The latest decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on Venezuela appears to have resulted from a serious assessment of the progress of internal investigations in the country. The Prosecutor’s Office in The Hague has decided to close the technical cooperation office operating in Caracas since 2024; however, it has announced that the Venezuela I and Venezuela II processes will continue in full.[i] This decision is a remarkable milestone for both the ICC’s resource management and the adequacy of Venezuela’s national investigations.
This move by the ICC, which has been one of the fundamental institutional structures of international criminal justice for 25 years, is more than just an operational change. It has also reignited discussions about human rights violations in Venezuela. In this context, both the international legal nature of the decision and the political reactions of Venezuela, as well as the regional dynamics, should be carefully examined.
Assistant Attorney General Mame Mandiaye Niang’s remarks at the 24th Assembly of States Parties clearly laid out the fundamental basis for the decision. The executive bodies of the ICC consider the principle of complementarity as one of the most sensitive parameters of international criminal justice. This principle essentially represents the understanding that states should primarily investigate serious crimes within their own jurisdictions. Therefore, the ICC comes into play only in cases where the national authorities do not fulfill this obligation.
Niang’s statement that “achieving real progress remains a challenge” indicates that Venezuelan authorities have failed to deliver significant overall progress in the investigative processes.[ii] The limited number of national investigations has created a negative picture in the ICC’s complementarity assessment. Because of this, the efficiency of maintaining a physical office in Caracas was questioned, and its closure was deemed appropriate for more effective management of limited resources.
This decision does not mean that the Venezuelan state has completely rejected technical cooperation; instead, it shows that the institutional coordination has not reached the expected level. At this point, it appears that Venezuela is struggling to conduct a comprehensive judicial process in accordance with international standards.
The harsh assessments by the President of the National Assembly of Venezuela, Jorge Rodríguez, of the ICC clearly show how political tension in the country is reflected in judicial processes. Rodríguez’s statements that “The court is useless and Venezuela should withdraw” have transformed the decision to close the Caracas office from a purely technical arrangement into a political debate.[iii]
The claim that the ICC has not said enough about “extrajudicial killings,” a topic particularly debated in the Caribbean since the fall of 2025, has caused unease within the government. This situation shows that Venezuela has been conducting its relations with international institutions in an increasingly cautious framework in recent years. Therefore, the closure of the Caracas office has been interpreted by the government as an element that can contribute to reducing external pressures on national sovereignty. However, this approach has a more limited acceptance in international law.
The Venezuela I investigation constitutes a vital reference point for human rights violations that have been a subject of debate in Latin America since the late 2010s. The application, submitted to the Court in 2018 by Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru, requested an investigation into alleged serious crimes committed during protests starting in 2014. The events of 2017, in particular, which resulted in the deaths of 127 people, were one of the key turning points in the process that resonated with the international community.[iv]
The fact that the then-Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda used the phrase “reasonable grounds” in 2020 increased the seriousness of the Venezuela I case.[v] Karim Khan’s 2021 decision to open a formal investigation further deepened the international dimension of this process. Although the Venezuelan government has denied the charges, the Court has shown a strong will to continue the investigation.
Developments such as the Appeals Chamber’s 2023 approval to continue the investigation and Khan’s withdrawal from the file in 2025 due to a potential conflict of interest have shown that the process is progressing dynamically. All these elements have confirmed that Venezuela I is situated within a long-term framework, not only politically but also legally.
The Venezuela II case presents a context that the ICC has rarely encountered before. The case was initiated by the Venezuelan government itself in 2020, requesting an assessment of whether US sanctions constitute international crimes. In this respect, the case differs from applications from non-state actors.
However, the ICC has not yet submitted any final assessment on this issue. Whether economic sanctions fall within the scope of crimes under the Rome Statute is a highly contested area in international law. Therefore, the Court’s cautious approach is considered normal. The fact that the case is still in the preliminary investigation phase indicates that the Prosecutor’s Office is continuing to gather extensive information.
The closure of the Caracas office has not created any legal changes regarding this case; the final assessment will still be conducted from The Hague. However, it should not be overlooked that political motivations also play a role in Venezuela’s approach to the case.
The closure of the office does not mean a retreat in the ICC’s relations with Venezuela. On the contrary, the Court has clearly announced that it will continue the investigation. From the region’s perspective, this decision has strengthened internal political discussions but has not weakened the mechanisms of international law.
The security-politics balance that human rights institutions have been facing in Latin America for many years has been brought back to the agenda with this decision. In particular, opposition groups in Venezuela have interpreted the ICC’s continuation of the Venezuela I case as a kind of legal guarantee. In contrast, the government front has tended to strengthen the discourse of national sovereignty.
The tension arising from these two approaches could become a decisive factor in the policies that international observers will adopt towards Venezuela in the coming period.
The decision to close the ICC’s Caracas office was taken for both operational and legal reasons, but it has remained at the center of human rights discussions in Venezuela. The fact that the investigations will continue demonstrates the importance the Court attaches to these cases. Venezuela’s political responses have added a different dimension to this process. Overall, ICC-Venezuela relations have entered a new phase, and the principle of complementarity has remained central to the process.
[i] Ruiz, Luis Alejandro. “ICC To Close Caracas Office, Venezuela I Investigation to Continue”, Guacamaya, guacamayave.com/en/UCM-to-close-Karakas-office-venezuela-i-investigation-to-continue/, (Access Date: 07.12.2025).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Ibid.
