The Black Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, while having different geopolitical contexts, have become two critical maritime areas that are increasingly similar in terms of maritime security, energy supply, and the protection of commercial vessels by 2026. In the Black Sea, threats have expanded from warships to commercial vessels and from ports to energy infrastructure, with attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War; while in the Strait of Hormuz, the primary threat is the targeting of commercial vessels and the severe restriction of transportation security at one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.[i]
Recent developments in the Black Sea demonstrate that the conflict is not limited to military objectives, but that maritime transport and energy infrastructure have also become significant targets. In particular, Ukraine has recently intensified drone attacks targeting Russia’s energy and port infrastructure along the Black Sea coast, as well as ships it claims belong to Russia’s shadow fleet. One of the most significant examples of these attacks is the one targeting the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) Marine Terminal near Novorossiysk, which plays a critical role in transporting Kazakh oil to world markets via the Black Sea. Following a drone attack on the Nelsa tanker loading oil at the CPC Marine Terminal in July 2026, loading operations at the terminal were temporarily halted, causing significant disruptions to oil exports via CPC. According to Reuters, CPC oil shipments in July decreased by approximately 20% compared to previous levels.[ii] In addition, crude oil shipments were temporarily halted following a drone attack on the Sheskharis oil terminal, a separate facility in Novorossiysk, on August 14, 2026. With a capacity of approximately 700,000 barrels per day, the Sheskharis terminal is a vital hub for delivering Russian and Kazakh oil to world markets.[iii]
Drone attacks targeting terminals and ships are resulting in the deaths and injuries of crew members unrelated to the conflict, cancellations of voyages to ports with security risks, difficulties in recruiting personnel for ships in the fleets of companies that continue to operate, and increased insurance and operating costs. In this regard, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the war is increasingly spreading to the Black Sea and civilian vessels, and called for concrete measures to be taken to ensure navigational safety.[iv] The security vulnerabilities of Russian ports such as Novorossiysk have played a significant role in the decline of Russian and Kazakh oil shipments originating from Novorossiysk; in the first half of August, oil exports from western Russian ports were approximately 15% below planned levels.[v]
In the Strait of Hormuz, military operations against Iran and Iran’s retaliatory actions have resulted in tankers and other commercial vessels facing risks of attack, mines, missiles, drones/IDA attacks, and obstruction of passage. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has stated that attacks around the Strait of Hormuz pose a serious risk to seafarers and commercial vessels, noting that the necessary conditions for safe passage have disappeared. With normal maritime traffic projected to dramatically decrease by the summer of 2026 compared to pre-war levels, the threat now extends beyond attacks on ships, putting pressure on energy supplies and global supply chains.
When comparing the two regions in terms of similar characteristics, firstly, the increase in attacks and the threat of attacks in both regions raises the perception of risk regarding maritime transport, causing ships to avoid passage. Secondly, it can be said that commercial vessels are no longer indirect victims of conflict, but have become a fundamental element of the maritime security crisis. The targeting of Turkish-owned vessels in the Black Sea concretizes this situation for Turkey, while tanker attacks in the Strait of Hormuz affect commercial maritime transport on a global scale. Finally, unmanned systems have now changed the nature of the maritime security threat. In the Black Sea, Ukraine’s long-range UAV/IDA and missile capabilities allow it to threaten the warships, ports, and energy infrastructure of conventionally stronger Russia, while in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s UAV, USV, missile, fast attack boat, and mine capabilities can threaten maritime traffic despite the conventional naval superiority of the US.
When considering the differences between the attacks in the two regions, it can be said that the Strait of Hormuz has a more systemic impact than the Black Sea. This is because the capacity of alternative sea routes is limited in the Strait of Hormuz, and a serious disruption of the strait’s function directly impacts global energy markets due to the limited alternatives. Another difference is that the threat in the Black Sea is more of a distributed “Denial of the Seas”[vi] nature, while in the Strait of Hormuz, due to the influence of geography, it is a “chokepoint denial”. While an attack in the Black Sea affects specific ports, ships, or energy terminals, a security crisis in the Strait of Hormuz can simultaneously affect a much wider maritime trade network. Another difference is that UAV/drones attacks in the Black Sea threaten the safety of ships and crews, increasing the risk level of port visits and consequently insurance and operating costs, while in the Strait of Hormuz, the high risk perception created by the attack and threat of attack leads to a significant decrease in maritime traffic, resulting in broader-scale consequences for energy supply and global supply chains.
In conclusion, recent developments demonstrate that the concept of maritime security in the Black Sea has expanded from protecting warships to encompassing the protection of commercial vessels, energy terminals, and international maritime trade corridors. When the Black Sea and Hormuz attacks are considered together, it becomes clear that contemporary maritime security threats are not limited to “attacks on ships,” but rather create a chain reaction of impacts on port security, energy exports, insurance costs, voyage planning, and the security of alternative energy corridors.
[i] Choke point: In maritime terminology, narrow passages or straits of strategic importance where ship traffic is heavy.
[ii] “Drone attacks reduce July CPC oil loadings by a fifth, sources say”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/drone-attacks-reduce-july-cpc-oil-loadings-by-fifth-sources-say-2026-08-07/, (Date of Access: 20.08.2026).
[iii] “Russia’s Black Sea’s Sheskharis terminal halts loadings after drone attack, sources say”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-black-seas-sheskharis-terminal-halts-loadings-after-drone-attack-sources-2026-08-14/, (Date of Access: 20.08.2026).
[iv] No: 151, 4 August 2026, Regarding Attacks on Turkish-Owned Civilian Vessels in the Black Sea”, Republic of Türkiye MFA, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-151_-karadeniz-de-turk-sahipli-sivil-gemilere-yonelik-saldirilar-hk.en.mfa, (Date of Access: 20.08.2026).
[v] “Oil exports from Russia’s western ports drop 15% below plan, traders say”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-exports-russias-western-ports-drop-15-below-plan-traders-say-2026-08-19, (Date of Access: 20.08.2026).
[vi] Sea Denial: When a weaker navy uses weapons that create asymmetry, such as mines and anti-submarine weapons, to prevent a much stronger navy from freely using a certain area of the sea.
