Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister under the Taliban government, Amir Khan Muttaqi, arrived in India on October 10, 2025, for a six-day visit. This visit marked a significant turning point in South Asian geopolitics.[i] It was the first and highest-level visit to India since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. With this occasion, India announced the reopening of its embassy in Kabul.[ii] Simultaneously, border tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban escalated, resulting in deadly clashes. These developments have signaled a rapid shift in the geopolitical balance of South Asia.
India has, in recent years, strengthened its cooperation with member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), particularly to ensure the security of Kashmir and eliminate extremist groups in the region. Indeed, areas such as the Hindu Kush Mountains and the Wakhan Corridor in eastern Afghanistan, the Fergana Valley in Central Asia, and, most notably, the disputed Kashmir region shared by three countries, have long been under the threat of radical organizations. To combat these extremist groups, which often cooperate due to shared living spaces and overlapping networks, significant collaborations have been carried out within the framework of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). Within this context, member states have deepened their military cooperation, placing emphasis on joint exercises and intelligence sharing. However, political disputes among member states continue to hinder the resolution of security issues in Asia.
Following the Taliban’s takeover of power in Afghanistan in 2021, the regional security interests of neighboring countries, particularly China, Pakistan, and India, began to converge. However, due to political divergences among these actors, cooperation in the field of security has remained limited. All three actors share the common objective of ensuring peace, security, and stability in Afghanistan. Driven by security-related concerns, China has been one of the most active countries seeking to strengthen its relations with the Taliban regime. Similarly, Beijing expects Islamabad to follow a comparable path and contribute to Afghanistan’s security, as the goal of linking the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan remains on the agenda. The stability and security of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are essential for the advancement of the CPEC project. Therefore, China has acted as a “mediator” to mend ties between Pakistan and the Taliban administration, seeking to maintain order in South Asia.
The Taliban’s approach toward India has remained largely unchanged since 2021, and the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi has continued to operate. On the other hand, India initially adopted a cautious and skeptical stance toward the Taliban government, becoming one of the countries that closed its embassy in Kabul. This reaction stemmed from India’s concerns regarding the Taliban’s potential ties with extremist groups operating in Kashmir. However, over the past four years, the Taliban has managed to demonstrate that it is not connected to organizations targeting India in the Kashmir region, even condemning such attacks[iii], thereby gaining New Delhi’s confidence. During this period, India came to the conclusion that the Taliban does not, in geopolitical terms, stand in direct opposition to its interests. India’s initial prejudice toward the Taliban was rooted in Pakistan’s historical support for the group. Yet, in the post-2021 geopolitical environment, tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban have steadily escalated. By October 2025, these tensions had transformed into open and direct warfare following clashes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
Islamabad has accused the Taliban of harboring members of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP has increased its cross-border attacks from Afghan territory into Pakistan, becoming one of the most significant security threats to Pakistan’s stability. Consequently, Pakistan has intensified its military operations against TTP targets within Afghanistan. This situation has caused serious tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan, leading to clashes that have resulted in casualties on both sides. Moreover, it is frequently emphasized that Pakistan is also uneasy about the Taliban’s efforts to normalize relations with India. The growing rapprochement between the Taliban and India has naturally provoked Pakistan’s anger and paved the way for Islamabad to conduct its operations in Afghanistan with greater determination.
During Muttaqi’s meetings in New Delhi, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar stated that India “fully supports Afghanistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.”[iv] This statement can undoubtedly be interpreted in relation to Pakistan’s ongoing operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, it indicates that India’s approach toward the Taliban has begun to align with that of other major regional actors such as China and Russia. It is worth recalling that Russia became the first country to officially recognize the Taliban government in July 2025.[v] This recognition was interpreted as a strategic move to reassert Russia’s influence in Afghanistan. The increasing involvement of SCO members such as Russia, China, and India in Afghanistan is of critical importance both for ensuring Eurasian security and for preventing Western powers from expanding their presence in the region. Pakistan’s exclusion from this regional alignment, and on the contrary its growing engagement with the United States of America (USA), leads to an escalation of geopolitical tensions in South Asia.
The United States’ potential intervention to de-escalate border clashes between Pakistan and the Taliban could lead to a rapid transformation of the existing geopolitical balance. Washington has been conducting negotiations with the Taliban over the possibility of returning to the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, yet no tangible progress has been achieved thus far.[vi] Consequently, the U.S. may strongly support Pakistan in the future as part of its broader strategy toward the Taliban. Although the U.S. has long blamed Pakistan for its failures in Afghanistan, it will inevitably require new partners to exert pressure on the Taliban. In other words, Washington will rely heavily on allies such as Pakistan to contain, weaken, and potentially coerce the Taliban into accepting certain conditions. The U.S. demand centers on maintaining a limited military presence at Bagram Air Base for counterterrorism purposes.[vii] However, if these requests are not met, Washington may seek alternative deployment points in South or Central Asia which is an outcome that neither China nor Russia would welcome. Therefore, Pakistan’s conflict with the Taliban and its foreign policy choices hold the potential to rapidly reshape both regional and global power dynamics.
[i] “Why Taliban minister’s visit to India is so groundbreaking”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8exzzz5dp5o, (Access Date: 16.10.2025).
[ii] “India to reopen embassy in Kabul after 4-year hiatus amid new Taliban ties”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/10/india-to-reopen-embassy-in-kabul-after-4-year-hiatus-amid-new-taliban-ties, (Access Date: 16.10.2025).
[iii] “Why is India embracing the Taliban? Is ‘enemy’s enemy is a friend’ dictum driving New Delhi?”, Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-plus/international/why-is-india-embracing-the-taliban-is-enemys-enemy-is-a-friend-dictum-driving-new-delhi/articleshow/124411151.cms, (Access Date: 16.10.2025).
[iv] “India to reopen embassy in Kabul after 4-year hiatus amid new Taliban ties”, a.g.e., (Access Date: 16.10.2025).
[v] “Russia becomes first state to recognise Afghanistan’s Taliban government”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n4wely9do, (Access Date: 16.10.2025).
[vi] “Pentagon Afgan üssüne geri dönmek istiyor”, Hürriyet, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/pentagon-afgan-ussune-geri-donmek-istiyor-42956040, (Access Date: 16.10.2025).
[vii] Ibid.
