The European Union’s (EU) growing interest in the Central Asia region in recent times has not been limited to economic collaborations but has also led to diplomatic steps that could influence the region’s geopolitical balance. This analysis examines the core dynamics of the EU’s strategic outreach to Central Asia, particularly focusing on investment projects, institutional partnerships, and the geopolitical impacts of this process.
1. The EU’s Outreach to Central Asia: Strategic Investments and Diplomatic Moves
The first EU-Central Asia Summit held at the leadership level in Samarkand on April 4, 2025, stands out as one of the clearest indicators of the EU’s strategic outreach to Central Asia. The €10 billion investment package announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the summit was shaped under the EU’s “Global Gateway” strategy. This initiative aims to create an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and seeks to diversify the EU’s connections in the digital, energy, transportation, and climate sectors.[1]
Most of the investments are directed toward Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and, to some extent, Turkmenistan, with priority areas identified as infrastructure projects, energy transition, and digital connectivity. In particular, the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC) has been positioned as a strategic axis for Europe-Central Asia connectivity. This corridor crosses the Caspian Sea via Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, connecting through Georgia and Turkey to Europe. The EU’s support for this project is significant not only from a logistical standpoint but also in terms of geopolitical balance.
The EU is attempting to establish its relations with Central Asian countries not merely on an economic basis but also on an institutional and value-based foundation. In this context, the “Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCA)” are among the most comprehensive foreign policy tools used with the region.[2] After signing an agreement with Kyrgyzstan in 2024, negotiations with Uzbekistan are nearing completion, and technical talks with Turkmenistan have been initiated. EPCAs cover multilayered areas such as political dialogue, trade liberalization, energy, environment, digitalization, good governance, and human rights.
The EU’s strategy of institutional integration aligns with its aim to integrate Central Asian countries more closely into the international system while also offering an alternative partnership structure to China and Russia. In this framework, the EU has announced its support for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s accession processes to the World Trade Organization (WTO). This support seeks to enhance the regional countries’ integration into the global economic order while strengthening the normative basis of their relations with the EU.
It is observed that such structural supports by the EU are also influencing the foreign policy positions of Central Asian countries. The recognition of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, while not directly but indirectly linked to close contacts and strategic agreements like EPCA with the EU, is notable. Thus, the EU’s incentive packages serve not only developmental purposes but also indirectly steer diplomatic positions.
2. EU-Central Asia Energy Cooperation
The EU positions energy cooperation with Central Asian countries as one of its key strategic priorities under its energy supply diversification policy.[3] In this context, the Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline Project, crossing the Caspian Sea, aligns with the EU’s goal of reducing dependence on Russian gas. Despite technical and political challenges, the project which is planned to channel energy through Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan toward Europe remains on the EU’s radar.
Central Asian countries’ extensive energy reserves (especially natural gas and uranium) and Europe’s sustainable energy transition goals have further diversified areas of cooperation. Turkmenistan, which holds the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, and Kazakhstan, the top global uranium producer, make this cooperation particularly critical.
The EU is focusing not only on a fossil fuel-based energy policy but also on renewable energy and critical raw materials from a green transition perspective. In this regard, cooperation mechanisms are being established with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on investments in green hydrogen, solar and wind energy, and the supply of critical raw materials such as rare earth elements.
The Critical Raw Materials Act, initiated by the EU in 2022, aims to diversify external supply sources and reduce dependence on China. Central Asia has been identified as a potential partner region under this act. Notably, the “Strategic Partnership Memorandum” signed with Kazakhstan at the end of 2023 has become a cornerstone of this collaboration.
EU-Central Asia energy cooperation carries not only technical and economic but also geopolitical significance. Following the Russia-Ukraine war, the shift in the EU’s energy strategy has enhanced the value of Central Asia. Thus, not only the direction of energy routes but also who builds and operates them has become increasingly important.
Although investments by China in energy infrastructure and Russia’s historical influence shape the regional energy balance and limit the EU’s maneuvering space, the EU is trying to establish a new balance by leveraging multifaceted topics such as energy security, green transition, and critical raw material competition. Central Asian countries, meanwhile, are seizing the opportunity to develop multilateral partnerships and accelerate their economic development amid this competition.[4]
3. EU-Central Asia Security Cooperation
The EU treats security parameters as one of the priority areas in its relations with Central Asia, alongside economic and institutional aspects. Especially after developments in Afghanistan post-2021, regional instability and radicalization risks have increased, adding a new dimension to the EU’s security strategies in Central Asia. In strategic documents published by the European External Action Service (EEAS) concerning Central Asia, border security, illegal migration, drug trafficking, and combating violent extremism stand out.
In this context, the EU cooperates with institutions like the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to provide support through technical capacity building, border management training, and security equipment to Central Asian countries. Preventive strategies are also being developed, such as youth education, social inclusion programs, and the supervision of religious structures to combat radicalization.
The EU’s security policies in Central Asia are designed not merely around classical border security and counterterrorism but also toward strengthening the institutional capacity of regional states and promoting stability. This strategy enhances the EU’s presence not only as an external security provider but also as a soft power actor in the region.
The EU’s engagement in the security domain reflects an approach aiming to facilitate Central Asian states’ integration into the international security system while balancing China’s and Russia’s influence over regional security. Thus, the EU is positioning itself not merely as a passive observer but as an active regulator shaping regional stability.
The increasing influence of the Organization of Turkic States and the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as an observer within the organization have prompted the EU to take a more active stance toward the region. The indirect support for the recognition of the Greek Cypriot Administration in the EU’s engagements with Central Asian countries, especially Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, highlights this. The close ties these countries are developing with the EU while recognizing the GCASC reinforce barriers against the international recognition of the TRNC and complicate Turkey’s diplomatic position.
Incentives such as investments from the EU, political support, and integration into international platforms (such as WTO membership) play a decisive role in their foreign policy preferences. Thus, these preferences are not mere diplomatic concessions but rather the natural outcomes of a multilateral strategic orientation. However, the fact that the EU uses these soft power tools to reinforce the international position of the GCASC makes the process more complex.
In conclusion, the EU’s presence in Central Asia is no longer limited to economic and technical assistance. In shaping its regional strategies, the EU is also indirectly reflecting its own internal political positions in its foreign policy. This shows that a multilayered and sophisticated diplomacy is being conducted, which can have an impact even on internationally sensitive issues such as the Cyprus dispute.
[1] “İlk AB-Orta Asya zirvesinin ardından ortak basın açıklaması”, Consilium, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/04/04/joint-press-release-following-the-first-eu-central-asia-summit/, (Accessed: 28.04.2025).
[2] “AB ve Kırgız Cumhuriyeti Arasındaki Geliştirilmiş Ortaklık ve İş birliği Anlaşması Hakkında Bilgi Notu”, EEAS, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/factsheet-enhanced-partnership-and-cooperation-agreement-between-eu-and-kyrgyz-republic_en?utm_source=chatgpt.com, (Accessed: 28.04.2025).
[3] “Enerji geçişi”, Europarl, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762409, (Accessed: 28.04.2025).
[4] “Dünya Enerji Görünümü 2024”, IEA, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024, (Accessed: 28.04.2025).
