initially focused on security, it encouraged economic cooperation.[iii]
China’s rise is evident when compared to Russia. While Russia’s trade volume with Central Asia was around 6 to 7 billion dollars in the 1990s, China’s remained below 500 million dollars. However, Russia’s economic decline following the 2008 global financial crisis, which included a 7.8% contraction in GDP, accelerated China’s growth. The launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 increased China’s infrastructure investments, leading to the construction of numerous railways, highways, and pipelines. While the BRI ensured China’s energy security, it also integrated Central Asia into global trade. By 2016, the China-Central Asia trade volume reached 30 billion dollars and surpassed Russia. The sanctions Russia faced after its annexation of Crimea in 2014 facilitated China’s access to the region, and China took over Russia’s commitments, such as the construction of hydroelectric power plants in Kyrgyzstan.[iv]
Historically, China’s approach has been built upon the “win-win” principle. China’s investments have revitalized regional economies, providing industrial growth in Kazakhstan and agricultural modernization in Uzbekistan.[v]
China becoming Central Asia’s largest trading partner in 2025 is a direct result of the Belt and Road Initiative. The trade volume increased by 12% to reach 106.3 billion dollars. While China’s exports are concentrated in machinery and electronic products, its imports are resource based. This situation shows that China has integrated the region into its supply chains. Kazakhstan stands out as China’s largest partner. In 2022, China’s investments reached 40 billion dollars. Regionalization with China has accelerated in Uzbekistan since 2017, and trade has increased through the SCO and bilateral agreements.[vi]
China’s superiority becomes evident when a comparison is made with Russia. Between 2022 and 2024, China-Central Asia trade surpassed Russia’s trade with the region; while China’s exports grew, Russia’s declined. Russia has lost its monopoly on energy transit, as the China-Central Asia gas pipeline (2009) and the Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline have eroded Russian influence. Infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have linked the region to China. According to the World Bank, the BRI has the potential to increase the national income of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan by 32% and the national income of Kazakhstan by 21%.[vii][viii]
The 2025–2026 period has been declared the “Years of China-Central Asia High-Quality Cooperation.” Additionally, the trade volume is aimed to reach 70 billion dollars by 2030. New sectors such as digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence, green energy, and pharmaceutical chemistry will expand. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could trigger national economic growth by integrating the region into global trade, yet geographical inequalities might increase. Competition with Russia may evolve into cooperation. Furthermore, geopolitical tensions such as the US-China rivalry and the decline of Russia have the potential to impact the region. Central Asian countries may choose to balance these risks through multilateral policies.[ix]
In this perspective, it is necessary to define the concept of “Pluripolarity,” which will become more dominant in 2026. In International Relations literature, pluripolarity is treated as an extension of the traditional concept of multipolarity. While multipolarity refers to a system where the distribution of power is spread across multiple equal poles, pluripolarity carries this structure to a more complex and pluralistic dimension. Pluripolarity emphasizes a system where centers of power possess unequal spheres of influence and where asymmetric relations prevail.[x]
Current developments are accelerating the transition from a state of multipolarity to a state of pluripolarity, creating uncertainties in the process. As an ongoing conflict as of January 2026, the Russia-Ukraine War continues to impact global energy markets and the security architecture. The prolongation of the war increases the complexity of the multipolar order, leading actors to redefine their strategic positions.[xi] Similarly, the foreign policy maneuvers of US President Donald Trump highlight the uncertain aspects of the state of pluripolarity. While these developments demonstrate the competitive nature of power centers within a pluripolar framework, they are also reshaping alliances.[xii]
China assumes a stabilizing role in this transition process, realizing the positive potential of the state of pluripolarity. While the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) integrate the region into global trade through infrastructure investments in Central Asia, it also builds bridges between unequal centers of power within the pluripolar structure. The “Years of China-Central Asia High-Quality Cooperation” declared starting from 2026 will strengthen the pluralistic aspect by encouraging innovative projects in fields such as the digital economy and green energy. In this context, China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI) aims to democratize decision-making processes in a pluripolar world and ensures the fair distribution of global public goods by supporting United Nations (UN) reforms.[xiii]
The diplomatic resolution of the Russia-Ukraine War could strengthen the energy security dimension of the pluripolar order by accelerating energy transitions. By integrating with China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects, new trade corridors may emerge across Eurasia. Consequently, pluripolarity marks a new paradigm in International Relations. China-Central Asia cooperation, as a successful example of this paradigm, will bolster global stability and development.
[i] “China becomes Central Asia’s biggest trading partner in 2025”, CGTN, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2026-01-18/China-becomes-Central-Asia-s-biggest-trading-partner-in-2025-1K225Lsovpm/p.html, (Access Date: 18.01.2026).
[ii] “Trade between China and 5 C.Asian countries increases by over 100 times in 30 years”, Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246237.shtml, (Access Date: 18.01.2026).
[iii] Karakaya, M. (2025). CHINA’S GROWING PRESENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA: WILL RUSSIA’S DOMINANCE COME TO AN END? Florya Chronicles of Political Economy, 11(1), 1-18.
[iv] “Central Asia’s economic evolution from Russia to China”, The Times of Central Asia, https://timesca.com/central-asia-s-economic-evolution-from-russia-to-china/, (Access Date: 18.01.2026).
[v] “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia: Ambitions, Risks and Realities”, OSCE, https://www.osce-academy.net/upload/file/BRI_08_07.pdf, (Access Date: 18.01.2026).
[vi] Karabayeva, A. (2025). China-Central Asia Regionalization and Its Impact on the Central Asian Region and Beyond. Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(1), 30-53.
[vii] “Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia”, ITUC, https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/belt_and_road_initiative_in_central_asia.pdf, (Access Date: 18.01.2026).
[viii] “Russia-China Relations in Central Asia: Why Is There a Surprising Absence of Rivalry?”, The Asan Forum, https://theasanforum.org/russia-china-relations-in-central-asia-why-is-there-a-surprising-absence-of-rivalry/, (Access Date: 18.01.2026).
[ix] “China-Central Asia in 2026: From Resource Access to Structured Interdependence”, China Global South Project, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/2026-outlook-china-central-asia/, (Access Date: 18.01.2026).
[x] Peters, M. A. (2023). The emerging multipolar world order: A preliminary analysis. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 55(14), 1653–1663. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2022.2151896
[xi] “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 17, 2026”, ISW, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/, (Access Date: 18.01.2026).
[xii] “From Greenland to Iran: Trump’s threats stretch far and wide since his Venezuela strike”, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/05/world/greenland-cuba-iran-trump-warning-intl, (Access Date: 18.01.2026).
[xiii] “Column: Global South is reshaping world order and 2026 will mark turning point”, Xinhua, https://english.news.cn/20260105/5582c76b55a542c6892c1b0f036da834/c.html, (Access Date: 18.01.2026).
