As of 2025, Hungary’s foreign policy has taken on a trajectory shaped by strategic ruptures and based on multi-axial geopolitical engagements, transcending the traditional normative and institutional adaptation behaviors expected of a European Union (EU) member state. The Budapest administration under the leadership of Viktor Orbán has not only systematically opposed Brussels-centered decision-making processes but has also become a synchronized and multi-dimensional actor within the context of the strategic triangle policy (Eastern Europe–Eurasia–Middle East) that the United States (US) seeks to reconstruct on a global scale. Through its strategic postures – blocking the EU’s enlargement and security policies via the Ukraine Crisis, systematically sabotaging sanctions against Russia, and challenging the international penal regime through defense collaborations developed with Israel – the Orbán Government has positioned itself not only as a “dissident actor” within the EU but also as a “functional peripheral partner” within the US-centered power architecture.
In the context of Eastern Europe, Hungary has demonstrated direct opposition to the Brussels-centered integration strategy in the debates concerning Ukraine’s EU accession process. At the EU Summit held on 21 March 2025, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán vetoed the joint statement regarding Ukraine, declaring that Hungary could not be part of a “pro-war position.” Citing the economic burden that the war imposed on Hungary, Orbán emphasized that each household bore approximately 2.5 million forints in costs and announced that no decision would be supported without first consulting the public.[1] This approach crystallized into a clearer political thesis on 19 April 2025. Orbán underlined that Ukraine was a state “without a functioning economy and sovereign borders”, asserting that its membership would provide a “blank check for endless war” for the EU, thus constituting a threat not only in terms of security but also in terms of economic sustainability. Within this framework, Hungary declared that it would initiate a voluntary-based referendum process between 14 April and the end of May, basing the decision-making process on public participation.[2] Although this policy was supported by rhetoric emphasizing domestic public legitimacy, it was essentially framed as “sovereigntist resistance” at the national level against the EU’s enlargement strategy.
In the Eurasian context, Hungary has consistently pursued a line that systematically sabotages the EU’s collective stance on sanctions against Russia. At the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers’ meeting held in Luxembourg on 14 April 2025, Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó openly rejected the proposed 17th package of sanctions, which included measures targeting Russia’s energy and nuclear industries. Opposing the demands presented via video link by Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, the Hungarian side also deemed continued military assistance to Kyiv unacceptable, arguing that Europe’s priority should be “a ceasefire and peace negotiations.”[3] This discourse aligns with Orbán’s earlier argument, made with reference to Trump’s “vision of peace”, advocating for dialogue with Moscow.[4] Since 2022, Hungary has either exercised its veto power or requested exemptions in 16 sanction packages, thereby slowing down the process. Concerning the fate of the 17th package, expected to come into force in July 2025, Brussels has begun discussing alternative pathways, such as using Council decisions instead of regulations, thus pushing the flexibilities of the EU’s legal system. Essentially, the process demonstrates that Hungary has evolved not merely into a “dissident actor” within the bloc but into a systematic veto center that blocks the decision–making mechanism.
On the Middle Eastern axis, Hungary’s strategic partnership developed with Israel should be interpreted not merely as a bilateral cooperation but also as an attempt to align itself with a diplomatic line parallel to the US–Israel axis. The visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Budapest on 3 April 2025, despite the arrest warrant issued against him by the International Criminal Court (ICC), constituted an open challenge to international law as it marked his first official engagement in Europe.[5] During the visit, Prime Minister Orbán, while welcoming Netanyahu, announced on the same day Hungary’s decision to withdraw from the ICC. The characterization of the ICC as a “politicized” institution by both leaders revealed not only a legal convergence but also an ideological rapprochement. In their meeting, partnerships in defense and technology, particularly in ammunition production, were deepened, and it was emphasized that more than 150 Israeli companies were operating in Hungary.[6]
During the visit, which continued between 3–6 April 2025, Netanyahu visited the Holocaust memorial, engaged with the Jewish community, and received an honorary doctorate from a university. During the visit, two French nationals were detained for tearing Israeli flags; in response to this incident, Orbán described the international pressure applied to Netanyahu as “disrespect to a guest.”[7] Netanyahu’s subsequent trip to the United States, where he met President Trump to discuss issues of trade, Iran, and the ICC, indicates that Hungary’s strategic axis in the Middle East has been synchronized with the Washington–Tel Aviv line.
Simultaneously with these developments in foreign policy, a democratic backsliding is also occurring within Hungary’s internal legal order. During the European Parliament (EP) delegation’s visit to Budapest in April 2025, it was emphasized that Hungary was “rapidly moving away from the principles of the rule of law”. During the visit, many state institutions refused to meet with EP members, and officials were reported to have behaved in a “harsh and disrespectful” manner. The main point of controversy was the 15th constitutional amendment adopted in the EP. This amendment brought into force regulations banning LGBTQ+ activities, allowing the use of facial recognition technology at protests, and permitting the revocation of citizenship for dual nationals on the grounds of security threats. The said constitutional amendment was condemned by 18 EU member states within the EPSCO Council framework as contrary to the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. In the same period, the announcement by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that sanctions against Prime Minister’s Advisor Antal Rogán – previously imposed by the Biden administration on grounds of corruption – had been lifted, was interpreted as a signal of support for the Orbán Government, granting it international legitimacy and easing Western pressure.[8]
From a realist perspective, Hungary’s veto against Ukraine’s EU membership and its move to bring this decision to an internal referendum represent not merely a populist maneuver but also an expression of institutional resistance conducted on the grounds of national sovereignty against the EU’s enlargement strategy. In this context, Brussels’ decision–making mechanisms concerning Ukraine’s accession process may need to be reconsidered due to blockages by “dissident actors” such as Hungary. This situation could lead to a revision of the unanimity principle in the EU’s full membership mechanism or the development of new integration models such as “gradual membership”. During this process, Hungary could consolidate its position through legitimacy arguments aimed at the domestic public, thereby increasing its bargaining power within the EU and using its proximity to Washington – particularly to a Trump-led United States – as a strategic bargaining tool.
In the Eurasian context, Hungary’s systematic sabotage of the EU’s sanctions against Russia and its prioritization of its own interests in the energy sector constitute a rational strategy aimed at creating a maneuvering space between Brussels and Moscow. The alternative formulas being developed by the EU to circumvent the unanimity requirement for sanctions (such as maintaining sanctions through Council decisions) may partially sideline Hungary; however, this would simultaneously strain the flexibility of EU internal law and could trigger a legitimacy crisis. In this scenario, Hungary would attempt to both sustain and legitimize its economic cooperation with Moscow by referencing Trump’s policy of renewed détente with Russia. Consequently, Budapest could pursue a dual balancing policy aimed at securing simultaneous concessions from both Brussels and Moscow while maintaining its role as a key actor within the EU’s decision–making mechanism.
On the Middle Eastern axis, Hungary’s strategic partnership with Israel and its decision to withdraw from the ICC constitute an open challenge to the norms of human rights and the rule of law within the EU. Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC following Netanyahu’s visit to Budapest represents not only symbolic support but also signals the construction of a new “authoritarian alliance” framework along the US–Israel–Hungary axis. In this context, Orbán aims to deepen cooperation with Israel’s military and technological power in the region to both enhance Central Europe’s defense industry capacity and assume a role within the US–led regional security architecture. This scenario allows Hungary to position itself as a “functional small power” in the geopolitical context and paves the way for it to leverage Washington’s trust gap with its European allies for greater bilateral gains.
When all these developments are considered together, it becomes clear that Hungary’s foreign policy trajectory as of 2025 is based not on normative values but on interest-driven rational choices. By excluding Ukraine and taking a confrontational stance against Brussels in Eastern Europe, by blocking the sanctions center to prioritize energy security in Eurasia, and by establishing strategic proximity to the United States via Israel in the Middle East, the Budapest administration has aimed – through synchronized moves covering three regions – to become not only a “dissident” within the EU but also a “disruptive actor” in the global balance of power. As long as Hungary maintains its capacity to conduct a rational foreign policy, it will be able to sustain its effectiveness within the multipolar system.
[1] “PM Orbán Vetoes Joint Declaration on Ukraine”, About Hungary, https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/pm-orban-vetoes-joint-declaration-on-ukraine, (Access Date: 20.04.2025).
[2] “Orban: Priyem Ukrainy v YES Dast Kart-Blansh na Prodolzheniye Konflikta”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23727807, (Access Date: 20.04.2025).
[3] “Siyyarto: Vengriya ne Podderzhit Novyye Sanktsii YES Protiv Rossii v Sfere Energopostavok”, Belta, https://belta.by/world/view/sijjarto-vengrija-ne-podderzhit-novye-sanktsii-es-protiv-rossii-v-sfere-energopostavok-708942-2025, (Access Date: 20.04.2025).
[4] Martin Fornusek, “EU Readies ‘Plan B’ for Bypassing Hungary’s Russia Sanctions Veto, RFE/RL Reports”, The Kyiv Independent, https://kyivindependent.com/eu-considering-loophole-for-bypassing-hungarys-russia-sanctions-veto-rfe-rl-reports, (Access Date: 20.04.2025).
[5] “Hungary, Israel Emphasize Growing Strategic, Economic Partnership”, Xinhuanet, https://english.news.cn/europe/20250403/ce7170f4e2524d1f93e21ba078ff0758/c.html, (Access Date: 20.04.2025).
[6] Tamas Fencsik, “Netanyahu and Orbán Discuss Defence Ties and Hungary’s ICC Exit”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2025/04/04/viktor-orban-and-benjamin-netanyahu-discussed-further-defence-cooperation-between-hungary-, (Access Date: 20.04.2025).
[7] “Israel’s Netanyahu ends Hungary Visit, Heads to US”, France24, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250406-israel-s-netanyahu-ends-hungary-visit-heads-to-us, (Access Date: 20.04.2025).
[8] Claudia Ciobanu, Edit Inotai, Jules Eisenchteter ve Peter Dlhopolec, “Democracy Digest: Hungary and EU on Collision Course After Latest Visit”, Balkan Insight, https://balkaninsight.com/2025/04/18/democracy-digest-hungary-and-eu-on-collision-course-after-latest-visit, (Access Date: 20.04.2025).
