The parameters of competition in global politics are no longer confined solely to domains of land and maritime dominance; with the effects of climate change, the emergence of new transportation routes, and the diversification of energy resources, the polar regions have become new focal points of struggle among major powers. Especially in the post–Cold War era, the Arctic (the official name used in international literature for the North Pole), once referred to as a “zone of peace and cooperation”, has now transformed into a strategic front in terms of both energy geopolitics and military-political fortification. Similarly, the Antarctica (the official name used in international literature for the South Pole) has increasingly become an area reflecting power balances despite the constraints imposed by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). In this context, the polar regions have moved to the center of the international agenda not only from the perspectives of environmental protection and scientific cooperation but also as strategic arenas that reveal the fragilities of the global order and the multidimensional nature of competition.
Within this new equation, the role played by Russia is one of the fundamental factors shaping the future of the polar regions. Moscow aims both to circumvent Western sanctions and to consolidate its “Pivot to the East” strategy through the development of trans-Arctic logistics projects, the integration of the Northern Sea Route, and efforts to diversify energy routes in the Arctic. In the Antarctic, Russia has been expanding its presence through new bases, runways, and station modernizations, turning scientific capacity into an instrument of geopolitical influence. The decline of the United States’ operational effectiveness in the field due to capacity shortfalls and program interruptions creates a wider maneuvering space for Moscow in polar politics. Therefore, any analysis of the polar regions would remain incomplete without placing Russia’s multilayered strategic orientations at its core.
1. Arctic Strategy: Geopolitical Rivalry, Logistical Deadlocks and Trans-Arctic Transformation
Statements by Vladislav Maslennikov, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, at the Eastern Economic Forum point to the global implications of the growing geopolitical rivalry in the Arctic. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-centered increase in military presence, alongside the West’s sanction and military fortification policies aimed at constraining Moscow, has not only undermined Russia’s interests but also damaged scientific projects, environmental protection initiatives, and economic linkages. The long-standing perception of the Arctic as a “zone of cooperation” has thus been replaced by its transformation into a new strategic front.[i]
Moscow’s logistical deadlock, as emphasized by Aleksey Chekunkov, the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic, arises from the inability of railway and overland transport infrastructure to handle the nearly 400 million tons of capacity at its ports. This “bottleneck” limits Russia’s energy and raw material exports and weakens its outreach to Asia-Pacific markets. Consequently, the integration of the Northern Sea Route, Far Eastern ports, and the Eastern Polygon corridor stands out as a long-term logistical backbone that will link Russia’s European part, the Ural Mountains, and Siberia to the Pacific Ocean. In this way, Moscow seeks to strengthen the infrastructural foundations of its “Pivot to the East” strategy in response to Western sanctions.[ii]
The “Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor” project, envisioned as a commercial route stretching from Saint Petersburg to Vladivostok and from Murmansk–Arkhangelsk to the Northern Sea Route, reflects Moscow’s global vision. This route aims not only to create shorter and safer trade paths but also to transform Vladivostok’s economic and cultural profile. The fact that investments have grown above the national average since 2015 demonstrates the region’s dynamism. However, for infrastructure to remain sustainable, public-private partnerships, long-term financing, and the coordination role of VEB.RF are of critical importance.[iii]
The new measures announced on 4 September 2025 point to a multidimensional transformation in Russia’s maritime strategy. Projects by the Far East Development Corporation and the Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transport aim to establish multimodal logistics centers and ensure transparent, efficient port management through digitalization. Plans for floating nuclear power plants proposed north of Khabarovsk are intended to enhance energy security. Conversely, cargo losses and sanctions in the Baltic Sea and Arctic basins are creating chokepoints in Moscow’s trade routes. The introduction of Rosatom’s “single maritime operator” model stands out as an effort to make tariffs more transparent and increase the predictability of northern shipments. Meanwhile, the search for alternative markets in response to Norway’s fisheries sanctions has become part of Russia’s flexibility strategy.[iv]
2. Rising Russian Presence in the Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty System
The future of the South Pole will be shaped not only by environmental protection and scientific cooperation, but also by how the intensifying geopolitical and economic interests are managed. In this regard, the ATS constitutes the defining framework: signed in 1959 and now encompassing 54 state parties, it has allocated the continent for peaceful and scientific purposes, prohibited military activities, suspended territorial claims, and generated stability for more than six decades by freezing sovereignty disputes. The 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection prioritized environmental preservation over economic gain by prohibiting the exploitation of mineral resources until at least 2048. The geographical proximity and historical territorial claims of Argentina and Chile in particular have placed Latin America at the core of the United States’ Antarctic policies, while the implementation and monitoring of ATS norms on the ground have further enhanced these actors’ diplomatic weight. [v]
Within this framework, Russia’s consolidation of its presence on the continent through new bases, airstrips, and modernization investments forms the backbone of Moscow’s strategy of accumulating legitimate influence in the South Pole via scientific capacity and logistical accessibility. Research stations, to the extent permitted by the ATS, function as tools for sustaining states’ de facto presence in the field and for gradually reinforcing their (suspended) sovereignty positions. Dual-use infrastructure –telescopes, satellite receivers, radar, and communication systems– can enable surveillance and monitoring capabilities alongside scientific measurement and data collection, thereby keeping alive the broader debate over the internal erosion of norms. While Moscow’s station modernizations and plans for new facilities stand out within this context, the United States’ diminished field leadership –stemming from shortcomings in its icebreaker fleet, infrequent station inspections, and interruptions in scientific programs– has become evident. For the United States, preventing violations and ensuring the sustainability of the ATS/Madrid Protocol regime requires strengthening inspection mechanisms, expanding icebreaking capacity, and broadening multilateral collaborations. [vi]
Empirical realities indicate that countries with the highest levels of scientific production and logistical capability enjoy disproportionate influence within the ATS. Consequently, Russia’s reactivation of closed stations, construction of new runways, and infrastructure upgrades bolster not only scientific performance but also diplomatic weight. Conversely, the budget cuts projected for the National Science Foundation and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) –amounting to an estimated $60 million– alongside a weak icebreaker fleet and declining logistical capacity, are undermining Washington’s influence on the continent.[vii] This situation is particularly alarming for Australia: while work continues in critical areas such as the Denman Glacier, the possibility that the vacuum left by the US retrenchment could be filled by other actors, primarily Moscow, makes conservation initiatives on marine parks and krill fisheries even more contentious. Indeed, in some decision-making processes, Russia’s –at times together with Beijing– objections to regulations tightening conservation measures complicate the functioning of the environmental regime; Australia, therefore, seeks to maintain its logistical-scientific partnership with the United States while also taking steps to increase its own capacity.[viii]
On the resource dimension, as noted in various assessments including The National Interest, claims that Russia has discovered a major oil field around the South Pole suggest that competition over the continent’s future may intensify.[ix]Such claims shift the issue of accessing untapped energy reserves from a debate on science policy to a directly geopolitical dossier. In such a scenario, it is emphasized that the United States should, together with United Kingdom and Australia, launch more research missions, strengthen infrastructure, and establish advanced monitoring and inspection systems; for Moscow, meanwhile, modernizing its base network and consolidating its logistics chain –thereby enhancing its visibility in the field by expanding scientific capacity in line with the internal logic of the ATS– represents a parallel approach. Ultimately, although Antarctica has preserved its status as a realm devoted to peace and science for more than sixty years, it has entered a new phase in which scientific output and logistical access have become the primary indicators of geopolitical influence; in this phase, Russia’s strategic moves will closely shape the resilience of the continent’s normative architecture and its balance of power.
3. The Rising Role of the Polar Regions in Great Power Rivalry
Global power competition is no longer confined solely to traditional geopolitical arenas; alongside the conflict zones in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, or Europe, the polar regions have also emerged as new theaters of tension in international politics. Under Joe Biden, the United States’ foreign policy priorities were shaped around the Asia-Pacific, aiming to contain Russia in this region. However, with the advent of the Donald Trump administration, Washington’s strategic priorities partially shifted; while efforts were made to establish more balanced relations with Moscow, US engagement in the Asia-Pacific was relatively deprioritized, and attention turned toward the South Pole. This shift reveals that Washington has sought to counterbalance its rivals not only in the Pacific but also in the South Pole, demonstrating that global competition has acquired a new strategic front along the North Pole–South Pole axis.
In the coming period, especially Russia’s policies in the Arctic will transform the polar regions into a central arena of international political contestation. Moscow aims to become a permanent actor in global trade by expanding port capacities, advancing Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor projects, and sustaining its “Pivot to the East” strategy. Simultaneously, Russia is reinforcing its presence in the Antarctica through new bases, runways, and station modernizations, turning scientific capacity into a source of strategic influence. Meanwhile, the United States’ shortcomings in its icebreaker fleet, the downsizing of its scientific programs, and the weakening of its diplomatic weight have put Washington’s leadership at risk, while regional actors such as Australia and Latin American states are attempting to partially fill the emerging gaps. In the future, the trajectory of the polar regions will be determined not only by environmental protection and scientific cooperation, but also by how Russia manages its infrastructural initiatives and reconciles its interests with other major powers. Should consensus fail, the polar regions will become a new “arena of rivalry” that deepens the fragilities of the international order.
In conclusion, global power competition has expanded beyond traditional regions and placed the polar regions at the center of international politics. Russia’s efforts to strengthen logistical and energy networks in the Arctic, and to enhance its strategic visibility in the Antarctic through bases and scientific production, have made these areas integral components of Moscow’s global calculus. While the United States’ weakened logistical capacity and interruptions in scientific programs erode Washington’s influence on the continent, actors such as Australia and Latin American states are trying to offset these gaps to a limited extent. Under these conditions, the future of the polar regions will be shaped not only by environmental protection and scientific cooperation, but also by how Russia’s multilayered strategy resonates within the international system; otherwise, both the Arctic and the Antarctica risk ceasing to be realms devoted to peace and science, and instead becoming new fronts of great power rivalry.
[i] “MID Rossii: Popytki Sderzhivat RF v Arktike Negativno Vliyayut na Mirovuyu Ekonomiku”, TASS, https://tass.ru/politika/24956511, (Access Date: 04.09.2025).
[ii] “Moshchnosti Dalnevostochnykh Portov Dostigli Pochti 400 Mln Tonn”, Alta, https://www.alta.ru/logistics_news/121499/, (Access Date: 04.09.2025).
[iii] Erik Romanenko, “Shuvalov: Razvitiye Transarkticheskogo Koridora Preobrazit Ekonomiku Vladivostoka”, TASS, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/24958367, (Access Date: 04.09.2025).
[iv] “Razvitiye Sudokhodstva v Arktike i na Dalnem Vostoke, a Takzhe Tsifrovizatsiya Infrastruktury Dalnevostochnykh Portov: Obzor Pressy za 4 Sentyabrya 2025 Goda”, Korabel, https://www.korabel.ru/news/comments/razvitie_sudohodstva_v_arktike_i_na_dalnem_vostoke_a_takzhe_cifrovizaciya_infrastruktury_dalnevostochnyh_portov_obzor_pressy_za_4_sentyabrya_2025_goda.html, (Access Date: 04.09.2025).
[v] “Antarctic Treaty System”, SCAR, https://scar.org/policy/antarctic-treaty-system, (Access Date: 04.09.2025).
[vi] Alexander B. Gray, “An America First Policy for the Antarctic”, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/19/antarctica-south-pole-china-russia-resources-geopolitics-treaty-security, (Access Date: 04.09.2025).
[vii] Brendan Cole ve John Feng, “Map Shows Where China and Russia Are Expanding Bases in Antarctica”, Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-china-antarctica-map-2106796, (Access Date: 04.09.2025).
[viii] Shen Sheng, “Australian Media Raises Alarm Over US Antarctic Science Cuts Amid China-Russia Expansion; Expert Cautions Against ‘Unhealthy’ Anxiety Undermines Global Collaboration”, Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202508/1340559.shtml, (Access Date: 04.09.2025).
[ix] Brandon J. Weichert, “Did Russia Just Strike Oil in Antarctica?”, The National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/did-russia-just-strike-oil-antarctica-bw-090325, (Access Date: 04.09.2025).
