On September 14–15, 2026, Mori Eisuke, Speaker of Japan’s House of Representatives, visited the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, to convey his country’s support for Ukraine. In an address to the Ukrainian parliament, he described Russia’s invasion as “an act of barbarism” that undermines the international order.[i] Mori also emphasized Japan’s support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. During these talks, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy invited Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to Kyiv.[ii] The discussions also covered support for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, defense cooperation, and the country’s reconstruction. Mori’s trip to Kyiv marked the first visit to Ukraine by a Japanese parliamentary speaker since 2011.
In March 2023, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited Kyiv. Shortly afterward, at Kishida’s invitation, Zelenskyy attended the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Hiroshima. One of the key messages conveyed in Hiroshima was that unilateral changes to the status quo through the use of force were unacceptable. Three years have passed since these high-level contacts, and the geopolitical environments of both Japan and Ukraine have changed considerably during that time. Examining the geopolitical shifts in Europe and the Asia-Pacific over this three-year period will therefore make it easier to assess future developments.
Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Europe and the broader Western world began working on policies to counter it. These efforts coalesced around Japan, which held the G7 presidency in 2023. Under Fumio Kishida, Japan expanded its defense and security cooperation with the West and pursued a highly proactive foreign policy, emerging as a prominent geopolitical actor in the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, and Europe.
A decisive factor in Japan’s policy toward Ukraine has been the transformation of Tokyo’s security strategy in recent years. By adopting a new National Security Strategy in December 2022, Tokyo began responding more comprehensively to changes in its security environment. In this context, Japan revised its traditional security approach, which had focused solely on threats in its immediate neighborhood, and established a broader strategic framework extending as far as Europe. Like Ukraine, Japan is a neighbor of Russia, and tensions between Tokyo and Moscow over the disputed Kuril Islands/Northern Territories have recently been rising. The war in Ukraine has influenced the development of Japan’s security strategies.
Tokyo’s primary concern is that Russia’s actions against Ukraine could set a lasting precedent for the international system. For this reason, officials at Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sometimes frame the Ukraine issue through the strategic perspective that “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow.”[iii] As of 2026, economic assistance and reconstruction have also become increasingly important dimensions of Japan’s approach to Ukraine. Alongside military support, Tokyo is playing an active role in energy infrastructure, demining, financial assistance, and reconstruction. According to the Japanese government, total aid to Ukraine has reached approximately $20 billion, and keeping the country’s energy infrastructure operational under wartime conditions has become a particular priority.[iv] During Mori’s visit to Kyiv, it was also announced that Japan would maintain its support for Ukraine and its sanctions against Russia.[v]
The invitation extended to Prime Minister Takaichi to visit Ukraine also has particular significance for the geopolitics of Europe and the Asia-Pacific. At the G7 Evian Summit in June 2026, Takaichi, who participated in the same session as Zelenskyy, stressed the need to support Ukraine and oppose changes to the status quo through the use of force. Announcements in July and August likewise reaffirmed that Japan would continue its support for Ukraine and its sanctions against Russia.[vi] From Ukraine’s perspective, Japan has become more than a provider of financial and humanitarian aid: its political support within the G7, economic capacity, and connection to the Asia-Pacific make it a strategically important partner. Mori’s visit to Kyiv and the invitation to Takaichi suggest that this mutual strategic rapprochement could become further institutionalized in the period ahead.
In Japan’s view, if actors such as Russia are allowed to violate the rules-based international order with impunity, “certain other actors” in the Asia-Pacific may be emboldened to take similar steps against Japan in the future. Tokyo’s reaffirmation of its support for Western actors in the war in Ukraine stems from the steadily growing security challenges in its immediate neighborhood. Expecting Western support against these risks over the long term, Japan is, in turn, providing greater support to Kyiv. The fundamental basis for Japan’s willingness to confront a nuclear power such as Russia directly is undoubtedly its bilateral security alliance with the United States. The US nuclear umbrella and military presence in the region provide Tokyo with a deterrent shield against potential conventional or military retaliation from Russia. Japan believes that US security and defense support will prevent Russia from attacking it. However, if Japan fails to give Ukraine its full support under current conditions, it may not receive the assistance it expects from the West should a crisis erupt in the Asia-Pacific in the near future. In other words, knowing that it may need the strategic support of its Western allies and NATO members in a possible future crisis in the East China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, Japan is building the basis for the legitimacy of that support through the assistance it provides to Ukraine today.
[i] “Will Takaichi visit Kyiv? Zelensky’s invite puts Japan PM in diplomatic bind”, SCMP, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3367750/will-takaichi-visit-kyiv-zelenskys-invite-puts-japan-pm-diplomatic-bind?module=top_story&pgtype=section, (Accessed: September 17, 2026).
[ii] “Zelenskyy asks Takaichi to visit Kyiv: lower house speaker”, Japan Today, https://japantoday.com/category/politics/update3-zelenskyy-asks-japan-pm-takaichi-to-visit-kyiv-lower-house-speaker, (Accessed: September 17, 2026).
[iii] “Japan-Ukraine Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, MOFA Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/seb/ua/pageite_000001_00008.html?utm, (Accessed: September 17, 2026).
[iv] “Japan so far pledged financial assistance of about $20B to Ukraine, says top diplomat”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/japan-so-far-pledged-financial-assistance-of-about-20b-to-ukraine-says-top-diplomat/3835025, (Accessed: September 17, 2026).
[v] “Zelenskyy invites Japan PM Takaichi to visit Kyiv”, Caliber, https://caliber.az/en/post/zelenskyy-invites-japan-pm-takaichi-to-visit-kyiv, (Accessed: September 17, 2026).
[vi] “G7 Evian Summit Session on ‘Building Peace and Security for Ukraine and Europe’ (Summary)”, Japan Kantei, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/105/diplomatic/202606/16evian1.html?utm, (Accessed: September 17, 2026).
