Burkina Faso’s decision to bring back the death penalty, which it had lifted in 2018, as of December 4, 2025,[i] although it may seem like a simple legal measure, essentially reflects the state’s survival concerns in its legislation. While this move is, as expected, framed as a setback for human rights in the West, it reveals a much more significant shift when viewed within the context of the Sahel region’s current security structure and political situation.
The Ouagadougou administration, through this legal regulation, is not only re-establishing a method of execution but also is seeking to redefine state authority by solidifying its exceptional status to the extent that it becomes permanent in the face of existential threats. Modern day nation states, when their very existence hangs in the balance during times of crisis, reflexively transform the law from a liberal “set of freedoms” into a “shield” that prioritizes survival. We can say by this step taken by Burkina Faso that this is, in every sense, a contemporary manifestation of this historical state of mind.
Over the past decade, Burkina Faso, surrounded by structures affiliated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS, faces the threat of losing its political relevance, beyond mere geographical encirclement. The emergence of a power vacuum along the northern and eastern borders has resulted in a fractured security map, effectively trapping the central administration in Ouagadougou and its hinterland. In the current situation, it is clear that the preventive nature of traditional criminal law instruments has significantly been eroded. Prison sentences that are spread over long periods get to be treated as a temporary rest period that can be avoided through exchanges, escapes, or raids by terrorist leaders and actors who have infiltrated state mechanisms. By introducing the death penalty, the Traoré administration aims to destroy this perception of permissiveness and reestablish the principle of definitiveness, particularly in cases of high treason, espionage, and terrorism. Thus, the message sent to those concerned is that the asymmetric warfare taking place will result in a final and irreversible outcome in the courtroom.
From the perspective of political science and sovereignty theory, a political authority’s ability to determine which crime to punish and at what cost is linked to its power to rule as an exception, as well as its monopoly on the use of force itself. Burkina Faso’s abolition of the death penalty in 2018 was, in a sense, a result of the ruling power at the time wanting to be in step with the Western world, an effort to say that “they are here too” for the EU standards. However, the past seven years in the staggering arena of the Sahel have painfully revealed the reality that these West inspired approaches could not be solution to the main problem.
As the wind of terror raised by jihadist groups intensifies and as the state’s sphere of influence is shrinking, day by day, it becomes clear that the universal rules written from Brussels or Paris are fundamentally at odds with the harsh local realities of Africa. The gap between ideals on paper and the reality on the ground has grown way too wide to ignore. Today, Traoré’s signature symbolizes a state’s mental and legal break from the West centered normative framework, moving away from any intention to tolerate this gap. Burkina Faso has chosen to leave behind the era of waiting for approval from Brussels or Paris, and has opted to develop a local security doctrine suited to the challenging sociology of its own geography.
The fact that the legislation focuses particularly on espionage and treason crimes reveals the essence of the issue. It is understood that the target is not limited to militants fighting in the field, but rather encompasses a much more extensive structure that poses a threat to states’ survival. The presence of pro-foreign elements within the bureaucratic, military, and political hierarchy of the state that could cause internal collapse is one of the most vital threats facing the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
The military regimes of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, which share a common destiny, have long been closely monitoring the reality that foreign powers could create “internal rifts” within the regime through their intelligence networks. Under this delicate equation, the death penalty is kept as a constant threat hanging over the heads of potential collaborators. The aim is to leave no gray area between loyalty and foreign engagement and to absolutely maintain unity. This degree of legal harshness is a product of efforts to consolidate state authority in a single hand. On the other hand, this move can be interpreted as an attempt to establish a discipline mechanism that produces definitive results, albeit based on fear within the bureaucracy and the army.
The public reaction to the decision, however, is unfolding on a completely different level than the debates in Western capitals. For the masses whose homes have been burned down for years, who have been displaced, and who face the destructive face of terrorism every day, the death penalty is not even near being considered a sign of barbarism. Instead, in the eyes of these people suffering deep pain, this decision seems to be interpreted as a “long overdue” form of justice finally being served. The population, deprived of security, expects more than just an abstract concept of freedom from the state, like concrete protection and power. Giving imprisoned terrorists access to state resources causes serious outrage among these people. At this point, execution could even be seen as the ultimate satisfaction of this anger and the institutionalized channeling of the desire for revenge. Ibrahim Traoré, using his practical intelligence born of his military background, is using this social state of mind as a tool to reinforce his regime’s legitimacy. A leader backed by popular support sees international reactions as a manageable burden. The decision in question is not just a tool of pressure imposed from above, but also a political move that responds to society’s desire for justice and revenge.
Yet, on the contrary, past experiences suggests that such harsh measures can have dangerous consequences. The death penalty can become a useful tool for terrorist organizations to portray themselves as victims. Unfortunately, the state’s hardening stance can create favorable ground for radical narratives. Individuals executed through “martyrdom rhetoric” can be made into symbols and used in new militant recruitment processes. While this may increase “dissuasion” in the short term, it can also fuel the spiral of radicalization in the long term. In such periods of stagnation, where the judicial mechanism has not yet been institutionalized and the separation of powers has become blurred, the most painful aspect of the issue is the possibility that an irreversible punishment could become a weapon in political settlements.
Criminalizing the opposition through vague concepts defined by the ruling power, such as treason, can create a culture of silence that is ingrained in society. People do not obey the state because they trust it; rather, they submit because they fear what might happen to them, which gradually undermines its legitimacy. The invisible contract between the state and its citizens gives way for a relationship of necessity shaped under the shadow of sheer power. Faced with a choice between Western funding and the reflex of sovereignty, the state has unhesitatingly chosen sovereignty.
The ongoing process is part of the new regional geopolitical architecture taking shape in the Sahel. Under the framework of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), established by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, liberal democracy, multiparty political competition, and a human rights-oriented approach to law are considered luxuries that do not contribute to security. This bloc is advancing along a line that argues that democratization “prescriptions” in the Western sense produce instability in this turbulent belt of Africa, transforming the “security first” perspective into a normative paradigm. Burkina Faso’s death penalty decision is one of the most striking practices of this line. The Traoré administration is reconfiguring the state as a “war machine” while turning the law into the sharpest instrument of this machine. Within this model, individual rights and freedoms are coded as variables that can be suspended and restricted in the name of guaranteeing collective security.
In conclusion, the return of the death penalty in Burkina Faso is far from being interpreted as the shallow result of impulsive anger or a primitive sense of revenge. The decision reflects the will of a divided nation-state, to mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, to maintain its existence, as reflected in the legal sphere. In this context, the law has ceased to be the impartial distributor of an abstract ideal of justice and has become a concrete weapon of the state. Whether this weapon will hit its target, backfire, or strengthen the fight against terrorism is difficult to predict at this stage. However, what is clear is that Ouagadougou has made a clear declaration of intent to strengthen its internal authority at the expense of its international prestige.
History is full of periods when the rule of law has been tested during the establishment, dissolution, and reconstruction of states. Burkina Faso has chosen to draw that sword at perhaps the most critical crossroads in its history. The repercussions of this move will be felt beyond the country’s borders, creating regional turbulence. The decision has the potential to profoundly shape the political future of the Sahel, the course of regional alliances, and how the concept of sovereignty is interpreted across Africa.
[i] “Au Burkina Faso, la junte va rétablir la peine de mort”, Le Monde, December 4, 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/12/04/au-burkina-faso-la-junte-va-retablir-la-peine-de-mort_6656031_3210.html, (Access Date: 05.12.2025).
