Developments in the conflict in Iran in 2026 indicate that low-cost, high-volume unmanned systems have become a decisive factor in the ability to exert asymmetric pressure. Iranian-made kamikaze drones are the most concrete example of this transformation. Their impact extends beyond the tactical level; they are bringing about a structural transformation in air defense architectures and cost balances.
This situation constitutes the most current example of the asymmetric warfare doctrine defined in the literature as a cost-imposition strategy. One side forcing the other to incur high-cost defense expenditures through low-cost systems necessitates a reevaluation of classical deterrence theory. This approach aims to gradually deplete the adversary’s economic and logistical capabilities over time rather than directly targeting military success.
The unit cost of these drones is approximately $20,000.[i] The United States (U.S.) does not yet have a fully cost-competitive alternative to counter this threat. While cheaper anti-drone systems are available, their cost still far exceeds that of low-cost drones. Systems with theoretical advantages, such as lasers, are not yet ready for widespread field use. For this reason, the U.S. occasionally employs high-cost missiles like the Patriot or THAAD against immediate threats on the battlefield. The resulting picture points to a clear cost asymmetry, where defense costs are increasing exponentially compared to attack costs. Iran aims to overwhelm defense systems by launching these vehicles in swarms to create target saturation. This strategy demonstrates that the war must also be interpreted as an economic attrition process.
The current transformation evokes the contrast between the United States’ aircraft carrier-centric sea-air approach and the Soviet Union’s missile-based area denial doctrine during the Cold War; however, it points to a deeper and more structural shift. Indeed, while the cost ratio during that period was approximately 10 to 1, today this ratio can reach as high as 200 to 1 in certain engagement scenarios. This shift in scale necessitates a fundamental reassessment of defense planning. The assumption that individual, high-cost platforms can sustain a sustainable advantage against numerous low-cost threats is no longer valid.
Estimates based on open-source data indicate that Iran’s stockpile is in the tens of thousands. The number currently in use is in the range of a few thousand. More importantly, Iran’s monthly production capacity has increased tenfold compared to pre-war levels. With these figures, Iran has the capacity to sustain the conflict for several more months based on its current stockpile and production rate. Moreover, Iran is developing and producing these systems with its own capabilities and continuously improving them based on combat experience. The more strategically critical point, however, is this: Iran has become not only a military threat but also a technology exporter. This situation strengthens Iran’s transformation in the defense industry and its strategic autonomy.
Since 2022, Ukraine has gained the world’s most extensive field experience in countering kamikaze drones. It has developed electronic warfare systems and software-based radar networks. Ukraine’s “Pokrova” system disrupts GPS signals to prevent drones from reaching their targets, effectively reducing the cost per shot to nearly zero. This expertise has transformed Ukraine not only into a combatant but also into a technology developer. Following the suspension of U.S. aid, Zelensky signed a trilateral strategic partnership agreement with Gulf countries (the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) in March 2026.[ii] This initiative by Ukraine builds upon another existing framework in the Gulf. According to information available in open sources, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are sharing early warning data with Israel to counter Iranian drone and missile attacks, coordinating air defense protocols, and providing a direct intelligence feed.[iii] This framework is a concrete outcome of the security dimension of the Abraham Accords. The model introduced by Ukraine, however, offers an innovation that goes beyond this existing structure: Unlike traditional intelligence sharing, Ukraine is directly transforming its wartime experience into a tangible product, thereby enabling Gulf countries to establish their own defense ecosystems. This process demonstrates that Ukraine has evolved from being merely a security consumer to becoming a security producer capable of exporting the experience it has gained on the battlefield.
In the traditional model, technology transfer typically took the form of licensed production or direct sales by Western defense companies to Gulf countries. In the Ukrainian model, however, there is a direct transfer of experience that has been tested and optimized under real combat conditions in the field. This transfer involves not only the sale of hardware but also the transfer of concepts, doctrine, and operational experience. This agreement frees Gulf countries from their dependence on the West’s expensive and limited defense systems against drone threats. The electronic warfare and software-based solutions developed by Ukraine enable the Gulf to establish a more flexible, cheaper, and more rapidly adaptable defense layer against drone swarms that could come from Iran and the Houthis.
This transformation goes beyond a mere technology transfer; it is transforming the defense paradigm itself. The fundamental strategic finding revealed by the current conflict is that conventional and high-cost air defense systems face sustainability issues when confronted with the asymmetric drone threat. Technologies with low per-shot costs (electronic warfare, laser systems, and drone-hunting unmanned aerial vehicles) play a central role in addressing this issue. In the new strategic equation, the advantage is shifting from actors producing the most advanced systems to those developing the most sustainable solutions. In this context, the determinant of military superiority in the coming period will not be possessing the most advanced platforms, but the capacity to utilize these platforms within a sustainable cost structure.
[i] “Iran’s Shahed-136 drones expose cost asymmetry in U.S. air defense”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-shahed-136-drones-expose-cost-asymmetry-us-air-defense-2026-03-03/, (Access Date: 21.04.2026).
[ii] “Ukraine and the countries of the Middle East are building mutually beneficial partnerships: Results of the President’s visits to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Jordan”, President of Ukraine Official Website, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-ta-krayini-blizkogo-shodu-buduyut-vzayemovigidni-pa-103601, (Access Date: 21.04.2026).
[iii] “3 GCC states say they intercepted missiles and drones”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/3-gcc-states-say-they-intercepted-missiles-and-drones/3881144, (Access Date: 21.04.2026).
