The continent of Africa stands out as an actor that has long been underrepresented in the geopolitical construct of the 21st century but is increasingly becoming central. This transformation stems not only from its demographic extent or natural resource reserves but also from Africa’s potential to convert global economic, political and normative axes. In this regard, the new generation U.S.-Africa Summit held in Washington from 9-11 July 2025, represents a desire to move away from a classic aid paradigm toward a more trade-centered model. The invitation of countries like Gabon, Senegal, Mauritania, Liberia, and Guinea-Bissau, nations that are both resource-rich and have strong historical ties with the West, demonstrates that this new era indicates not only a symbolic but also a strategic repositioning. However, the fundamental question that must be asked is this: Does this summit truly promise a partnership that will contribute to Africa’s development, or is it merely Washington’s attempt to fortify its own Africa front in global competition against China?
The key topics on the summit agenda include expansion of trade agreements, integration with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), energy investments, digital infrastructure cooperation and security partnerships. Particularly the increased strategic interest of U.S. in the Gulf of Guinea, the West African Coast and the Sahel belt indicates that this summit must be approached not only in its economic dimensions, but also in its military and security aspects. As the U.S. tries to counterbalance China’s influence in Africa, its commercial offers to African nations are framed not only through bilateral interests but also through discourses of normative values, principles of governance, and the promotion of democracy. Yet, it is becoming difficult to see the counterpart of these discourses on the ground. This is because an increasing number of African countries are forced to make a pragmatic choice between the expectations of the Western model and the unconditional loans offered by China.
The trade relations of African countries with the U.S. were shaped by unilateral access programs like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). While these programs provided a duty-free access to African goods, they imposed compliance with U.S. normative values as a pre-condition, which created a structural barrier for most countries. In 2025, it appears that this approach has started to change. At the new summit, it’s been indicated that a more horizontal partnership model based on mutual obligations will be featured instead of AGOA. Nonetheless, it remains unclear to what extent this new trade model proposal will strengthen Africa’s production capacity, create how much local added value and contribute to the continent’s industrialization processes. Otherwise, an increase in trade with the U.S. could lead to the perpetuation of a model based on primary commodity exports, reinforcing Africa’s already fragile position within the current global system.
One of the significant topics of the summit is energy cooperation. The U.S. interest in natural gas projects in countries like Senegal and Mauritania is viewed not only through the lens of commercial gains but also within the framework of diversifying Europe’s energy supply security. This could once again relegate African countries to the position of energy suppliers serving as “geopolitical buffers.” However, genuine development depends on Africa developing its own energy strategy that feeds its own people, meets its own energy needs, and strengthens regional integration. From this perspective, there is not yet a complete correspondence between U.S. investment strategies and Africa’s development priorities.
For Africa to be positioned not merely as an energy basin that meets external demands but as a continent at the center of the energy transition, investments must include production chains, employment, and technological transfer.
Another prominent factor at the summit is digital infrastructure cooperation. In response to China’s “Digital Silk Road” initiative in Africa, the U.S. is proposing a new framework called the “Open Digital Partnership.” This proposal is designed to support digitalization in Africa, enhance data security, and integrate cyber infrastructure with Western standards. However, a significant contradiction exists here as well: while China’s digital projects in Africa are fast, affordable, and provide easy access to credit, the models offered by the U.S. are more regulation-focused, costly, and tied to bureaucratic processes. This situation leads many African governments to prefer China to meet their short-term needs. Furthermore, the main obstacle to digitalization in Africa is not just a lack of technology but also inadequate infrastructure, problems with access to energy, and inequalities in education levels. Therefore, proposed models for digital development must not only build digital networks but also enhance human resource capacity, localize content creation, and consider institutional components like tax infrastructure.
Security cooperation is one of the most sensitive topics of the summit. The effectiveness and legitimacy of U.S. counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel region began to be questioned in the 2020s. Anti-Western discourses has grown stronger in countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, military cooperation with Russia has increased, and traditional allies like France have been forced to withdraw from the region. Although the U.S. has made some attempts to fill this void, these moves are often perceived by local populations as “a new form of external control.” For security collaborations to find traction on the ground, they must be supported not only by military aid but also by local peace initiatives, cross-border security reforms, and social reintegration policies. Otherwise, security decisions made at the summit will, like other international documents, be destined to remain on the shelf.
The greatest dilemma of the summit relates to the question of how Africa is participating in this process. The presence of governments with authoritarian tendencies among the invited countries creates a contradiction with Washington’s emphasis on democracy. It is also debatable to what extent African countries have negotiating power at this summit and on which issues they can assert their priorities. This is because the U.S. still views most African leaders as “allies in need of aid,” imposing a hierarchical relationship rather than a strategic partnership of equals. This approach reduces Africa’s role in the international system to that of a consumer, supplier, or buffer zone. What the continent needs, however, is a partnership model that allows it to set its own agenda, maintain its strategic autonomy, and design its development processes according to its own priorities, not external influences. Otherwise, such summits will remain mere image-refreshing exercises, diplomatic showcases, or temporary fields of engagement.
Looking toward the future, three critical breaking points can be mentioned in U.S.-Africa relations. The first is Africa’s deepening of its own regional integration and connecting its internal markets. The successful implementation of AfCFTA will be one of the most important factors determining the direction of external partnerships. The second is Africa’s active participation in the green transition. If Africa cannot secure sufficient resources for climate finance and environmental investments, it may be forced to continue its development based on fossil fuels, which would create new dependency relationships. The third is the issue of digital sovereignty. If Africa does not become a continent that not only imports technology but also builds its own data infrastructure and produces its own content during its digitalization process, it will be vulnerable to the digital colonization of the 21st century. How the U.S. views Africa as a partner on these three issues will determine the future direction of relations.
In conclusion, the U.S.-Africa Summit is not just an element on the diplomatic calendar; it is a critical threshold in terms of how the multipolar world will be shaped, what position Africa will occupy in this new order, and how the U.S. will redefine its own global vision. If Washington genuinely wants to build an egalitarian, sustainable, and mutually beneficial partnership with Africa, it must construct this vision not just in summit halls, but on the ground, at the local level, and in daily life. Africa’s development is not only a strategic necessity for the West but also a humanitarian responsibility.
