At the March 2025 summit, European Union (EU) leaders once again reaffirmed their “unwavering” commitment to supporting Ukraine. In this official stance, the European Council emphasized its determination to uphold Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.[1] The conclusions of the March 2025 summit included provisions for additional military support, building upon the €20 billion in aid already allocated in 2024. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, announced that “in 2025, the amount pledged by member states to Ukraine exceeds €23 billion,” thus indicating that the EU’s total support has surpassed that of the previous year.[2]
Italy and Spain have taken a cautious approach to the EU’s plan to raise an additional €20-40 billion in military aid for Ukraine. While 26 leaders signed the final communiqué, Hungary was the only country to oppose it.[3] By late April 2025, the issue of arms support to Ukraine had become a serious topic of debate within the EU. Germany’s hesitation to supply Ukraine with Taurus cruise missiles and the generally reluctant stance of countries like Italy and Hungary have made internal divisions within the EU increasingly apparent. This situation has become a major test of international support for Ukraine’s security and independence, while also marking a critical turning point for EU solidarity, security policies, and its approach to the war in Ukraine. These divergent perspectives among member states are testing the EU’s ability to formulate a common foreign policy and are raising serious questions about the future of the European security architecture.
1. Germany’s Cautious Approach
Germany has displayed a hesitant attitude regarding the supply of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine. Chancellor Olaf Scholz publicly voiced his concerns, stating that “direct weapons deliveries from Germany to Ukraine could increase the risk of Germany becoming a direct party to the war.” Post-war Germany has adopted a low-profile security policy, and there is a deep public concern about the war potentially spilling over into German territory. Left-wing parties in Germany have advocated for a more restrained approach, calling for limitations on military aid. This reflects Germany’s traditionally cautious and measured stance in foreign and security policy. Additionally, Germany’s relationship with its most significant security partner, the United States, often plays a decisive role in resolving such debates.
2. Italy’s Peace-Oriented Stance
The Italian government officially continues to support Ukraine. By the end of 2024, Rome had sent nine separate military aid packages, with the tenth expected to be approved by the end of 2025.[4] Since taking office in 2022, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has maintained a firm commitment to supporting Ukraine, promising to “stand by Kyiv until the war ends.”[5] In December 2024, the Italian cabinet also extended its authorization to supply military equipment to Ukraine through the end of 2025.[6]
However, Italy has adopted a more cautious position within the EU. In March 2025, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani emphasized the need to “examine the Kallas Plan in detail,” and noted that “Italy is not alone” in its reservations. Tajani referred to Italy’s NATO defense spending target (2% of GDP), suggesting that budgetary considerations must be taken into account when evaluating additional aid. This reflects Italy’s alignment with Spain and other Mediterranean countries, which have expressed concern over aid distribution based on income and resisted aid burden-sharing strictly based on GDP.
Italy has maintained a reserved attitude toward sending new weapon systems directly to Ukraine. Prime Minister Meloni’s government has stressed that the priority should be on diplomatic solutions. This position reflects the deep impact of war fatigue and economic concerns within Italian public opinion. Italy’s approach serves as a balancing factor in Europe’s common security architecture and highlights how economic interests are influencing resistance to increased military spending in a time of EU-wide economic difficulty.
3. Hungary’s Reluctance
Hungary is the most vocal opponent within the EU regarding support for Ukraine. Before the March 2025 summit, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán wrote a letter to the President of the European Council, stating that “strategic differences cannot be overcome,” and harshly criticized the EU’s current Ukraine policies.[7] While Hungary has supported existing EU sanctions against Russia, it continues to reject military and direct arms support to Ukraine.[8]
By refusing to sign the Brussels summit communiqué in April 2025, Orbán demonstrated his opposition. He also publicly claimed that “the EU’s goals are not unified; we support Trump’s peace plan,” advocating for an end to the EU’s financial and military aid to Ukraine. This position is also viewed as a strategic move aimed at increasing Hungary’s influence within the EU.
4. Poland and the Baltic States
Countries like Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia strongly advocate for increasing support to Ukraine. The Polish Defense Minister stated, “Ukraine’s victory is essential for the security of all of Europe,” sending a clear message of support. Due to their geographic proximity and historical experiences, these countries perceive Russia as a direct national security threat. Russia’s assertive actions in its immediate neighborhood have led the Baltic states and Poland to adopt a more robust military stance. These countries believe that enhancing Ukraine’s defense capabilities through external assistance is critical not only for Ukraine but also for the security of Europe as a whole. As such, they aim to take a leadership role in shaping Europe’s collective security strategy.
5. France’s Balancing Policy
French President Emmanuel Macron stated, “We must increase our support for Ukraine, but this support should not result in NATO becoming a direct party to the conflict,” thus proposing a balanced approach. France is more inclined than Germany to provide active military support but prefers to avoid direct intervention. This approach is likely tied to both its relationship with the United States and its own national security strategy. Macron’s policy is intended not only to enhance the effectiveness of military assistance but also to mitigate the risk of the war spreading into Europe. While supporting Ukraine, France also insists on continuing diplomatic efforts for a resolution.
In conclusion, as of May 2025, the debate over military aid to Ukraine has become a serious stress test for the EU. The inability to achieve full alignment among member states has revealed deep cracks in the EU’s common foreign and security vision. These internal differences are shaped not only by political will but also by strategic national interests and public sentiment.
[1], “Ukrayna”, Avrupa Konseyi, https://shorturl.at/v675j, (Access Date: 08.05.2025).
[2] AB Ülkeleri Yardım Paketi (2025), https://shorturl.at/FMxtd, (Access Date: 08.04.2025).
[3] “Friday briefing: Why Europe is divided over how to defend Ukraine – and itself”, Reuters, https://shorturl.at/gfA8q, (Access Date: 08.04.2025).
[4] “Ukrayna’ya İtalya’dan Askeri Onay”, Reuters, https://shorturl.at/AnlGI, (Access Date: 08.04.2025).
[5] Ibid.
[6] “İtalya, Ukrayna’ya savaş malzemelerini 2025 sonuna kadar uzatacak”, Reuters, https://rb.gy/larody, (Access Date: 08.04.2025).
[7] “Italy to prolong war supplies to Ukraine until the end of 2025”, Reuters, https://rb.gy/80mt4w, (Access Date: 08.04.2025).
[8] “EU’s Kallas: EU countries committed over 23 bln euros for Ukraine so far in 2025”, Reuters, https://rb.gy/ytz13u, (Access Date: 08.04.2025).
