On August 12, 2025, Mexico extradited 26 high-ranking cartel members to the United States under a new agreement reached with the Trump administration. Those handed over to U.S. custody include Abigael González Valencia, a leader of “Los Cuinis” linked to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG); Roberto Salazar, held responsible for the killing of a U.S. deputy sheriff in 2008; and Servando “La Tuta” Gómez Martínez, the former leader of the Knights Templar cartel.[i]The U.S. Justice Department has decided not to seek the death penalty in these cases, which is a diplomatically critical concession.[ii] This move demonstrates the notable deepening of law enforcement cooperation between the two countries. A comparable degree of cooperation was shown by Mexico in 2025 when it extradited 29 high-ranking cartel members, including Rafael Caro Quintero.[iii]
This development demonstrates that, despite differing priorities, the parties can find common ground in addressing certain threats. Cartel violence and drug trafficking are perceived as serious challenges to both public safety and state authority, paving the way for extraordinary legal measures and mutual concessions. Early in 2025, the Trump administration issued Executive Order No. 14157, which categorized groups such as MS-13, Tren de Aragua, and the CJNG as terrorist organizations. The decision strengthened the call for cooperation from Mexico and framed the threat within a stricter security discourse.[iv]
Legal frameworks, intelligence sharing, and criminal justice safeguards can facilitate joint operations even during politically challenging periods. Furthermore, the timing of the extraditions is notable. The decision was made against the backdrop of trade tensions over tariffs and U.S. economic pressures, which illustrates how security cooperation is intertwined with economic leverage. In such multifaceted bargaining processes, states include not only security threats but also their commercial and political interests in their decision-making processes.
The impact of such operations is often limited and short-lived. The removal of leadership cadres temporarily weakens the operational capacity of organizations, disrupts communication channels, hinders planning, and creates gaps in internal authority structures. This situation could create a short-term period of uncertainty and provide an advantage to security forces. Nevertheless, such a strategy is rarely sufficient to prevent long-term activities of criminal networks. As long as local societal support persists, financial resources remain stable, and recruits can be rapidly integrated, these structures adapt and find ways to reorganize. In regions characterized by deep economic inequalities, high unemployment, and weak perceptions of state authority, organizations can gain legitimacy among the population by fulfilling gap-filling roles such as providing social assistance, employment, or alternative security mechanisms. Thus, removing leadership cadres only has short-term impacts if the social roots of the organization are not also eliminated.
It is indicated in recent academic research that relying solely on punitive measures achieves limited success in permanently reducing violence. The capture or killing of high-profile leaders can disrupt internal power balances, triggering polarisation and leadership struggles within organizations. Sometimes, such procedures may give rise to more aggressive and dispersed types of violence. Increased competition among polarized groups can intensify clashes between law enforcement and criminal organizations, resulting in greater harm to civilians. Furthermore, the loss of leaders can motivate organizations to conceal their activities and develop more flexible, cell-based structures, rendering them less predictable and more difficult to detect.
In contrast, long-term social and economic interventions have the potential to limit the scope of human resources that sustain criminal organizations. Expanding employment opportunities, providing the youth with educational and vocational development programs, strengthening local economies, and institutionalizing social assistance through the state can weaken the “protective” or “economic provider” role of these groups. Similarly, the social legitimacy of organizations is eroded by structural reforms, such as transparency in the justice system, the fight against corruption in law enforcement, and the strengthening of local governments, as well as the long-term strengthening of social trust.
The extradition operation carried out in August 2025 is a strong example in terms of its symbolic value and short-term impact. Yet, for such measures to achieve sustainable effectiveness, they must be accompanied by parallel social and economic development policies. Otherwise, as repeatedly observed in the past, these operations remain only a temporary phase in the broader struggle against crime. Even if law enforcement gains a temporary advantage, these achievements can quickly disappear, leading to new waves of violence. More critically, as public resources are continually diverted to addressing resurgent security threats, insufficient investment is made in areas that can permanently enhance societal well-being.
In the long run, lasting success will depend not solely on punitive measures but on strategies that strengthen societal resilience. The success of these strategies depends on the state building trust in local communities, creating economic opportunities, and ensuring citizens have access to non-violent ways of living. Thus, while the August 2025 extradition operation represents an important tactical achievement under current circumstances, it risks sharing the fate of similar cases in history unless it addresses the underlying structural problems: a brief respite followed by the resurgence of a cycle of violence.
[i] “Mexico transfers 26 cartel figures wanted by US authorities in deal with Trump administration”, AP News, https://apnews.com/article/cartels-trump-administration-bondi-justice-department-712bdb8f99522ee72ec357492cfa393b, (Accessed: 13.08.2025).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “Close ally of drug kingpin ‘El Mencho’ gets 30 years in prison as US ramps up pressure on cartels”, AP News, https://apnews.com/article/el-mencho-justice-department-drug-cartels-cjng-73b539b8029c793fbd995a357b57f25f, (Accessed: 13.08.2025).
[iv] “Executive Order 14157—Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists”, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-14157-designating-cartels-and-other-organizations-foreign-terrorist, (Accessed: 13.08.2025).
