The future of the New START Agreement is among the top items on the international agenda, and the fact that the Agreement will expire in 2026 is creating serious concerns regarding the control of nuclear weapons. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov states that under current conditions, a new nuclear arms reduction agreement with the United States of America (USA) is “unimaginable.”[1] These statements indicate that the Ukraine War and the deepening mistrust between the USA and Russia constitute a significant obstacle to a new strategic arms control effort.
Due to Russia suspending its participation in the New START Agreement in 2023, there is currently no effective verification and inspection mechanism between the parties. The parties no longer share data mutually, do not carry out field inspections, and do not fulfill notification-based obligations. However, the complete expiration of the agreement in 2026 will mean the disappearance of all inspection regimes not only in practice but also legally. In such an environment, the removal of all controls over the number and capacity of weapons may lead to a deepening of strategic uncertainties and a more fragile structure of the nuclear deterrence balance.
In the current geopolitical environment, it is considered that a new strategic arms control agreement does not appear possible in the short term. Russia’s desire to preserve its advantage especially in tactical nuclear weapons strengthens the possibility that it may be unwilling to accept more transparent and intense verification regimes. This situation may be a sign that Moscow is constructing the Ukraine War and the expanding influence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a diplomatic basis to avoid new agreements.
On the part of the USA, in the event of the expiration of the New START Agreement, it can be predicted that a “temporary mutual limitation” model will be adopted. This model was an approach adopted with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Reagan era when the SALT II Agreement was not in force, and under current conditions, it is seen as possible for the parties to implement de facto limitations without an official agreement.[2] However, such unofficial approaches appear unlikely to ensure lasting stability in the long term.
At the same time, it appears likely that the USA will accelerate its nuclear modernization programs. With the commissioning of systems such as Columbia-class ballistic submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, and B-21 stealth bombers, it can be predicted that the USA will establish a multi-layered deterrence strategy against Russia and China.
On the other hand, the increase in China’s nuclear capacity has made it one of the central actors in global strategic stability. The USA and Russia may want to establish a new balance that includes China. However, Beijing still maintains that its nuclear capacity is behind that of the USA and Russia, and approaches multilateral restrictions with distance. In the future, China’s desire to maintain its global leadership ambitions and protect its economic interests may push Beijing into a more constructive position. In this direction, it seems possible for trilateral negotiations to begin in the medium to long term. However, in the short term, due to China’s reserved stance, achieving concrete progress appears quite difficult.
Russia’s acceptance of extending New START in 2021 indicates that Moscow, at that time, was in pursuit of preserving strategic stability, gaining time for the development of new-generation nuclear systems (such as Avangard, Sarmat), and appearing as a constructive actor in the international public opinion. With the transition process from Trump to Biden, the understanding that the USA would again give importance to arms control strengthened the expectation that this extension would create a diplomatic gain for Russia. Additionally, the need to establish a balance, albeit limited, with the USA against China’s rapidly increasing nuclear capacity prepared the ground for Moscow to support this decision.
However, the reality that these conditions have brought forth today points to a different strategic picture. As of 2025, with the Ukraine War, all trust-based relations between Russia and the West have been severed; a more aggressive approach has become dominant in the Kremlin. This situation leads to the conclusion that the steps taken in the past to preserve strategic balance have today formed a basis for Russia to increase its nuclear capacity in an uncontrolled manner. Especially the superiority achieved in tactical nuclear weapons serves Moscow’s avoidance of participating in a new arms control regime and continuing its strategy of preserving its current superiority.
Therefore, the extension decision made in 2021 with pragmatic interests appears to have laid the ground for Russia to pursue nuclear competition on a more risky basis and to move away from the international arms control architecture.
If current trends continue, entering a period without an agreement is considered the most realistic possibility. In such a period, the development of hypersonic weapons, AI-supported command-control systems, and space-based surveillance technologies will make the nuclear balance even more fragile.
As Russia increases its tactical nuclear capacity outside of control and the USA accelerates its nuclear modernization programs, both sides will be unable to be sure of each other’s intentions, and mutual suspicions may trigger new armament cycles. In Europe, the tendency of countries like France and Germany to develop independent nuclear deterrence strategies may strengthen. NATO’s redefining of its nuclear strategy documents and increasing its military fortification on the eastern flank are among possible developments.
In diplomatic channels, Europe’s exerting more pressure on China and forcing it toward transparency steps may become one of the long-term strategic goals of the Western alliance. In contrast, Russia’s orientation toward a closer strategic cooperation with China and strengthening Eurasia-centered security arrangements are also among possible scenarios.
As a result, the expiration of the New START Agreement is laying the ground for entering a multipolar nuclear competition era. Although the possibility of a new agreement appears possible in the long term, in the short term it faces serious obstacles. In the event that a period without agreement begins, the world may enter a more fragile, unstable, and risky period in terms of nuclear balance. In this environment, the likelihood of small crises rapidly escalating into large-scale conflicts will increase. Europe’s orientation toward strategic autonomy, NATO’s reshaping of its nuclear policies, and the acceleration of the global arms race on the axis of hypersonic and AI-supported systems will be among the defining dynamics of the upcoming period.
[1] “Russia Will Not Return to Yeni START Treaty — Lavrov”, TASS Agency, https://tass.com/politics/1943571, (Date Accession: 21.04.2025).
[2] “Averting Unconstrained Nuclear Risks with Russia”, RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/04/averting-unconstrained-nuclear-risks-with-russia.html, (Date Accession: 21.04.2025).
