The current geopolitical landscape in the Middle East indicates that classical power projections and established alliance structures are failing to produce their intended outcomes and, instead, within the framework of the “law of unintended consequences,” point to a process in which the use of force is backfiring. In this context, first-strike capability, assessed as operational superiority, cannot be converted into a lasting strategic gain due to the target country’s asymmetric response capacity. As seen in the case of Iran, while the combined US and Israeli military presence in the region initially functioned as a protective shield, the “decapitation” operation targeting senior leadership and the neutralization of air defense systems during the joint operation carried out on February 28, 2026, provided short-term operational superiority. Yet Iran’s rapid, large-scale retaliation with missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles prevented this superiority from translating into a lasting strategic outcome. This situation reveals the chasm between “first-strike capability” as envisioned in classical military doctrine and conventional superiority and offensive capacity, on the one hand, and asymmetric defense and counterattack capabilities, on the other.
While the traditional understanding of power assumes that strong armies and forward bases guarantee deterrence, modern conflict dynamics are transforming these fixed assets into concentrations of targets. Within this framework, rather than creating strategic opportunities for an attacker, bases have become focal points of risk for defense systems and logistics centers. Iran’s retaliation demonstrated that American military presence has diminished in its deterrent function and instead attracted conflict upon itself, targeting not only Israel but also US bases in the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain. These strikes spread across a wide geography, encompassing Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, hitting the most strategic points of American military presence in the region. Iran’s retaliation proved that, beyond being merely an operational response, US military presence in the region no longer functions as a protective shield but rather as a “lightning rod” that draws conflict upon itself.
From Washington’s perspective, the scale and scope of these strikes caused serious shock within the intelligence community. Although both the Biden administration and the subsequent Trump administration had anticipated that Iran would retaliate to some degree, the attack being this coordinated, this wide-ranging, and directly targeting US bases in the Gulf to this extent was not expected. American intelligence had focused on scenarios in which Iran would launch symbolic missile strikes against Israeli territory or carry out limited harassment through proxy forces. It had assessed a direct, high-volume strike by Tehran against US bases as a low-probability scenario. This miscalculation revealed that the US early warning systems and intelligence network in the region had failed to fully grasp Iran’s asymmetric capacity.
The atmosphere in Washington immediately following the strikes was characterized by both anger and strategic panic. While emergency meetings at the Pentagon addressed damage assessment at the bases and the extent of personnel casualties, the question of how to respond to such a wide-scale attack simultaneously occupied the agenda. While neoconservative circles and some Republican senators argued that an “overwhelming retaliation” against Iran was necessary, the tendency to keep escalation under control prevailed within an administration that was in the midst of a post-election transition period. The magnitude of the strikes left the US facing a dilemma: either lose its credibility entirely or be dragged into a regional war.
On the Israeli front, the situation took on a different dimension. Iran’s retaliation was one of the largest attacks to test the capacity of Israel’s “Iron Dome” and other layered air defense systems. Although Israeli defenses managed to repel the bulk of the strikes, missiles hitting certain strategic sites caused a serious security trauma within the country. As sirens echoed in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the public mood began to form around the idea that the cost of the government’s operation against Iran might be far higher than anticipated. While the Netanyahu government attempted to characterize the attack as “Israel’s struggle for survival” and project resolve, it was simultaneously accused by the opposition and media of “strategic adventurism” and “failure to protect the people.” Security meetings held after the attack discussed the idea of a new operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities, but warnings that Iran still possessed thousands of missiles and that retaliation could escalate to a more destructive level removed this option from the table for the time being. This situation laid bare how Israel’s traditionally held “first strike” advantage was neutralized in the face of Iran’s “second strike” capacity. Iran’s response shook the foundational pillars of the military deterrence doctrine built over the years by both the US and Israel; both countries experienced a deep strategic shock, having failed to anticipate such a comprehensive attack against their own territories and most strategic military assets.
International reactions presented a far more complex and layered picture than expected. Within the Western alliance, criticism of the operation launched jointly by the US and Israel began to be voiced openly, deepening the crisis further. Leading EU countries, such as France, Germany, and Spain, while stopping short of condemning the military operation, characterized it as “concerning” and were pushed to call on the parties to exercise restraint and agree to a ceasefire. The French President emphasized that dragging the Middle East into a new war would benefit no one. At the same time, the Spanish Foreign Minister stated that completely abandoning the diplomatic table would have grave consequences. The UK, while traditionally maintaining a position closer to the US, acknowledged after Iran’s retaliation that the situation had become even more dire, and announced that the UN Security Council needed to convene urgently to reduce tensions.
However, the most striking reaction came from northern Europe. The President of Finland openly stated that the US had violated international law, questioned the legitimacy of the operation carried out against a sovereign state, and emphasized that the international community needed to take a clearer stance against such unilateral actions. Coming from the leader of a NATO member state known for its traditionally moderate policies, this statement was highly significant and caused discomfort in Washington. Other European powers, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, followed a similar line, drawing attention to the risk of the conflict turning into a regional war and inviting the parties to return to negotiation under the UN umbrella.
The reactions of regional actors took shape along a far more pragmatic, anxious line than those of the international community. Oman and Egypt immediately stepped in and accelerated their mediation efforts between the parties. While the Sultan of Oman shuttled between Tehran and Washington, Egyptian leadership openly expressed its concern about the conflict spreading to the region, particularly Gaza and Sinai. Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar faced the most difficult equation. On one hand, the US bases on their territories had come under direct Iranian attack, and their security was threatened; on the other hand, they were wary of their response to this attack disrupting the delicate balance they maintained with Iran.
These countries’ official statements remained limited to general expressions such as “preserving stability” and “ending the conflict,” carefully avoiding any clear stance that would openly support the US or condemn Iran. Behind the scenes, however, information leaked that Gulf states were making urgent, pragmatic contacts with Iran to protect energy security and trade routes. This was the most concrete indicator that faith in the US security umbrella had been shaken, and that regional countries had begun seeking new ways to ensure their own security. Iran’s missile strikes had painfully demonstrated that war could paralyze economic and commercial life by hitting commercial centers such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi, as well as offshore oil platforms. This picture created a deep crisis of confidence in relations between the US and its traditional Middle Eastern allies and pushed regional countries to take bolder steps to diversify their relationships with other global powers, such as China and Russia.
In the context of regional security architecture, the defense infrastructure and forward bases deployed in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf countries, rather than serving as expected buffer zones for attackers, became strategic burdens expanding the geographical scope of the conflict. In the recent conflict, Iran’s missile and drone strikes targeted commercial and tourism centers such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi, and offshore oil platforms in the UAE waters were also struck. This reveals the limitations of the host countries’ strategy of providing base access in exchange for a security umbrella. Furthermore, the US military presence in the region lost its expected deterrent function, instead assuming the role of a lightning rod that attracted conflict. This not only increased military risks but also narrowed the diplomatic maneuvering space of regional countries, emerging as a factor feeding regional instability.
While classical deterrence theories expect a strong military presence to dissuade aggressors, developments on the ground reveal that power projection may not yield expected results. This has created a strategic dilemma for Gulf states. In this context, these countries want to see the Iranian threat neutralized, while at the same time wanting to avoid their own territories becoming the focal point of this struggle. The common defense reflex displayed in the face of Iran’s recent missile and drone strikes took shape within this dilemma. However, this operational togetherness generated by the war appears to be a temporary cooperation arising in the face of an immediate threat, rather than a long-term strategic convergence.
Another important dimension of the regional power struggle is the strategy of meeting the need for ground forces through local actors. It is apparent that the US and Israel’s military pressure strategy against Iran does not rely solely on air and missile capacity, but also aims to create new ground forces by activating ethnic and political fault lines in the region. In this context, the potential use of Kurdish actors as ground forces draws attention as a development making the regional security architecture more complex. Additionally, the possibility exists that Washington and Tel Aviv may use Kurdish groups living in western Iran, northern Iraq, and northeastern Syria as an indirect pressure tool against Iran. This approach brings serious security concerns not only for Iran, but also for Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. This scenario could trigger a new wave of insurgency in regions of Iran with dense Kurdish populations, while also having the potential to further destabilize the already fragile political balances in Iraq and Syria. Consequently, the use of non-state actors or ethnic groups as “proxy forces” in modern hybrid warfare strategies emerges as a method that reduces the cost of direct military intervention but expands the area over which conflict spreads. This shows that the current crisis in the Middle East may acquire the character not only of an interstate war, but also of a multi-layered proxy conflict.
On the diplomatic front, the incompatibility between the domestic policy dynamics shaped by the populist rhetoric of the Trump and Netanyahu governments and the military realities on the ground has accelerated the diplomatic isolation of both countries on the global stage. This process manifests as intelligence failures and strategic entrapment. The political cost of stepping back from the initiated military escalation was perceived as higher than the military cost of continuing it. The operation carried out demonstrates that the US and Israel have completely lost faith in diplomatic efforts regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Indeed, despite negotiations conducted through Omani mediation yielding positive signals, the resort to the military option indicates that diplomacy is no longer seen as a credible tool.
Parallel to this, the Trump administration’s granting of a 10-15-day deadline to Iran for negotiations, followed by action upon its expiration, emerged as a manifestation of the situation where “the bill doesn’t match the budget.” Iran’s flexibility at the negotiating table, despite sending positive signals, fell short of meeting the red lines of the US and Israel, reinforcing the escalation decision. In this context, decision-makers’ failure to properly assess the variables on the ground and the adversary’s sub-threshold and open warfare capacities has led to serious erosion in strategic decision-making mechanisms. The perception of power has been worn down from the classical hegemonic perspective against modern hybrid and asymmetric warfare methods; the traditional “lion” figure has retreated to a “mouse” position in the region, exposing its strategic vulnerability. Furthermore, Iran’s counter-attack capacity is emerging not merely as a military threat, but as an existential risk fundamentally shaking the security architecture of Western allies in the region.
Indeed, Trump defined the purpose of the operation against Iran as “preventing them from obtaining nuclear weapons.” Meanwhile, Netanyahu openly pointed to regime change, and Trump’s call to the Iranian people to “take your country back” showed that the objective was not limited solely to military capacity but also encompassed regime transformation. This ambiguity of objectives exposes the strategic incompatibility among allies and the vagueness in the long-term political framework of the operation.
The energy security dimension is directly linked to instability and military target density in the Middle East. Military facilities in the Gulf, by attracting conflict upon themselves, have transformed the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding logistics routes into critical geopolitical fracture points. This has invalidated the core assumption of traditional energy security doctrines, namely, that producer countries enjoy absolute protection under the US umbrella. The possibility of breaching the protective shield has now become real, supply disruption risk has become a permanent norm, and a volatility spiral has emerged stemming from the high risk premium created by uncertainty in markets.
In this context, the effects of the conflict on the ground were not limited to the military and strategic sphere alone, but also created serious repercussions in energy and trade. The closure of global logistics hubs such as Dubai International Airport immediately following the conflict, and the near-standstill of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, stand out as concrete indicators of this vulnerability. A disruption at this chokepoint, through which approximately 20% of global oil supply passes, was immediately reflected in oil prices, bringing the geopolitical risk premium back to the center of the global economy. Indeed, with Iran effectively halting tanker transits through the Strait of Hormuz, a rapid price increase was experienced in oil markets; the Brent crude price, which stood at approximately $73 per barrel at the end of February 2026, quickly rose above $80 and climbed to the $85 band in spot market transactions. Moreover, energy market analysts noted that the scenario of oil prices rising to the $120-150 range could even come onto the agenda should the strait remain closed for an extended period. This not only increased inflationary pressure in energy-importing countries but also led to serious disruptions in global trade and logistics networks.
Thus, the current crisis in the Middle East created direct and rapid effects not only on military and diplomatic risks, but also on energy markets and global economic balance. Consequently, military strategies and power projections in the region are out of alignment with classical deterrence and energy security frameworks, presenting a multi-dimensional risk environment. This multi-layered crisis shows that US and Israeli military operations have not been limited to tactical superiority on the ground, but have also produced serious consequences for regional energy security and global economic stability.
From the perspective of global alliance systems, unilateral and escalatory policies have damaged the internal coherence of the Western-centered alliance structure and increased allies’ fear of being dragged into a conflict they do not want. The joint US-Israeli operation against Iran launched on February 28, 2026, clearly exposed the dimensions of this crisis: while traditional allies such as France, Spain, and Belgium voiced deep concerns, the Finnish President emphasized that the US had violated international law, and regional actors such as Oman and Egypt called for de-escalation and a return to dialogue. The operation transformed the US’s role as global leader from a security provider to a risk generator, and laid the groundwork for the establishment of a “post-American order” in the Middle East. Asymmetric resistance on the ground, the strategic maneuvers of regional actors, and international reactions reduced the effectiveness of traditional power projection, creating a catalytic effect that accelerated the global system’s transition to a multipolar structure. These developments also led to a temporary and pragmatic rapprochement between Sunni actors and Shia Iran; factoring in the risk of regional instability that the US-Israeli operation could trigger, these countries increased coordination in the areas of energy security, trade, and border security, forming a short-term balancing mechanism that transcended historical and sectarian differences.
In conclusion, recent developments in the Middle East demonstrate that classical power projection and deterrence theories possess increasingly limited explanatory power in the environment of modern hybrid warfare. Although the US and Israeli military operation against Iran provided short-term operational superiority, Iran’s asymmetric response capacity prevented this superiority from translating into a lasting strategic gain, thereby revealing that conventional military force alone is moving away from being a decisive tool for determining regional balances, and that asymmetric defense and hybrid warfare methods are becoming increasingly determinative in conflict dynamics. Moreover, from the perspective of regional security architecture, it is apparent that forward military bases deployed in Gulf countries failed to provide the expected deterrence and instead transformed into strategic targets attracting conflict. Similarly, vulnerabilities emerging in the field of energy security demonstrated that critical logistics routes such as the Strait of Hormuz are extremely sensitive not only from a regional perspective but also in terms of global economic balances. This shows that military escalation in the Middle East has created a multi-dimensional crisis affecting not only regional security but also global energy markets and trade networks. Parallel to this, the foregrounding of the military option at the diplomatic level has increased question marks regarding the effectiveness of international law and negotiation mechanisms, and has weakened the internal cohesion of the Western-centered alliance system. The questioning of the US’s role as a security provider and allies’ adoption of a more cautious approach has accelerated the search for new equilibria in the international system, thus making the current crisis in the Middle East an important indicator not only of regional conflict but also of the transformation of global power distribution and the shaping of a multipolar international system. The picture that emerges in this framework shows that military force alone is insufficient to produce lasting political results, and that regional stability can only be achieved through multilateral diplomacy and the strengthening of inclusive security mechanisms, otherwise indicating that this multi-layered crisis in the Middle East will continue to affect regional balances, as well as the global security and economic order, for a long time to come.
