One of the most prominent trends observed in European politics over the last two decades has been the transformation of traditional party systems by far-right and populist movements. One of the most visible examples of this transformation has occurred in the Netherlands. Known as the “stable European model” for its relatively high living standards, strong welfare state, and institutionalized democracy, the Netherlands has witnessed the rise of a political discourse based on identity, immigration, and opposition to the European Union (EU) since the 2000s. This process, symbolized by Pim Fortuyn’s rapid rise in 2002, gained institutional significance with the founding of the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) under Geert Wilders in 2006.
The PVV’s rhetoric, at odds with the traditionally liberal-pluralistic structure of Dutch political culture, has been based on themes of “national identity,” “the threat of Islamization,” and “anti-elite sentiment.” The increasing influx of refugees in the 2010s, the European debt crisis, and Brussels-centered integration debates created a backdrop for the party’s growing popularity. Wilders has become a mainstream opposition figure in Dutch politics, achieving notable successes, particularly in the 2017 and 2023 elections. However, this rise has also triggered a defensive response among centrist parties, systematically limiting the PVV’s coalition potential.
The factors that explain the rise of the far-right in the Netherlands are not only economic but also cultural and psychological. The growing immigrant population, socioeconomic disparities between urban and rural areas, distrust in European integration, and the perception that traditional identities are eroding have all served as fuel for populist rhetoric. By uniting these dynamics around the concepts of “national sovereignty” and “freedom,” Wilders has succeeded in generating an emotional response in the electorate. However, the PVV’s policies have largely served as a channel for protest votes and have failed to achieve the political flexibility necessary to form a government.
The 2025 Dutch general elections are considered a turning point in the country’s political history. The rise of far-right tendencies in previous elections was significantly curtailed this time, while the centrist Democrats 66 (D66) made a strong surge. Exit polls showed that D66 and the PVV, led by Geert Wilders, won almost equal seats. However, the mainstream parties’ clear refusal to form a coalition with Wilders has created a strong expectation that the far-right will remain outside the government[i]. This situation marks a significant period in terms of both the domestic political balance in the Netherlands and the direction of populism across Europe.
D66’s electoral success is linked not only to its political content but also to the style of its campaign. The party adopted a “constructive, hopeful, and positive” discourse throughout the election campaign. This resonated with voters weary of the polarizing and alienating rhetoric that had long dominated public opinion. Party leader Rob Jetten’s youthful, socially liberal, and pro-European profile has built trust, particularly among urban voters. The surge in votes in major cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam has demonstrated that D66 has broadened its social base. D66’s success is arguably influenced not only by its political program but also by the renewed appeal of a centerline approach that promises stability and governability[ii].
Meanwhile, the PVV, led by Geert Wilders, failed to maintain the momentum it had achieved in previous years. While Wilders’ anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and distancing policies from the European Union gave him a significant advantage in the 2023 elections, this rhetoric resonated with a limited electorate in the 2025 elections. While Wilders’ party will continue to hold a strong parliamentary group, the centrist parties’ pronounced “coalition without Wilders” approach has virtually eliminated his chances of becoming prime minister[iii]. This situation is also significant because it demonstrates that the recent populist wave in European politics cannot necessarily translate into power. Populist parties may garner electoral support at some point, but they face serious obstacles regarding their legitimacy and coalition capacity within the system.
Because the Dutch system is based on proportional representation, no single party can form a government. Therefore, the coalition negotiations, expected to be lengthy after the election, are shaping the country’s political agenda. Among the most likely scenarios is D66 forming an alliance with parties like the center-right Christian Democrats (CDA) and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), as well as the left-leaning Greens (GL) or the Labor Party (PvdA)[iv]. Such a government’s broad ideological base would necessitate serious negotiations in decision-making. However, a formula that excludes Wilders is interpreted by European public opinion as a “reconsolidation of the democratic center.”
Another notable aspect of these elections is the shift in voter behavior. The fear, anger, and identity-based politics that have long dominated Europe have been replaced by a desire for economic stability and social consensus. A large portion of Dutch voters are inclined to support parties that address concrete issues such as energy prices, the housing crisis, and climate change[v]. D66’s detailed policy proposals and technocratic approach to these issues have generated greater trust than populist emotional rhetoric. This situation serves as an important precedent for centrist parties in Europe, as the weakening of centrist politics in many countries over the past decade has paved the way for the rise of populism. The Dutch electorate appears to have temporarily put the brake on this trend.
However, the far-right cannot be said to have been completely neutralized. Formations outside Wilders’ party, such as JA21 and Forum for Democracy (FvD), have maintained a certain presence among the more radical segments of the electorate[vi]. This demonstrates the populist right’s capacity to reorganize in the long term. A similar situation is observed in Europe in countries like France, Germany, and Italy: even if centrist parties exhibit a short-term recovery, populist movements have the opportunity to resurface as long as they fail to provide lasting solutions to structural problems. Therefore, the 2025 elections do not signal the complete decline of the far-right, but rather a period in which its boundaries are being redefined.
These results in the Netherlands could also be decisive for the overall political direction of Europe. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, far-right parties increased their votes in many countries but failed to significantly influence government formation. The Dutch example demonstrates a similar dynamic at play at the national level: populist parties gain electoral visibility but still struggle to find a place at the center of institutional politics. This trend may provide short-term relief for pro-EU parties, but this relief will be temporary if voters’ expectations are not met quickly and effectively.
In conclusion, the 2025 Dutch general elections demonstrated that the populist wave in Europe may be a periodic reaction rather than a permanent trend. While D66’s success demonstrates that a politics based on hope and stability can revive, Wilders’ limited victory demonstrates that the far-right maintains a mass base but remains weak in its capacity for systemic transformation. The most significant challenge facing the Netherlands in the coming period is whether a broad-based coalition can forge a sustainable governance model. If the D66-led government can provide concrete solutions to economic problems and immigration debates, this could pave the way for the resurgence of centrist politics in Europe. However, a failed coalition process could lead to a resurgence of populism after a temporary lull. Therefore, the 2025 elections represent a critical laboratory test not only for the Netherlands but also for the future of European democracies.
[i] Jon Henley, “Geert Wilders faces shutout as centrists hail huge gains in knife-edge Dutch election”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/30/geert-wilders-faces-shutout-centrists-dutch-election-netherlands (Access Date: 31.10.2025).
[ii] Paul Kirby & Anna Holligan, “Dutch centrist liberals neck and neck with populist Wilders in tight election”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpwvy4w875vo (Access Date: 31.10.2025).
[iii] Bart H. Meijer, Toby Sterling & Anthony Deutsch, “Dutch centrist D66 party wins big in election as Wilders loses support”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/dutch-vote-elections-test-european-populisms-reach-2025-10-29/ (Access Date: 31.10.2025).
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Claire Moses & Jeanna Smialek, “Dutch Voters Deliver Major Setback to Far-Right Party of Geert Wilders”, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/29/world/europe/netherlands-elections-geert-wilders.html (Access Date: 31.10.2025).
[vi] Ibid.
