The U.S. Senate is preparing to vote on the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement signed with Saudi Arabia following the midterm elections and before 13 December 2026. The 90-day review period for the text submitted to Congress at the end of August began on 14 September 2026, while several Democratic and Republican senators have called for the disclosure of two classified letters accompanying the agreement.[i] Thus, a matter that has been part of energy diplomacy for years has evolved into an overt political debate encompassing issues ranging from the risk of nuclear proliferation to Congress’s oversight authority.
The agreement signed by Riyadh and Washington in July establishes a legal framework for cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy.[ii] Such agreements, based on Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, are required to enable companies to transfer reactor technology, nuclear materials, and technical services. The issue at hand, therefore, extends beyond the details of a power plant to be built in the near future. The agreement could shape, for many years to come, the technology, fuel supply, and safeguards regime underpinning Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program.
Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of nuclear energy has a strong economic dimension. Electricity consumption, seawater desalination, petrochemical facilities, and the need for cooling during the summer months result in large quantities of oil and natural gas being consumed domestically. The National Atomic Energy Project identifies large reactors, small modular reactors, the nuclear fuel cycle, and an independent regulatory body as its four core components.[iii] Riyadh thus aims to export hydrocarbons rather than use them for electricity generation, diversify its energy sources, and establish a new industrial sector requiring advanced technologies.
The sensitive part of the debate begins with the nuclear fuel cycle rather than the reactors themselves. While low-level uranium enrichment can be used for electricity generation, the same technical expertise and facilities can also enable the pursuit of higher levels of enrichment. Plutonium that can be separated during the reprocessing of spent fuel likewise has a dual-use nature. The current agreement is therefore subject to criticism for not explicitly prohibiting enrichment and reprocessing by Riyadh, and for not requiring the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which expands the Agency’s ability to conduct unannounced inspections.[iv]
The agreement concluded by the United Arab Emirates with Washington in 2009 has established a different benchmark. Abu Dhabi renounced domestic enrichment and reprocessing activities and agreed to obtain the fuel it needed from external suppliers. This approach, referred to as the “gold standard,” reinforced the view that entry into the field of civilian nuclear energy in the region could be made possible by forgoing sensitive fuel-cycle technologies. The more flexible terms of the Saudi agreement, however, could create a perception that different rules are being applied to the two neighboring countries.
The Iran factor directly turns this perception into a security issue. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated explicitly in the past that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, his country could pursue a similar path. This statement does not prove that the current civilian program has a military purpose, but it leads other regional capitals to focus not on intentions alone, but on the technical capabilities that could emerge in the future. In the nuclear field, trust is built by taking into account not only existing decisions but also political choices that may change years from now.
From Washington’s perspective, the commercial value of the agreement cannot be overlooked either. For Saudi Arabia’s first large-scale reactors, the U.S. company Westinghouse, South Korea’s KEPCO, Chinese companies, and Russia’s Rosatom have long been regarded as potential suppliers. Selecting American technology would involve more than reactor sales; it would establish a relationship lasting for decades through fuel supply, maintenance, training, and safety standards. In this way, Washington seeks to gain market share while keeping Riyadh’s nuclear trajectory aligned with the U.S. approach to regulatory oversight.
It also remains unclear whether normalization with Israel has been included as a condition of the agreement. President Donald Trump has stated that the text would enter into force if Riyadh recognizes Israel, while congressional officials have indicated that no such provision appears in the published agreement. The Saudi government, meanwhile, has shown no inclination toward normalization without credible progress toward Palestinian statehood. Linking nuclear cooperation to another diplomatic issue through verbal statements could lead to the technical provisions being interpreted differently as political negotiations evolve.
For Riyadh, domestic fuel-cycle capabilities are a matter of strategic autonomy before they are a matter of a weapons program. Building a large-scale energy program using foreign-supplied technology creates dependence on fuel suppliers and long-term service contracts. Exploration of the country’s uranium resources and the localization of certain stages of fuel production could reduce this dependence. At the same time, because every new technical capability could prompt neighboring countries to reassess their own options, the space for balancing economic autonomy with regional security is becoming increasingly narrow.
The regional consequences of the agreement may be felt less through an immediate Saudi move toward nuclear weapons than through the emergence of a new precedent. The flexibility granted to Riyadh could pave the way for other countries seeking to establish civilian nuclear programs to demand similar rights in the future. The energy strategies of regional actors such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Türkiye differ from one another, but any change in the U.S. approach to the fuel cycle could affect the calculations of all these countries. When common rules are weakened, security assurances come to depend less on the text of agreements and more on temporary trust between governments.
The tools for reducing this risk are clear. Adoption of the Additional Protocol could give inspectors access to broader information and, when necessary, undeclared locations. Obtaining fuel from reliable suppliers under long-term contracts, removing spent fuel from the country, and placing any decision to pursue enrichment within a multilateral framework could also reduce concerns. The disclosure of the classified letters submitted to Congress would clarify which obligations are contained in the agreement and which are political commitments. Transparency, in this context, ceases to be merely a diplomatic choice and becomes one of the technical instruments of security.
Saudi Arabia’s desire to diversify electricity generation, expand water desalination capacity, and invest in advanced technologies is a legitimate development objective. Whether this will increase regional insecurity will depend less on the number of reactors than on the limits placed on the fuel cycle, the scope of inspection authorities, and the clarity of the political conditions. An agreement underpinned by strong rules could help secure Riyadh’s energy transition and serve as an example of responsible nuclear cooperation in the region. If uncertainties persist, however, the stated objective of civilian energy could become a long-term source of suspicion intertwined with the deterrence calculations of neighboring states.
[i] “US senators expect vote after midterms on Trump’s nuclear power pact with Saudi Arabia”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-senators-expect-vote-before-december-13-trumps-nuclear-power-pact-with-saudi-2026-10-02/, (Date of Access: 2 Ekim 2026).
[ii] “Saudi Arabia and United States Sign Agreement on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”, Saudi Press Agency, https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2639735, (Date of Access: 2 Ekim 2026).
[iii] “Saudi National Atomic Energy Project SNAEP”, Saudi Ministry of Energy, https://www.energy.gov.sa/en/snaep/Pages/ov.aspx, (Date of Access: 2 Ekim 2026).
[iv] “Saudi Arabia preparing to grant IAEA more intrusive powers, Grossi says”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-arabia-preparing-grant-iaea-more-intrusive-powers-grossi-says-2026-09-07/, (Date of Access: 2 Ekim 2026).
