The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plays a decisive role in China’s bilateral relations with Central Asian states. With its strategic geographical location, rich natural reserves, and growing market potential, the region is of critical importance to China in terms of both diversifying its trade networks and ensuring energy security. Countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, are at the center of both land and energy corridors under this initiative. This makes Central Asian countries the focus of Chinese investment. However, this process extends beyond economic opportunities, and raises several questions about regional power balances.
When considering China’s investment strategies in Central Asia, it has been noted that investments in the energy sector have come to the fore. Kazakhstan attracted $12 billion and $7.5 billion in Chinese capital to the country in the first quarter of 2025 in the aluminum and copper sectors, respectively. This is the highest level recorded in the last decade. These investments have created many different positive effects for the countries in the region, such as infrastructure modernization and increased export capacity.
Kazakhstan, as the world’s largest producer of uranium, has been making intensive efforts in recent years to convert its nuclear raw material potential into electrical energy. These efforts have not only led to the development of energy production capacity, but also to a reshaping of the state’s foreign policy orientation and relations with regional powers. Joint projects primarily with China and Russia reflect Kazakhstan’s efforts to strike a balance between the two major powers in its energy strategy.
The Astana Government has planned three large-scale nuclear power plant projects to date and has sought to carry out the process through various international partnerships. The first of these plants has been awarded to Russia’s Rosatom, while agreements have been reached with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) for the second and third plants. The cost of this facility is estimated to be approximately $14 billion.[i]
Kazakhstan’s growing interest in building a nuclear power plant was reflected in a referendum held in October 2024, in which, according to official results, more than 71% of voters said yes to nuclear energy. Astana is conducting numerous talks with potential suppliers for the construction of the country’s third nuclear power plant. According to a statement made by the Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency on July 31, 2025, CNNC is among these suppliers. The negotiations also cover the development of high-capacity nuclear reactors and small modular reactors.[ii]
China’s energy applications are not solely dependent on fossil reserves. For example, the Dzhankeldy Wind Energy Plant in the Bukhara region of Uzbekistan is one of the largest renewable energy projects in Central Asia. Although this project was implemented with European Union funding, the fact that it was built in partnership with China and Saudi Arabia highlights the multi-vector nature of the KYG and the complex nature of international partnerships. This incident shows that China is not a unilateral investor, but can also play a role in multilateral initiatives to adapt to the global energy transition.[iii]
A considerable portion of Chinese investments in the region are still focused on carbon-intensive sectors. High-emission industries are at the center of economic development policies in Kazakhstan. China’s investments also appear to support this trend. In this context, there have been criticisms that strategic change and transformation opportunities, referred to as decarbonization measures, are not being utilized to a sufficient degree. However, renewable energy investments, energy efficiency projects, and the raising of environmental standards are of critical importance for both the regional states and China in terms of long-term sustainability.
The process of constructing nuclear power plants is not limited to increasing energy production capacity. The supplier country’s reactor technology, maintenance, consulting, and spare parts supply have a long-term strategic impact on the host country. The construction of the third nuclear reactor in Kazakhstan under a partnership with China is expected to further deepen the strategic energy alliance between the two countries and increase China’s influence and presence in Central Asia’s energy infrastructure. For this reason, remaining dependent on two major powers such as China and Russia simultaneously brings certain risks for Kazakhstan in terms of energy security. As a result, Kazakhstan’s nuclear energy investments are one of the strategic issues that must be handled with care in terms of technological dependence, environmental impacts, and geopolitical balances, while also serving the government’s economic development and energy diversification goals.
[i] “China’s Nuclear Power Play in Kazakhstan Is Accelerating”, Oil Price, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Chinas-Nuclear-Power-Play-in-Kazakhstan-Is-Accelerating.html, (Date Accessed: 11.08.2025).
[ii] “Kazakhstan Holds Negotiations with China on Nuclear Power Plant Construction”, The Astana Times, https://astanatimes.com/2025/08/kazakhstan-holds-negotiations-with-china-on-nuclear-power-plant-construction/, (Date Accessed: 11.08.2025).
[iii] “Site surveys begin for first Kazakh nuclear power plant”, World Nuclear News, https://world-nuclear-news.org/articles/site-surveys-begin-for-first-kazakh-nuclear-power-plant, (Date Accessed: 11.08.2025).
