Russian military satellites maneuvering close to a commercial satellite that provides intelligence support to Ukraine have brought renewed attention to an increasingly apparent vulnerability in space security. German Space Commander Michael Traut has warned that similar activities could affect the operational lifespan and service quality of large satellite networks such as Starlink.[i] This development shows that competition in space is not limited to direct physical attacks. As commercial satellite systems become more deeply integrated into military operations, Russia’s activities targeting these systems raise questions about the limits of traditional deterrence and the changing nature of military competition.
The Russia–Ukraine War has highlighted the importance of commercial space technologies in military operations. Starlink’s satellite communications and the radar imaging services of Finland-based ICEYE contribute to Ukraine’s operational capabilities in different areas. Synthetic aperture radar technology, in particular, enables intelligence collection at night and in adverse weather conditions.[ii] From Russia’s perspective, these systems may be regarded as technological extensions of Western support for Ukraine. Activities targeting commercial satellites therefore constitute an arena of competition that can influence the operational balance of the war, even when they take place outside Ukrainian territory.
In May 2026, Russia’s Cosmos 2610–2613 satellites approached the orbital plane of ICEYE-X36, providing a concrete example of this competition. Although the technical capabilities of the Russian satellites and the precise purpose of the maneuvers remain unclear, the activities are assessed as potentially serving intelligence collection, interference with data transmission, or preparations for future operations.[iii] The strategic advantage Russia could gain here is to create uncertainty in Ukraine’s intelligence flow without completely disabling the satellite. Even delays in target identification or doubts about data continuity can affect operational planning. The potential strategic impact of such activities should therefore be assessed not only in terms of physical damage, but also in terms of the uncertainty they may create in the other side’s intelligence continuity and military decision-making processes.
Another element in Moscow’s potential calculations may be to observe the limits of Western actors’ security commitments. Russia has previously stated that commercial satellites supporting Ukraine could be considered legitimate military targets.[iv] Such a claim, however, does not mean that every form of interference with these systems is lawful under international law. The use of commercial infrastructure for military purposes requires separate assessments of the nature of the target and the consequences of any potential action against it. For Russia, the strategic function of gray zone activities lies in the opportunity to test how the other side will respond to particular actions while avoiding the political and military costs that an overt attack could entail.
The physical characteristics of the space environment increase the capacity of such activities to exert pressure. Satellite avoidance maneuvers consume fuel, while repeated orbital changes can shorten operational lifespans. The scenario Traut discussed in relation to Starlink shows that service quality can be affected even without physical destruction. However, the substantial fuel Russia expends to position its own satellites demonstrates that these activities also impose costs on Moscow. This suggests a trade-off in strategic calculations between the damage that can be inflicted on a target and the sustainability of the operation. Russia’s maneuvers should therefore be assessed within specific technical and operational constraints, rather than interpreted as evidence of an unlimited capacity to interfere.
The central problem that gray zone competition poses for deterrence is the growing uncertainty over the point at which a threat warrants a military response. NATO’s recognition of space as an operational domain and its acknowledgment that attacks on space systems could have implications for collective defense have strengthened the Alliance’s approach to security in this domain.[v] Yet not every proximity maneuver or temporary service disruption constitutes an armed attack. For Russia, this ambiguity may create opportunities to exploit Western actors’ tendency to avoid escalation. Conversely, misjudging intent or interpreting a technical maneuver as preparation for an attack could also trigger unintended military escalation. Deterrence in space thus depends as much on accurate threat assessment and crisis communication as on the capacity to respond.
Protecting commercial satellite infrastructure also requires a reassessment of responsibilities between states and private companies. NATO’s Commercial Space Strategy, adopted in February 2025, prioritizes continuous access to commercial services, coordination with the private sector, and reduced overdependence on a single provider.[vi] However, integrating commercial systems into military operations leaves these companies more exposed to the effects of interstate competition. In this respect, Russia’s activities do more than provide a potential means of exerting pressure on Ukraine; they also expose vulnerabilities in NATO’s security approach, which relies on commercial space services.
System resilience is therefore becoming increasingly important in space security. The use of different satellite networks, alternative service providers, and complementary communications systems can limit the operational consequences of interference with any single infrastructure. NATO’s Hybrid Alliance Layered Operations in Space (HALO) initiative, announced in Ankara in July 2026, aims to integrate Allies’ nationally controlled military satellites.[vii] This approach could enable Allies to use their respective space-based capabilities in a more coordinated manner during joint operations. The aim is thereby to facilitate access to alternative military capabilities in the event of disruptions to particular services. Nevertheless, HALO should not be expected to replace commercial communications and imaging services entirely. Its strategic contribution lies in its potential to reduce the operational vulnerabilities associated with dependence on a single service provider by improving coordination among existing capabilities.
Within this framework, deterrence in space security can be assessed through the distinction between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. The former seeks to increase the political, economic, or military costs an aggressor would face, while the latter rests on limiting an attack’s expected strategic gains.[viii] The ambiguity surrounding the threshold for a direct attack in Russia’s gray zone activities complicates the practical application of threats of punishment. By contrast, redundant satellite networks, alternative service providers, and capability integration initiatives such as HALO can strengthen deterrence by denial by reducing the operational impact of potential interference. This approach does not, however, entirely eliminate Russia’s capacity to exert pressure. Effective deterrence in space security therefore requires the simultaneous development of the capacity to respond and the ability to maintain the continuity of critical services.
In conclusion, Russia’s activities around ICEYE demonstrate that military competition in space can produce strategic consequences below the threshold of physical destruction. For Moscow, pressure on commercial satellite systems has the potential to constrain Ukraine’s intelligence capabilities and test Western actors’ security responses. However, the impact of these activities depends not only on Russia’s technical capabilities but also on the resilience of the targeted systems. Strategic superiority in space is therefore tied as much to the ability to maintain the continuity of one’s own critical services as to the ability to threaten the other side’s infrastructure. The growing military importance of commercial space systems calls for a more comprehensive approach to security, in which the capacity to respond and operational resilience are considered together as elements of deterrence.
[i] “Russian Satellite Activity Raises Concerns for Starlink, German Space Commander Says”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/russian-satellite-activity-raises-concerns-starlink-german-space-commander-says-2026-10-09/, (Accessed: 09.10.2026).
[ii] Juliana Suess, “Checkmate? Russian Orbital Manoeuvring Threatens Ukraine’s Space Capability”, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/checkmate-russian-orbital-manoeuvring-threatens-ukraines-space-capability, (Accessed: 09.10.2026).
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] “NATO’s Approach to Space”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/natos-approach-to-space, (Accessed: 09.10.2026).
[vi] “NATO Commercial Space Strategy”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/02/13/nato-commercial-space-strategy, (Accessed: 09.10.2026).
[vii] “NATO Allies Join Forces to Develop High-End Space Capabilities”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/07/07/nato-allies-join-forces-to-develop-high-end-space-capabilities, (Accessed: 09.10.2026).
[viii] Glenn H. Snyder, “Deterrence by Denial and Punishment”, Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1959, p. 3.
