Recent developments in Mali represent not only the transformation of a form of governance, but also a process of redefining the country’s political sociality. In the early years of the transition period that began with the military intervention in 2020, the expectation of reform, combined with the reaction against the corruption of the current regime, was prominent in a wide segment of society. However, as of the end of 2024 and the first months of 2025, this transition process started to move away from the goal of stabilization and restructuring over time and started to show a tendency towards consolidation of the administration and limitation of political pluralism. The interim government, led by General Assimi Goïta, has gradually transformed the legitimacy it initially received from the people into an administrative structure that controls constitutional arrangements, dissolves political parties and does not make any announcements regarding the election calendar. In this context, the political environment in Mali should be considered not only as a constitutional issue, but also as a multidimensional manifestation of a crisis of representation, legitimacy and governance.
The decision taken on April 28, 2025 to suspend the activities of political parties and the failure of the administration to provide a clear timetable for the constitutional transition brought with it various debates in terms of the democratic future of the country.[i] Although official statements justify this decision on the grounds of ensuring national unity, preventing ethnic tensions and protecting social cohesion, many political observers on the ground interpret this step as a further centralization of the political sphere. On the other hand, representatives of political parties, especially those based in Bamako, consider this decision as a direct interference with constitutional rights and emphasize that the limitation of civic space restricts Malian citizens’ right to political participation. However, it is noteworthy that these reactions have not yet turned into a broad-based social movement across the country.
Assimi Goïta’s clear intention to prolong the transition process and his emphasis on the construction of a new political architecture at the end of this process have led to the shaping of two main perceptions within the country. While some see the current regime as a stabilizing force, others see it as a suspension of political competition and freedom of expression. At a time when the security threat is still a hot reality, much of Malian society judges the legitimacy of the transitional administration on the basis of direct actions and performance on the ground. In this respect, the lack of a national participatory dialogue mechanism limits the inclusiveness of the political transition, making it difficult for all sectors of society to participate in the restructuring of the political system.
Much of the opposition to the decision to dissolve political parties centers around the principle of protecting civic space. According to RFI, some party leaders see this decision as a direct threat to the legitimacy of the constitutional process and call on the public to defend the constitutional order.[ii] However, the practical impact of these calls is not yet clear. This is because a significant part of the Malian population prioritizes the expectations of daily life over political demands due to the decade-long security crises, economic imbalances and infrastructure problems. This is one of the factors that explain the limited public reaction despite the regime’s increasing political control. As terrorist incidents and economic problems continue on the one hand, it would be unlikely to expect a great reaction from the public. Nevertheless, after this decision, party representatives and small groups supporting the parties started to organize protests.
The administration led by Assimi Goïta can be considered not only as a military regime, but also as a structure acting within the framework of the security-state model. In this model, the state’s capacity to produce security stands out as one of the main criteria of legitimacy. Therefore, the social approval of political decisions is often linked to security indicators rather than elections or political representation mechanisms. In such a structure, the need for the existence of political parties may be relegated to a secondary position. This situation causes principles such as political pluralism, freedom of expression and institutional balance, which are among the basic components of democracy, to be pushed to the background due to short-term security concerns.
The lack of a clear timetable for the transition process reduces the predictability of political actors, increases institutional uncertainty and narrows the space for political participation. This situation makes it difficult for the young population and civil society in particular to express their demands for reform through institutional means. On the other hand, the experience of countries in the West African region that have gone through similar transition processes shows that protracted transition regimes can lead to institutional disintegration, political polarization and social fractures. How Mali manages these risks will be one of the main factors that will determine the content, duration and social legitimacy of the transition.
Another striking factor in Mali is the very limited reaction of international actors to this process. Whereas in the past the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union and European countries took clear positions against violations of the constitutional order or delayed elections, the tone of these reactions has significantly decreased. Mali’s formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Burkina Faso and Niger, and its formal secession from ECOWAS, have also contributed to this. In this context, in parallel with the new foreign policy axis of Mali, it is observed that Mali has followed a line that reduces its dependence on the West and diversifies its relations with actors such as Russia and China. This multifaceted foreign policy approach eases the administration’s hand in domestic politics, reduces external pressures and expands the regime’s room for maneuver.
At this point, the most critical test facing the Malian government is whether it is able to construct the transition process not only as a military arrangement but also as an opportunity for social and institutional restructuring. If a model that involves different segments of society on fundamental issues such as constitutional reform, the electoral system, the legal status of political parties and media freedom is not built, even if stability is achieved in the short term, the re-emergence of governance crises in the medium and long term may become inevitable. In this context, the establishment of a national political reconciliation mechanism would not only enhance the legitimacy of the regime but also reflect grassroots demands for the reconstruction of the political space.
At the social level, the future of the transition process will depend to a large extent on how the population internalizes it and trusts the government. Establishing open public participation mechanisms, holding consultations at the local level and sharing clear visions for the post-transition period can reinforce trust in the administration. On the other hand, steps such as an indefinite transition or a long-term ban on political parties could undermine confidence building and deepen polarization. It is therefore vital that the interim government underpins its security-orientated rhetoric with principles of governance, service delivery and participation.
Mali’s challenges are not limited to the structure of its institutions. At the same time, structural problems such as conflicts that have left deep traces in the social memory, local identity demands and regional inequalities directly affect the success of the transition process. Therefore, the administration needs to develop an inclusive political model that takes into account the demands of the periphery instead of a capital-centered approach. Otherwise, the transition process will remain within a narrow security-oriented framework and this will lead to an increase in the distance between the state and society.
In conclusion, the transition process in Mali is not just a process of constitutional reform or political party realignment, but a much broader process of reconstruction. Beyond the intentions of the military leadership, the direction and success of this process is directly related to the way in which the population is engaged, the resilience of institutions and the building of an environment for dialogue. Today, Mali has the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the past and build an inclusive, just and long-term political architecture. However, in order to capitalize on this opportunity, it is essential that the transition process is not characterized by uncertainty and is based on clear timetables, social participation and institutional transparency. Otherwise, the transition process may turn into a prolonged suspension of not only a new power structure, but also the people’s right to political participation. Nevertheless, given that terrorism in the Liptako-Gourma border region has been at the forefront and has had a significant impact on the political process in Mali, the transition process may be delayed.
[i] “Au Mali, une centaine de partis politiques redoutent leur dissolution par la junte”, Le Monde, April 28 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/04/28/au-mali-une-centaine-de-partis-politiques-redoutent-leur-dissolution-par-la-junte_6600874_3212.html, (Date Accessed: 06.05.2025).
[ii] David Baché, “Mali: les partis politiques appellent à un nouveau rassemblement le 9 mai contre la transition”, RFI, May 6 2025, https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250506-mali-les-partis-politiques-appellent-à-un-nouveau-rassemblement-le-9-mai-contre-la-transition, (Date Accessed: 06.05.2025).
