The Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement, signed in Egypt on October 13, 2025, to promote peace in Gaza, officially marked the first phase of U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point action plan. This event represented a turning point that raised questions about the implementation capacity of ceasefire mechanisms. Announced by Trump alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House on September 29, 2025, the 20-point Gaza Peace Plan presented a multilayered diplomatic framework designed to end the two-year-long conflict.
It is based on a phased implementation model that integrates elements such as the cessation of radicalization, humanitarian assistance, broad-based governance, and a long-term security architecture.[i] The ceasefire took effect on October 10, 2025, with the Israel Defense Forces withdrawing to lines controlling 53% of Gaza. The summit formalized a four-party mediation format involving the United States, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey, while the United Nations assumed responsibility for monitoring and verification.[ii]
The initial provisions of the plan position Gaza as a region that poses no threat to its neighbors, while promising comprehensive reconstruction and economic revitalization to alleviate the suffering of its population. The ceasefire mechanism is structured to take effect upon mutual consent of the parties and includes immediate steps such as the withdrawal of Israeli forces to designated lines, the suspension of military operations, and the exchange of hostages and prisoners. It also offers Hamas members amnesty and safe passage in return for a commitment to peaceful coexistence and disarmament.[iii]
Governance will be carried out by a temporary, technocratic Palestinian committee operating under the supervision of the Peace Council chaired by President Trump. The committee will determine the framework and funding until the Palestinian Authority completes its reform program, with reference to the 2020 Trump Plan and the Saudi-French proposals.
The legal bindingness of the Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement under international law can be evaluated in terms of soft law and hard law distinctions. The plan functions as a letter of intent rather than a binding treaty under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; it presents political commitments instead of a formal treaty text and establishes a flexible framework not subject to the pacta sunt servanda principle. However, if supported by a potential United Nations Security Council resolution, similar to Resolution 242, it could acquire binding force. In its current form, the mediating roles of the United States, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey create moral and diplomatic obligations within the framework of customary international law, yet the plan’s legal enforceability remains limited.
The plan, within the realist paradigm, transforms Israel’s military superiority into a diplomatic gain while aiming for sustainable peace through elements of liberal institutionalism. However, ambiguities and commitment issues regarding Hamas’s disarmament and exclusion from governance increase the associated risks. The plan’s asymmetric concessions are also notable. Developments on October 13, 2025, such as the release of all surviving hostages and the return of 1,950 Palestinian prisoners, confirm the feasibility of the first phase of implementation. While the plan offers a hybrid model for post-conflict governance, lasting peace appears contingent on reforms and the effectiveness of regional guarantors. It represents a critical turning point in the reconstruction of regional security in the Middle East and may potentially encourage the expansion of the Abraham Accords.
In conclusion, the long-term effects of the Gaza Peace Plan encompass both optimistic consolidation and fragile imbalance scenarios. In the optimistic scenario, effective shuttle diplomacy by Qatar and Egypt could expand humanitarian corridors, while a strengthened UN monitoring role could accelerate economic recovery. Infrastructure renewal may be further boosted through investments from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. However, the likelihood of Hamas fully agreeing to disarm appears low. In the fragile imbalance scenario, asymmetric concessions could cause the agreement to collapse, as has occurred in the past. In the medium term, hybrid governance models may trigger the expansion of the Abraham Accords, and Iran’s isolation could weaken the axis of resistance. Over the long term, the plan could pave the way for Palestinian state recognition and a two-state solution, though the risk of large-scale conflict may persist.
[i] “Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan in full”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70155nked7o, (Accessed: 13.10.2025).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
