One day after Russia’s attack on a SOCAR-owned gas station in Ukraine on July 5, 2026, the Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Mikhail Yevdokimov, was summoned to the ministry and given an official protest note. In addition, the Azerbaijani Embassy in Kyiv and the Consulate buildings in Kharkiv were subjected to various air strikes. The continuation of similar attacks despite repeated warnings has caused Azerbaijan to evaluate the said attacks as deliberate.[i]
Azerbaijani-Russian relations were tense even before these events and mostly progressed at the level of pragmatic partnership. Baku did not join the Western sanctions against Moscow, but at the same time showed solidarity with the Kyiv administration by providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine. In December 2024, the trust and diplomatic relations between the two countries were largely broken when Russian air defense systems shot down Azerbaijan’s civilian passenger plane. Following the incident, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s delayed apology caused bilateral political relations to be damaged even further.[ii]
The recently increasing tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia are closely followed by Central Asian countries, which have close economic and security relations with Russia. Because the Central Asian states, traditionally seen as Russia’s near abroad and sphere of influence, have been developing a more autonomous and multi-vector foreign policy in recent years. Despite a significant decrease in Russia’s military and political presence in Central Asia due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, its influence in the region still continues. As a matter of fact, the regional states are largely integrated with Russia in the economic and energy fields. Therefore, the difficulties experienced in Russia directly affect the energy security and economic stability of the Central Asian countries as well. The most current example of this is the serious impact on the regional states, especially Kyrgyzstan, due to Ukraine’s increasing attacks on Russia’s oil facilities[iii] in recent weeks.
In this direction, the Azerbaijan-Russia tension can further increase the importance of the multi-vector foreign policy followed by Central Asian countries in recent years. Because integrated relations with Russia in the economic and security fields limit the room for maneuver of the regional states. Therefore, these actors act cautiously when a crisis similar to the tension between Azerbaijan and Russia emerges. Indeed, the regional states, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are trying to establish balanced relations with China, Türkiye, and Western actors outside of Russia in order to diversify their partners in foreign policy. However, Russia’s influence in the region still continues, and Azerbaijan’s attitude towards Moscow is considered an example that is carefully followed by the regional countries.
At the international conference titled “Cultural and Ethnic Diversity: Lessons from History and Current Challenges” held in Shusha on July 6, 2026, Azerbaijan called on Russia to recognize the Circassian genocide and the historical crimes committed against other peoples.[iv] In this direction, Azerbaijan’s harsh attitude towards Russia can be seen more clearly.
On the other hand, the fact that Central Asian states did not attend this conference is not just a coincidence either. Because, although the regional states are trying to distance themselves from Russia and obtain a more autonomous room for maneuver, they cannot risk attending a conference of this scale that addresses Russia’s controversial historical legacy. Participation in the said conference carries the risk of being perceived by Moscow as openly identifying with an anti-Russian initiative. In this context, the non-participation of the Central Asian states in the conference can be evaluated as an indicator of their political caution.
The conditions that allow Azerbaijan to display a harsh attitude towards Russia are not largely applicable to the Central Asian states. Because Russia’s traditional influence in Azerbaijan is not at the same level as in Central Asia. Especially the 2023 Karabakh Victory and Russia’s long-running war in Ukraine have contributed to the decrease of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus. However, its influence over Central Asia remains largely unchanged. One of the most fundamental reasons for this is that Russia is still the region’s largest security provider. Moreover, in terms of migration and workforce, Russia continues to be one of the top destinations for Central Asian states. Additionally, the billions of dollars in remittances sent back to their home countries by migrant workers provide a significant contribution to Central Asian economies. Almost half of Tajikistan’s economy is dependent on these remittances. Although Central Asian migrant workers have started looking for alternative job markets following the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia’s influence on the region’s migration dynamics is still huge.[v]
Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is not dependent on Russia at the same level thanks to the strategic partnership it has developed with Türkiye. Furthermore, the strategic importance Azerbaijan has gained for Europe in recent years as an alternative energy supplier and one of the key actors of the Middle Corridor also offers a wider room for maneuver for Azerbaijan. Central Asian countries, on the other hand, follow a strategy of silent diversification instead of open conflict, despite acting within the framework of partnership diversification and independent foreign policy principles in the same way.
In this context, although the Azerbaijan-Russia tension strengthens the multi-vector foreign policy understanding of the Central Asian states, the regional states are not expected to adopt Azerbaijan’s harsh attitude towards Moscow in the short term. Even if Azerbaijan’s attitude sets an example that is carefully followed by the Central Asian countries and encourages them to diversify their partners, this process is anticipated to be quite long and challenging due to their economic, security, and political dependencies. Because the regional states do not possess the political, economic, and geopolitical conditions that Azerbaijan has. Therefore, under the current conditions, it can be foreseen that the Central Asian states will continue to display a more cautious and pragmatic approach in their relations with Moscow.
[i] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Press release on the summoning of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, https://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/no30126, (Accessed: 09.07.2026).
[ii] Nate Ostiller, “Putin admits fault for deadly plane crash to Aliyev in awkward press conference”, OC Media, https://oc-media.org/putin-admits-fault-for-deadly-plane-crash-to-aliyev-in-awkward-press-conference/, (Accessed: 10.07.2026).
[iii] “Almost every Russian region hit by fuel crisis, as Ukraine escalates drone attacks”, CNN World, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/07/06/europe/russia-fuel-crisis-ukraine-drone-attacks-intl-vis, (Accessed: 10.07.2026).
[iv] “Russia faces criticism over ethnic discrimination at state-backed conference in Azerbaijan”, JAMnews, https://jam-news.net/criticism-of-russia-at-azerbaijani-conference/, (Accessed: 10.07.2026).
[v] Nodira Kholmatova ve Nodira Abdulloeva, “Central Asian Migrants Look Beyond Russia, Yet New Destinations Carry Challenges Too”, Migration Policy Institute, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-asian-migrants-new-destinations, (Accessed: 10.07.2026).
