The international security architecture of the 21st century has evolved beyond the traditional state-centric approach into an era of asymmetric conflicts, where non-state actors and proxy actors have become significant elements. In the modern conflict environment, states’ reliance on private security and intelligence companies to achieve operational flexibility and low visibility against asymmetric threats has accelerated the process of security privatization. In this context, private companies have ceased to be mere “service providers” and have transformed into “semi-statized” actors operating in accordance with national interests. This transformation is fundamentally reshaping international strategic balances and diplomatic instruments.
One concrete example of this change in the field is the United States’ (US) increasing dependence on Private Military Companies (PMCs) in its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Particularly in areas such as logistical support, operational assistance, and field training, the contributions provided by private companies have made them not merely secondary elements on the battlefield but, in effect, part of military power projection. The increase in PMC personnel in Iraq from 250 to 2,000 at the beginning of 2015 reflects the growing role of these companies in modern warfare doctrines. In Afghanistan, the presence of a private security force numbering 30,400 has served as a practical example of the legitimization of non-state actors in hybrid warfare environments.[1] Cooperation with the private sector in military activities has helped states achieve cost efficiency; however, it has also created new security gaps, such as legal responsibility, lack of oversight, and human rights violations.
Private security companies have assumed leading roles not only on battlefields but also in the protection of critical diplomatic and strategic facilities. G4S, one of the global security giants, provides a wide range of services from American and British embassies to strategic military bases and government offices. With between 250,000 and 280,000 employees, G4S possesses a workforce larger than the armies of many medium-sized countries.[2] The security services this company has provided solely to American embassies have exceeded $100 million over the past three years. Firms like G4S reduce the necessity for direct military interventions by states, thereby creating opportunities for “covert interventions” and “strategic denial” strategies; this situation adds new tools to the methods of indirect power use by states.
In the field of intelligence, privatization has evolved into a more complex and multi-layered structure. In particular, the activities conducted by companies such as Black Cube have brought the concept of intelligence outsourcing to the forefront. Established in 2010 by former Mossad agents, Black Cube conducts operations that lack transparency, serving commercial and political interests.[3] The legal proceedings involving Evolution have demonstrated that private intelligence companies are not only collecting information but also possess the capacity to directly influence judicial processes. In this new environment, intelligence has become not merely a tool for national security purposes but also an instrument employed in the realms of economic and political competition.
State institutions have also turned to the technological capabilities offered by the private sector to enhance their own operational capacities. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has developed mass surveillance systems in cooperation with companies such as Geo Group and Palantir. Through the use of facial recognition technologies, social media monitoring systems, and data mining applications, ICE has come to be regarded as a modern “secret police” structure, demonstrating how the state’s internal security strategy has been reshaped within the concept of “information warfare.”[4] ICE’s planned budget increase of $175 billion over the next decade indicates that the capacities of such institutions will expand further.
Technological advancements have constituted another fundamental component of security modernization. The U.S. Federal Directives issued on April 3, 2025, aim to enhance data security, efficiency, and competitiveness by increasing the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) by state institutions.[5] However, this objective simultaneously increases technological dependence between the private sector and the state, creating new threat surfaces in the field of cybersecurity.
This risk has become more pronounced due to the intensive use of critical components manufactured in China within U.S. data centers. According to reports, these components could be disabled even by attacks costing only a few thousand dollars, potentially disrupting AI infrastructure.[6] China-based Alibaba’s Qwen 3 model demonstrates that technological competition has evolved not only into an inter-state rivalry but also into an “intelligence war” between private sectors.[7]
Private intelligence companies fill gaps not only in the use of technology but also directly in operational fields. The radar-based geospatial data provided by Japan to Ukraine illustrates how state-private sector collaboration has become a central element in security policies.[8] Such partnerships indicate that the concept of information superiority during wartime can now be ensured not only by national states but also through private companies.
In parallel, strategic information disclosure has become an important tool in modern diplomacy and intelligence policies. In 2022, the public disclosure by the United States and the United Kingdom of Russia’s planned attacks against Ukraine prior to their execution demonstrated a transition beyond traditional intelligence approaches into a new phase of information and propaganda warfare.[9] However, this process has also brought risks, such as the exposure of sources and the weakening of intelligence operations.
Within these dynamics, private intelligence companies have become actors that enhance the flexibility of states but simultaneously threaten security-ethics balances. Lack of oversight, information manipulation, and insufficient transparency have emerged as the weak links of the modern security environment.
In the coming years, the weight of private military and intelligence companies (PMCs and private intelligence firms) in the international system is expected to increase. States will systematically employ these semi-statized actors, particularly in areas of low-intensity conflicts, hybrid wars, and proxy wars, to operate effectively without displaying direct military presence. Private security giants like G4S or private intelligence agencies like Black Cube will undertake active roles not only in war zones but also in diplomatic crises, internal security, and information warfare. In doing so, they will meet states’ needs for operational flexibility while creating maneuvering space beyond the framework of international law. However, this process, due to a lack of oversight, may lead to serious erosion of the international human rights regime and the laws of war; if supranational oversight mechanisms are not strengthened, these actors may achieve independent operational capacities capable of triggering international crises.
The development and use of AI-supported intelligence and cybersecurity technologies by private companies will further increase states’ technological dependence. Especially in an environment where technological competition between China and the U.S. is intensifying, private companies will become indispensable partners for states in areas such as data security, critical infrastructure protection, and intelligence gathering. However, this dependency will create “strategic gaps,” increasing national security vulnerabilities and jeopardizing states’ operational control during crises. Examples such as China’s potential to control global data flows through its AI capacity via the private sector or U.S. data centers’ dependency on Chinese-made components stand out as concrete indicators of this fragility. In this context, states will engage in a race to build their own AI ecosystems in the future; however, since this process will be costly and time-consuming, private sector dominance is expected to continue in the short term.
The structure of intelligence wars is anticipated to change fundamentally in the future. Strategic information disclosure practices will become an effective foreign policy tool not only for major powers but also for private companies and even state-supported private intelligence networks. Satellite data provided by Japan to Ukraine or preemptive information disclosures by the U.S. and the U.K. regarding Russia’s plans will occupy a central position in future information wars and constitute the main elements of intelligence diplomacy. However, the active participation of private companies in this process is expected to introduce new risks, such as the commercialization of strategic information and increased susceptibility to manipulation. To avoid entirely losing control over their information sources, states may inevitably need to both redefine their relationships with the private sector and develop hybrid models that will maintain independent intelligence capacities. Otherwise, the actors controlling the flow of information in the international system will not be states alone but also semi-independent and difficult-to-regulate global corporate networks.
At this point, the international security and intelligence structure has transformed into a hybrid order in which private security and intelligence companies have become semi-statized and the boundaries between the state and the private sector have blurred. States’ increasing dependence on these actors has given rise to new security risks such as lack of oversight, ethical erosion, and technological dependence. The strengthening of AI-supported information wars is deepening structural vulnerabilities in national security. In this environment, it is inevitable for states to strengthen their independent capacities and to redefine their relationships with private actors within a framework of strategic balance.
[1] “Chislennost Sotrudnikov CHVK v Irake i Afganistane na Kontrakte Pentagona Rastet”, Live Journal, https://bmpd.livejournal.com/1867626.html, (Access Date: 29.04.2025).
[2] “‘Voyevat Cherez Posrednikov’: kak Krupneyshaya Britanskaya CHVK Prevratilas v Kvazigosudarstvo s Armiyey i Tyurmami”, RT, https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1469123-voennaya-kampaniya-britaniya-ssha-armiya-tyurma, (Access Date: 29.04.2025).
[3] Zak Thomas-Akoo, “Mystery Entity Behind Evolution Illegal Markets Report Unmasked”, Next.io, https://next.io/news/casino/israeli-private-intelligence-firm-black-cube-behind-evolution-illegal-markets-report, (Access Date: 29.04.2025).
[4] Lee Morgenbesser, “How ICE is Becoming a Secret Police Force Under the Trump Administration”, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/how-ice-is-becoming-a-secret-police-force-under-the-trump-administration-255019, (Access Date: 29.04.2025).
[5] “New Federal Agency Policies and Protocols for Artificial Intelligence Utilization and Procurement Can Provide Useful Guidance for Private Entities”, Epstein Becker Green, https://www.workforcebulletin.com/new-federal-agency-policies-and-protocols-for-artificial-intelligence-utilization-and-procurement-can-provide-useful-guidance-for-private-entities, (Access Date: 29.04.2025).
[6] Billy Perrigo, “Exclusive: Every AI Datacenter Is Vulnerable to Chinese Espionage, Report Says”, Time, https://time.com/7279123/ai-datacenter-superintelligence-china-trump-report, (Access Date: 29.04.2025).
[7] “Alibaba Unveils Advanced Qwen 3 AI as Chinese Tech Rivalry İntensifies”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/alibaba-unveils-advanced-qwen-3-ai-chinese-tech-rivalry-intensifies-2025-04-29, (Access Date: 29.04.2025).
[8] “Yaponiya Soglasilas Predostavlyat Ukraine Razvedyvatelnyye Dannyye so Sputnikov — SMI”, New Voice, https://nv.ua/ukraine/events/razvedka-ukrainy-yaponiya-soglasilas-predostavlyat-gur-razvedyvatelnye-dannye-so-sputnikov-50508225.html, (Access Date: 29.04.2025).
[9] Adam Jawor, “Strategiczne Ujawnianie İnformacji Wywiadowczych. Nowe Narzędzie w Dyplomacji?” InfoSecurity24, https://infosecurity24.pl/sluzby-specjalne/strategiczne-ujawnianie-informacji-wywiadowczych-nowe-narzedzie-w-dyplomacji, (Access Date: 29.04.2025).
