Türkiye’s full membership process in the European Union (EU) has continued to this day as a negotiation and harmonization effort spanning over half a century. The acceptance of candidate status at the 1999 Helsinki Summit and the launch of full membership negotiations in 2005 were seen as significant milestones in this process. However, the intervening years have shown that the process has been transformed into a matter of political debate within Europe rather than one of technical and legal harmonization. The “privileged partnership” concept developed during the Merkel and Sarkozy era has repeatedly been demonstrated to remain valid. Indeed, EU decision-makers have periodically stated that Türkiye, due to its population size, political structure, and cultural identity, cannot become a full member of the Union. Consequently, discussions regarding a privileged partnership have grown in Türkiye-EU relations by 2025.
The 1999 Helsinki Summit marked a critical turning point in Türkiye’s relations with the EU. Türkiye’s attainment of candidate status at this summit was seen as a critical moment for the commencement of harmonization efforts with the acquis. Full membership negotiations, which began in 2005, brought EU-Türiye relations to a new phase. However, the progress of this process was disrupted and shifted in a different direction due to the actions of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy.
The Privileged Partnership was first proposed in April 2000 by former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing[i]. The Privileged Partnership represents a more limited model of cooperation between the EU and Türkiye, proposed instead of full membership. This model envisions Türkiye establishing a close economic, commercial, and political relationship without becoming a full member of the EU. This model does not include the right to participate in decision-making processes within EU institutions or the other rights and obligations that come with full membership[ii].
This approach, advocated by Merkel and Sarkozy, aims to maintain Türkiye’s integration into the EU at a certain level and offers an alternative that rejects full membership on the grounds of cultural and political differences. In the early 2000s, Türkiye deemed this proposal insufficient and interpreted it as a shift from technical negotiations to political ones. Since 2018, Türkiye’s full membership negotiations have been completely suspended[iii]. Despite the suspension of the full membership process, Türkiye is considered an indispensable actor for the EU due to its importance in the migration crisis, energy transit lines, and regional security issues. Therefore, Brussels considers maintaining close cooperation with Ankara in functional areas a strategic imperative.
Demographic factors play a significant role in the EU’s reluctance to accept Türkiye as a full member. Firstly, considering Türkiyes population size, it is anticipated that it will hold the most seats in the European Parliament upon accession. This has always been considered a concern for the EU, as it could create a balance of power that exceeds the current weight of key EU actors such as Germany and France. Consequently, Türkiye’s demographic capacity has been positioned as a barrier to the accession process, as it could potentially disrupt the Union’s decision-making mechanisms. Furthermore, Türkiye’s political incompatibility with the EU is also seen as a significant obstacle to the accession process. Deficiencies in areas such as freedom of expression, judicial independence, and the rule of law, frequently emphasized in EU Commission reports, have been among the factors hindering the progress of the process. The Cyprus issue and Türkiye’s “Blue Homeland” objective in the Eastern Mediterranean are also considered geopolitical factors complicating Türkiye’s accession to the Union. The accession of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) to the Union has consistently hindered Türkiye’s accession negotiations. Discussions regarding the continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular, have consistently led to cautious and reserved EU-Türkiye relations.
Despite this, the EU continues its strategic cooperation without Türkiye becoming a full member. The Customs Union continues to be a mechanism that integrates Türkiye into the European economy. Türkiye is the only country that has tariff- and quota-free access to the European internal market without being a member of the Union. The EU, on the other hand, can utilize Türkiye’s large consumer market and production capacity without tariffs or quotas. The migration agreement signed in 2016, along with the Customs Union, has given Türkiye the function of a country controlling the flow of refugees for the EU. With agreements such as the readmission agreement, which ease the EU’s refugee burden, Türkiye is the EU’s most critical ally in managing the migration crisis. Finally, in terms of energy transit routes, Türkiyeis at the center of the strategic Zangezur Corridor, which stretches from the Middle East and the Caspian region to Europe. The EU clearly has an alliance with Türkiye on energy security. Therefore, Merkel and Sarkozy’s “privileged partnership” plan, while not officially mentioned in this context, remains valid in a different form.
Looking at the future of Türkiye-EU relations, the focus appears to be on deepening specific areas rather than pursuing full membership. Ankara’s role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 2016 Migration Agreement demonstrate that Türkiye plays a significant role in the security architecture of the European continent and that this role will grow in importance in the future. Therefore, Türkiye’s partnership with the West is expected to continue through military alliances and migration management. Despite disagreements on certain issues, Türkiye’s critical role in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus intersects with the EU’s strategic interests and necessitates continued cooperation in the region. Furthermore, it is clear that the Western Balkan countries and Ukraine are prioritized within the EU’s enlargement agenda. Therefore, the future of Türkiye-EU relations is likely to be shaped by an institutionalized privileged partnership model. This can be interpreted as a new form of alliance emerging from the convergence of both Brussels’ strategic calculations and Ankara’s geopolitical importance. This strategic partnership has made Türkiye an important and functional part of the Union, even without being an EU member state.
[i] Küçük, B. (2011). “Europe and the Other Turkey: Fantasies of Identity in the Enlargement Europe”. Eurosphere Working Paper Series, S. 34: 89-115
[ii] “European Union-Turkey: from an illusory membership to a ‘Privileged Partnership’”, Foundation for Strategic Research (Robert Schuman Foundation), European Issues No. 437, Pierre Mirel, June 2017, https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0437-european-union-turkey-from-an-illusory-membership-to-a-privileged-partnership, (Date Accession: 28.08.2025).
[iii] “Avrupa Parlamentosu: ‘Türkiye’nin AB üyelik süreci askıda, 2018’den bu yana ilerleme yok’”, Euronews, 7 Mayıs 2025, https://tr.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/07/avrupa-parlamentosu-turkiyenin-ab-uyelik-sureci-askida-2018den-bu-yana-ilerleme-yok, (Date Accesion: 21.08.2025).
