In the state election held in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in September 2026, Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in first place with 38.3 percent of the vote, according to exit polls.[i] France is also facing a similar political shift ahead of the 2027 presidential election. Indeed, while National Rally (RN) remains a major force in French politics, Italy’s new Futuro Nazionale has also established itself among the country’s leading political parties in public opinion polls. From Germany’s AfD and France’s RN to Spain’s Vox and Italy’s Futuro Nazionale, far-right parties have expanded their voter bases and increased their influence over national political agendas. Yet this rise is neither homogeneous nor are these parties united around a single foreign policy program. What they increasingly have in common, however, is that they are challenging the assumptions underlying Europe’s approach to Russia and the war in Ukraine since 2022.
Since 2022, the European Union (EU) has developed various mechanisms to support Ukraine and strengthen European security. As of July 2026, the EU had adopted its 21st package of sanctions against Russia. The Union and its member states have mobilized a total of €224.5 billion in financial, economic, military, and humanitarian support for Ukraine.[ii] The evolution of the war into hybrid warfare and the rise of the far right are testing the sustainability of this approach, as they could deepen political fragmentation within Europe. In this context, far-right and ultranationalist parties may play a decisive role in determining whether Europe fundamentally changes its Russia policy or loses its capacity to maintain a common approach toward Moscow.
Far-right parties in Europe are becoming important electoral actors capable of influencing mainstream political parties and, in some cases, directly participating in governments. Their political agendas emphasize national sovereignty, strict immigration policies, opposition to deeper European integration, and a stronger stance against what they characterize as the economic and political costs of Europe’s commitments. These positions also intersect with debates over Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, defense spending, and Europe’s relations with the United States (US).
The rise of the far right in Europe is often interpreted through the lens of its relations with Moscow, based on the assumption that the emergence of pro-Russian parties seeking to advance Russia’s interests represents the primary danger. Yet European far-right parties do not constitute a single geopolitical bloc. Their positions toward Russia, Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the US, and the EU differ significantly. Some advocate closer ties with Russia or a reduction in support for Ukraine, while others have adopted a more critical stance toward the Kremlin. The AfD has maintained a considerably more conciliatory approach toward Russia and has opposed key elements of Germany’s policy of supporting Ukraine. By contrast, National Rally has sought in recent years to distance itself from Marine Le Pen’s and other party figures’ past relations and ties with Vladimir Putin.[iii] In September 2026, Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella publicly condemned Russia’s actions and warned of the threat posed by Russian hybrid activities in Europe. Nevertheless, RN has continued to argue that France’s assistance to Ukraine should be reduced, with senior party officials citing financial constraints.[iv]
The rise of the far right does not necessarily mean that European governments will suddenly reverse their Russia policies. Political parties can change considerably when they move from opposition into government. In the process, they face coalition partners, institutional constraints, economic interests, military commitments, and international alliances. Giorgia Meloni’s experience in Italy provides a concrete example of this tension. Her party came to government from a nationalist and traditionally skeptical political environment, but her government subsequently became a strong supporter of Ukraine while maintaining close relations with NATO.
The significance of the rise of the far right extends beyond the question of whether individual parties support Russia. The deeper consequence may be a transformation of the political environment in which Europe’s Russia policy is formulated. Far-right parties can place national sovereignty, immigration, economic pressures, and opposition to established European elites at the center of electoral competition. In doing so, they may compel mainstream political forces to respond to a changing electorate. A far-right party does not necessarily need to control the foreign ministry in order to influence foreign policy. Raising the political cost of a particular policy sufficiently may itself be enough to exert influence.
Thus, the more important development is not that Europe will turn into a pro-Russian bloc through a single political move. The central issue is whether the far right can further fragment the strategic consensus that Europe has sought to develop toward Russia. The EU’s institutional structure makes this issue even more significant. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy relies heavily on the principle of unanimity. For example, sanctions are adopted unanimously by the Council of the EU, effectively giving each member state veto power over the continuation of restrictive measures. More broadly, foreign and security policy remains one of the areas in which unanimity is still the fundamental rule. Therefore, weakening Europe’s Russia policy does not require a large-scale political transformation. The policy can also be eroded through obstruction, delay, or demands for national exemptions.
This situation raises the possibility of what could be described as strategic fragmentation. A fragmented Russia policy does not mean that one group of European states becomes openly pro-Russian while others remain firmly anti-Russian. One government may question military assistance to Ukraine because of fiscal pressures. Another may oppose new sanctions because of their economic consequences. A third may prioritize bilateral relations with Washington over deeper European defense cooperation. A fourth may advocate restoring commercial relations with Russia after the hostilities subside. None of these positions is necessarily explained by sympathy toward Moscow. Yet together, they can make the pursuit of common and sustainable action more difficult.
From Russia’s perspective, the rise of the far right in Europe matters not because of ideological loyalty but because it creates strategic opportunities. Moscow may not need nationalist parties across Europe to adopt a common pro-Russian position. A more significant opportunity for Russia could be the emergence of a Europe in which governments differ over the costs of confronting Russia and the EU’s role in security policy. This could give the Kremlin greater room for maneuver to engage with European states individually and to present cooperation with Moscow as an alternative to policies that nationalist parties portray as costly or undesirable. A united Europe can impose costs on an adversary even when its member states disagree over tactics. A fragmented Europe, however, must reach internal agreement before it can respond to an external challenge. In geopolitical competition, the capacity to act collectively can therefore be as important as the policies states formally adopt.
In conclusion, the rise of the far right in Europe does not necessarily entail a single, fundamental rupture in the Russia policy pursued since 2022. Europe may formally maintain its Russia policy while gradually losing the political cohesion required to sustain it. From Moscow’s perspective, this could create new opportunities even without the emergence of explicitly pro-Russian governments. Greater prioritization of national interests and growing uncertainty surrounding Europe’s long-term commitments could provide Russia with greater room for maneuver. For Europe, therefore, the strategic risk lies less in a dramatic shift toward Moscow than in the gradual weakening of its capacity to translate shared security concerns into a sustainable collective policy.
[i] “AfD leads as Merz rues ‘disaster’ in worst state election results in postwar Germany”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/merz-under-pressure-two-more-german-states-go-polls-2026-09-20/, (Date Accessed: 25.09.2026).
[ii] “EU solidarity with Ukraine”, European Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-solidarity-ukraine/, (Date Accessed: 25.09.2026).
[iii] “France’s National Rally criticizes Russia in rare rebuke”, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/france-national-rally-russia-rebuke/, (Date Accessed: 25.09.2026).
[iv] “France’s Le Pen rules out more money for Ukraine”, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/france-marine-le-pen-ukraine-military-aid-financial-support/, (Date Accessed: 25.09.2026).
