The Democratic Republic of the Congo has adopted a new decision immediately suspending the export of copper and cobalt concentrates. The interministerial regulation dated June 29, 2026, supersedes previously recognized exceptions and makes exemptions subject to strategic conditions.[i] The primary objective of the decision is to reduce the export of minerals in a minimally processed state and to increase the Congo’s economic share of its mineral wealth.
The phrase “raw cobalt” in the headline summarizes this approach. The regulation does not completely ban the export of all types of cobalt products. The focus is on concentrates. The export of processed products with higher commercial value to foreign markets will continue. This distinction is important. Rather than cutting off the global supply, the Kinshasa government is encouraging companies to conduct more processing within the country.
This new step can be seen as the second phase of the market intervention that began in February 2025. At that time, cobalt exports had been temporarily suspended due to high stockpiles and falling prices. In October, the country transitioned to a quota system to regulate export volumes. A total quota of 96,600 metric tons has been set for 2026, of which 9,600 metric tons has been allocated for projects of national importance.[ii]
The Congo’s ability to implement such a policy stems from its extraordinary dominance in production. In 2024, the country accounted for an estimated 75 percent of global cobalt production and held approximately 55 percent of global reserves.[iii] This mineral, which is critical for electric vehicle batteries, aerospace alloys, defense technologies, and portable electronics, provides Kinshasa with a powerful tool that could influence the global market.
However, there is a clear difference between mining the ore and generating significant revenue along the value chain. The conversion of cobalt into chemical products, the production of cathode materials, and the manufacturing of battery cells involve more advanced technology and yield higher profits. A significant portion of global cobalt refining takes place in China. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, meanwhile, aims to combine its dominance in mineral production with its processing capacity to transform its bargaining power into industrial strength.
Restricting concentrate exports could create strong demand for local smelting and refining investments. New facilities could increase employment outside the mining sector, help local suppliers grow, and expand the tax base. As the product undergoes more processing stages within the country, sectors such as engineering, maintenance, laboratories, logistics, and vocational training may also develop. In this way, revenue from natural resources can be distributed more broadly from the balance sheets of a few large companies to the economic life of cities.
Electricity supply will be a key factor in achieving this goal. Without an uninterrupted power supply, it is difficult to operate facilities that run at high temperatures efficiently. Transportation routes, water management, chemical inputs, technical personnel, and adequate financing also directly affect production costs. If the government supports its export restrictions with investments in hydroelectric power, grid upgrades, and industrial zones, this decision could help establish sustainable production capacity.
Predictability is also important for companies. When the strategic conditions under which exemptions are granted are not tied to clear criteria, investment decisions may slow down. Some large companies, such as Kamoa-Kakula, have in the past exported a portion of their production in concentrate form under special permits. Striking a balance between the transition timeline, existing contracts, and facility construction timelines will support both the government’s objectives and the continuity of production.
Changing the export model will also require companies to restructure their production plans. For a company that sells concentrates, partnering with a local facility, signing a long-term processing contract, or leasing capacity are new options. These models can help share the capital burden and, by drawing on the experience of existing companies, accelerate the local implementation of the ban by translating it into concrete investment decisions.
Quotas and export controls have given the Congo significant influence over prices. However, maintaining high prices for an extended period could drive producers toward battery chemistries that use less cobalt and toward recycling. The growth of lithium iron phosphate batteries reinforces this possibility. It is crucial that Kinshasa’s approach not be limited to seeking short-term revenue by restricting supply, but rather evolve into a long-term industrial program that offers processed products at competitive costs.
Chinese companies play a significant role in the Congo’s mineral production, infrastructure, and the delivery of cobalt to the global market. The new policy could enhance the quality of this partnership rather than weaken it. The participation of existing companies in investments in refineries, precursor cathode materials, energy, and vocational training could open up new areas of profit for both sides. China’s production expertise and the Congo’s resource strength could converge around the goal of local processing.
The human security dimension of resource sovereignty is evident in the situation of small-scale and artisanal miners. In areas where hundreds of thousands of people earn their livelihoods, the risks of informality, workplace accidents, child labor, and smuggling persist. If the ban on concentrates is supported by traceable procurement channels, it could make it easier for producers to participate in the formal economy. Without safe working conditions, a steady income, and environmental oversight, the rising value of exports will not fully translate into societal well-being.
The initiative by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to establish joint special economic zones for the battery and electric vehicle value chain provides an important foundation in this regard. The two countries’ copper and cobalt resources can be integrated with regional-scale processing and the production of battery precursor materials. Common standards, the streamlining of border crossings, and the integration of local businesses into the supply chain could enable Africa to transition from being a raw material exporter to an industrial partner.
At this point, it can be said that the focus of logistics will also shift. The Lobito Corridor, regional railways, and road connections will become increasingly important for the safe and rapid transport of processed goods to ports. Routes opening up to the Atlantic will diversify export options while facilitating market access for facilities to be established within the country. Corridor investments, along with mining sites, will provide settlements with electricity, transportation, and digital connectivity, thereby strengthening the impact on development.
From Türkiye’s perspective, this development is creating a new area of economic partnership. Turkish companies can contribute in the fields of mineral processing equipment, energy facilities, automation, laboratory services, railway technology, and vocational training. Rather than being based on a narrow form of trade centered on mineral imports, advancing the relationship through joint production, technology transfer, and local employment could lend Ankara’s Africa policy a more sustainable character.
The success of the decision cannot be measured solely by the tonnage that remains within the country’s borders. More meaningful indicators include the increase in the share of refined products, the number of facilities established, the quality of local workers, the transparent use of public revenues, and improved services in mining regions. It is also important for regulatory agencies to apply regulations equally across companies. Open bidding, traceable exports, and regular data sharing can align resource sovereignty with reliable state capacity.
Finally, the Congo’s decision not to export raw cobalt represents a new phase, shifting from quantity control to managing the quality of production. The country’s significant share of global production provides a strong foundation for this transformation. When electricity, infrastructure, human resources, and predictable regulations are developed in tandem, the ban on concentrate exports could foster the growth of the domestic industry. Cobalt could thus evolve from a raw material exported abroad into a production asset that finances development.
[i] “Congo bans copper and cobalt concentrates exports, official order says”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-bans-exports-copper-cobalt-concentrates-official-order-says-2026-08-06/, (Date of Access: 08.08.2026).
[ii] “DRC ARECOMS Decision No. 004/2025 – Cobalt Quota System”, International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/policies/29138-drc-arecoms-decision-no-0042025-cobalt-quota-system, (Date of Access: 08.08.2026).
[iii] “U.S. Geological Survey, Congo (Kinshasa)”, National Minerals Information Center, https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/congo-kinshasa, (Date of Access: 08.08.2026).
