On 8 December 2025 in London, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met and drafted a revised version of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Ukraine peace plan, demonstrating their determination not to accept Trump’s current proposal.[i] This is because European countries continue to support Ukraine both on the ground and at the rhetorical level, not only to stop the conflict as soon as possible but also to prevent similar attacks in the future and to establish a lasting security order.
Europe views a ceasefire model in which Russia’s battlefield gains are imposed at the negotiating table as a threat to both Ukraine’s sovereignty and European security and therefore rejects this approach. At this very point, Europe’s cautious stance toward a ceasefire and its continued support for Ukraine create a favorable environment for Putin to reshape his narrative in line with his own interests.
Indeed, the statement Putin made on 2 December 2025, before his meeting on Trump’s peace plan with the U.S. Special Envoy to Moscow Steve Witkoff and U.S. President Donald Trump’s adviser Jared Kushner, can be seen as a reflection of this narrative. Statements such as “Europeans have no peace agenda… They are on the side of war… If Europe wants to fight us, we are ready…”,[ii] carry meaning beyond a simple comment made in the context of peace negotiations. Continuing this narrative, during his visit to India on 4-5 December 2025, Putin stated that “we want to end the war that the West started through Ukraine,” reinforcing the systematically constructed narrative he seeks to promote.
So what is this narrative? Through the claim that “Europe does not want peace and is blocking peace talks, while Russia wants to end the war,” this narrative aims to frame Russia as the main actor seeking peace and Europe as the party preventing it. In this way, Europe’s financial and military commitments to Ukraine are portrayed as “actions that sabotage peace,” creating a suitable ground for Russia’s search for international legitimacy.
Secondly, this discourse , which implies that Europe has turned into a “dangerous actor”, signals a shift in Russia’s threat hierarchy toward the West. Traditionally, in Russia’s security narrative, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were seen as the “primary threat,” while the European Union (EU) was considered a “secondary threat” operating largely in the shadow of the U.S. However, in Putin’s recent statements, Europe is framed as the party “seeking war,” while the United States is portrayed as a “peace-supporting and negotiable actor,” suggesting that the focus of the “primary threat” narrative has shifted toward the EU. This shift is closely linked to the approach of the United States under Trump’s leadership. Unlike the Biden era, the Trump administration has questioned NATO, accused Europe of relying on the U.S. for its security, sought to reduce support for Ukraine, refocus on the Asia-Pacific, and engage in negotiations with Russia over peace.
Europe is no longer the same Europe it was before the war. Russia is now facing a Europe that has strengthened its eastern flank, especially Ukraine and Eastern Europe, developed strong initiatives in the field of defense, set out defense projections toward 2030, and become more security-oriented through deeper integration with NATO. This securitized Europe poses a direct challenge to Russia’s geopolitical interests, and for this reason, Europe’s role and meaning in Russia’s strategic thinking are being redefined.
Thirdly, in this narrative construction, Russia presents Europe as the actor directing and sustaining the war, while Ukraine is removed as a political subject and pushed into the position of a passive object in a proxy war. This can be seen as a strategy aimed at domestic audiences in Russia, Europe, and the United States. As Ukraine is increasingly blurred, Russia sends the message that it is not fighting Ukraine but confronting major powers. This framing turns the war into a larger and more legitimate existential struggle, making it easier to portray Russia not as a revisionist actor but as a defensive one. In this way, it creates a powerful image that helps legitimize the war policy in the eyes of both the public and political elites.
When Putin’s targeting of the EU as “responsible for the war” is combined with Trump’s “America First” approach and rejection of transatlantic burden-sharing, it strengthens the feeling within U.S. public opinion that “Europe’s problems are not our concern.” This situation, which is likely to deepen tensions in transatlantic relations, aligns with a policy deliberately pursued by Putin. Russia believes that, in order to regain great-power status both in its immediate neighborhood and in the global order, Europe must be separated from the United States in line with Russia’s traditional strategic interests. In response to Putin’s move, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that there is no distrust between the United States and European countries.[iii] He emphasized that Americans and Europeans should work together on the issue of Ukraine, sending a message that he does not want to give room for a possible tension between the U.S. and Europe. Although the European side seeks to prevent Russia from gaining a strategic advantage through the transatlantic link, the statements in the Europe section of the U.S. National Security Strategy under Trump’s leadership suggest that Trump has provided Putin with a noticeable room for maneuver.
Putin’s statements aim to increase debates within European public opinion by sending the message that “your leaders are unnecessarily escalating the war,” thereby questioning whether supporting Ukraine is pragmatic. His threatening remark that “we are ready if they want to fight” appears to serve less as a direct war threat and more as a form of “psychological operation” intended to deepen divisions within Europe. By portraying Russia as an actor ready for peace but forced to respond to Europe, the goal is to encourage public debate over the costs of the war for Europe. This is because triggering internal European divisions, where military, economic, and political support for Ukraine is increasingly questioned, weakens support for Kyiv, makes unified pressure on Russia more difficult, and ultimately strengthens Russia’s position both at the negotiating table and on the battlefield.
European societies have, in fact, directly felt the economic and social costs of the Russia–Ukraine War for nearly four years, from rising defense spending and inflation to energy prices and migration pressures. Considering the economic slowdown, inflation, and polarization experienced in European countries (especially Germany, France, and Italy) there is a social environment in Europe where public resistance to the continued support for Ukraine can emerge. Therefore, Putin’s statement that “if Europe wants to fight, we are ready” targets precisely this sensitivity: the declining public patience and the weakening ability of governments to convince their societies why this war should continue. Indeed, Italy’s delay in approving a decree that would facilitate military aid to Ukraine for political and economic reasons,[iv] can be seen as an indication that Europe’s strategic vulnerabilities are finding resonance in Putin’s rhetorical strategy.
Although the current context appears to support Putin’s rhetorical strategy, this policy also has certain limitations. The most important constraint is that EU decision-making processes operate on a collective basis. Since a single country taking a different position is not enough to weaken the entire Union, existing coordination can balance Russia’s narrative management. Similarly, while some opportunities may arise for Putin during the Trump era, the United States’ traditional policy remains centered on maintaining the transatlantic bond.
Although European countries are facing economic and political challenges, they continue to maintain their strategic support for Ukraine. For example, despite the energy crisis, Germany continues to provide military and financial assistance to Ukraine. France remains determined to support Ukraine despite domestic political pressure and economic difficulties. Poland has increased its support for Ukraine in terms of border security and military assistance, regardless of the economic costs. In addition, European countries’ efforts to justify military and financial support for Ukraine as a way to secure their own security against the Russian threat, together with Ukraine’s resistance on the battlefield, may make it difficult for the narrative that “Europe is responsible for the war” to gain acceptance among European publics.
In conclusion, Russia’s attempt to redefine Europe as a threatening and “anti-peace” actor in response to Europe’s stance toward Trump’s peace plan and its continued support for Ukraine shows that the war is no longer limited to the battlefield. Instead, it has become a multidimensional struggle shaped by diplomatic initiatives, strategic maneuvers, and coalition-building, where discourse and perception management will also play an important role in determining the balance of power on the ground.
[i] Peter Beaumont, “Zelenskyy meets European leaders in London for talks on ending Ukraine war”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/08/ukraine-peace-deal-trump-zelenskyy-not-ready, (Accessed: 08.12.2025).
[ii] Sasha Vakulina, “If Europe wants to start a war we are ready now, Russia’s Putin says”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2025/12/02/if-europe-wants-to-start-a-war-we-are-ready-now-russias-putin-says, Accessed: 05.12.2025).
[iii] Oliver Holmes, “‘No mistrust’ between Europe and US over Ukraine, Macron says”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/05/no-mistrust-between-europe-and-us-over-ukraine-macron-says, (Accessed: 08.12.2025).
[iv] Angelo Amante, “Italy to postpone decree on military aid to Ukraine, sources say”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/italy-set-extend-permission-military-supplies-ukraine-document-shows-2025-12-02/, (Accessed: 05.12.2025).
