The European Union’s security approach has undergone a transformation in recent years, moving beyond the traditional understanding of defence as the threats facing Europe have diversified. The Russia–Ukraine war, hybrid attacks, cyber threats, sabotage attempts, and the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the security domain have made it necessary for the Union to reassess its capacity for collective action in response to crises. One of the current manifestations of this transformation is the security proposals put forward by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her“State of the Union”address delivered at the European Parliament on 16 September 2026. In addition to preparing a new security strategy for Europe, von der Leyen proposed the establishment of a common emergency security protocol for incidents that remain below the threshold of an armed attack but threaten national security, as well as the establishment of a European Security Council. She also raised the issue of strengthening joint European investments in key supporting elements of defence, such as air and missile defence, strategic transport, space, and cyber capabilities.[i] These proposals demonstrate that the EU’s security approach is directed not only towards increasing military capacity, but also towards strengthening institutional coordination against hybrid threats, developing strategic capabilities, and reinforcing common response mechanisms among member states.
At the heart of this transformation lies a change in the nature of the threats facing Europe. While threats in the traditional understanding of security were largely assessed in terms of overt military attacks and conventional conflicts between states, today, cyberattacks, sabotage attempts, the targeting of critical infrastructure, disinformation and foreign interference activities, as well as security risks posed by unmanned aerial vehicles, can affect the security of states even without an overt military conflict or declaration of war. The European Commission also addresses its current security approach within the framework of this changing threat environment and draws attention to the increasingly intensifying hybrid threats facing Europe. The fact that certain threats can emerge below the threshold of armed conflict makes it necessary for security policies to be shaped not only by the capacity to respond to attacks that have already occurred, but also by the capacity to detect, assess, and manage threats in a coordinated manner. Within this framework, von der Leyen’s approach points to the strengthening of a proactive understanding of security in European security policy, moving beyond an approach based on responding after a crisis has emerged towards identifying threats at an earlier stage, assessing them collectively, and developing a coordinated political response among member states.
Within this framework, the proposed Emergency Security Protocol stands out as one of the significant institutional innovations in the European security architecture. The mechanism’s primary objective is to ensure that other member states can rapidly come together and formulate a common European response to threats that do not reach the level of a direct armed attack but seriously affect the national security of a member state. In this respect, the proposal envisages a consultation and coordination mechanism that can be compared with Article 4 of NATO. At the same time, it aims to develop a more systematic and coordinated political response at the European Union level to hybrid threats. The fundamental change here is that the understanding of security is no longer limited to responding to an armed attack that has already occurred, but also envisages collective action in response to cyberattacks, sabotage attempts, and similar hybrid threats. Such a mechanism aims to bring the differing threat perceptions of European states together within a common security assessment framework and strengthen political coordination in response to threats. Nevertheless, the mechanism’s practical effectiveness will depend on the criteria used to determine which incidents trigger the protocol and on the capacity of member states to reach agreement on a common threat assessment.
The proposal for a European Security Council reveals the broader geopolitical dimension of this security transformation. In von der Leyen’s approach, Europe’s security is not addressed within a framework limited solely to the security of European Union member states; rather, a broader political security format is envisaged, in which countries holding important positions within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, such as Canada, Norway, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, could also participate. This approach demonstrates that the distinction between the institutional boundaries of European security and its geopolitical and strategic scope is becoming increasingly pronounced. Ukraine’s emergence in particular as one of the potential participants in this structure reveals the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on the reshaping of the European security order. The inclusion of NATO member states such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Norway in this structure also reflects the EU’s pursuit of extending security cooperation beyond the Union’s borders. Nevertheless, how such a formation would operate in terms of the division of labour with NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and other existing security mechanisms emerges as an important institutional issue. Therefore, the establishment of a European Security Council is not merely a matter of creating a new institutional structure; it points to a broader process that could bring the division of responsibilities, coordination, and authority relations among existing security mechanisms in Europe back under consideration.
Another important dimension of the new security approach is that Europe’s defence capacity is not addressed solely in terms of weapons systems and military personnel. The Russia–Ukraine war has made the importance of supporting elements such as air and missile defence, strategic transport, air-to-air refuelling, space, and cyber capabilities more visible in terms of the effectiveness and sustainability of modern military capacity. These elements, defined by the European Commission as strategic enablers, constitute critical supporting capabilities that enable the effective use of military forces. Therefore, strengthening Europe’s defence capacity is not limited solely to increasing defence expenditure or developing more weapons systems. It also requires the joint development of technological, logistical, and strategic support infrastructures that enable military capabilities to operate effectively. In this regard, the design of the European Strategic Enablers Instrument proposed by the European Commission in full alignment with NATO demonstrates that efforts to strengthen Europe’s defence capacity are envisaged to be carried out in coordination with the existing NATO defence structure. Thus, the development of Europe’s defence capacity is moving towards a more comprehensive approach based not only on increasing national military capabilities, but also on establishing critical supporting capabilities at a collective level.
This development also brings the debate on Europe’s strategic autonomy into a new dimension. Strategic autonomy is understood not so much as Europe becoming a completely independent actor in its foreign and security policies, but rather as developing capabilities that can reduce its dependence on external resources and capacities in critical security and defence areas. Particularly at a time when debates concerning the role of the United States in European security are intensifying, Europe’s move towards developing its own capabilities in areas such as the defence industry, intelligence capacity, space infrastructure, cybersecurity, and strategic transport reveals its pursuit of increasing its ability to act independently in the security domain. Nevertheless, interpreting Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy as a separation from NATO or the creation of a security structure alternative to NATO does not fully correspond to the existing policy framework. Indeed, the European Commission envisages that initiatives aimed at developing new strategic capabilities will be developed in alignment with NATO. Within this framework, the emerging approach reflects an effort to develop capabilities that would enable Europe to strengthen its own defence capacity, assume greater responsibility within the existing alliance structure, and rely more heavily on its own resources when necessary, rather than creating an alternative security system that would replace NATO.
One of the notable features of the new security approach is that the concept of security is increasingly acquiring a technological dimension. Cybersecurity, space systems, satellite technologies, intelligence infrastructures, and unmanned systems are moving beyond their role as elements supporting traditional military capacity and becoming fundamental components of strategic capability. This transformation increases the importance of the capacity to collect data, process data, and develop forward-looking projections based on the information obtained within security policies. The security capacity of a state or international organization is now associated not only with the physical military assets it possesses, but also with its ability to analyse data obtained from different sources in real time, classify threats, and accelerate decision-making processes. Within this framework, Europe’s new security approach demonstrates that the role of technological and digital capacity in the formulation and implementation of security policies is steadily increasing. Thus, security is becoming a multidimensional domain shaped not only by the quantity of military resources, but also by data, technology, and information-processing capacity.
This situation is particularly important in terms of the increasingly significant role of artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-support systems in security policies. The complex and multidimensional nature of hybrid threats may necessitate the simultaneous assessment of data obtained from different sources. Processes such as monitoring cyberattacks, analysing the movements of unmanned aerial vehicles, detecting unusual activities targeting critical infrastructure, and identifying disinformation networks require large amounts of data to be processed and interpreted within a short period of time. At this point, AI-supported analytical systems stand out as technological tools that can contribute to reducing the information burden faced by decision-makers and developing early-warning mechanisms concerning threats. Nevertheless, the use of algorithmic systems in the security domain also brings various problems, such as data quality, algorithmic bias, transparency, accountability, and false-positive results. Therefore, developing technological capacity alone does not guarantee an increase in the level of security; the institutional, legal, and ethical framework within which artificial intelligence and algorithmic systems will be used is also becoming one of the fundamental elements of security policy.
Within this framework, the new security architecture proposed by von der Leyen points to a more comprehensive transformation in the European Union’s understanding of security, one that is not based solely on increasing capacity. This transformation is not limited solely to increasing defence expenditure or developing new military projects. At the same time, Europe’s approach to defining and assessing threats, its decision-making mechanisms, security coordination among member states, its relations with NATO, and its capacity in critical technologies are being reconsidered. As the security domain becomes increasingly digitalized, data-processing capacity, artificial intelligence, cyber infrastructure, space systems, and strategic communication tools are becoming fundamental elements of Europe’s future security architecture. In this direction, the security plan brought to the agenda in 2026 presents a more comprehensive approach aimed at strengthening the European Union’s technological and security capacity alongside its economic and normative instruments.
The new security approach announced by von der Leyen reveals the European Union’s effort to develop an institutional response to the changing international security environment. The proposed Emergency Security Protocol aims to provide faster political coordination in response to threats. The European Security Council envisages a broader framework for security cooperation extending beyond the Union’s borders. The Strategic Enablers Instrument, meanwhile, aims to strengthen the technological and logistical infrastructure supporting Europe’s defence capacity.
The implementation of these proposals, however, depends on various political, financial, and institutional conditions. First and foremost, member states need to reach agreement on the nature of threats and common security priorities. In particular, establishing clear criteria regarding the circumstances under which the Emergency Security Protocol will be activated is important for the mechanism’s effectiveness. As for the European Security Council, its areas of responsibility and duties will need to be clarified in relation to NATO and other existing security structures. With regard to the Strategic Enablers Instrument, sustainable financing, joint procurement, and member states’ implementation of the necessary capacity investments will also be decisive. The Commission’s earlier preparatory work also emphasizes that strengthening Europe’s security and preparedness capacity requires common and national responsibilities to be carried out jointly.
For this reason, the feasibility of the plan in question depends not only on the political will demonstrated by the Commission, but also on the member states’ capacity for joint decision-making and resource mobilization. Differences in national priorities in the security domain, financing requirements, and the division of authority among existing institutions may constitute the main challenges in the implementation process. Conversely, designing the initiatives in alignment with NATO and carrying them out in coordination with existing European security mechanisms are among the factors that may support institutional feasibility. In this respect, the Commission’s particular emphasis on full alignment with NATO for the Strategic Enablers Instrument is important.
In this respect, Europe’s new security pursuit represents an institutional transformation process planned to be developed gradually, rather than a completed security architecture. Within this transformation, the understanding of security is not limited solely to military capacity, but also encompasses data processing, artificial intelligence, cyber infrastructure, space systems, and early-warning mechanisms. Therefore, the new approach demonstrates that the importance of technological capacity and data-driven decision-making processes in European security is increasing. Whether the plan will develop into a lasting security capacity will depend on the ability to sustain political consensus, financial resources, and interinstitutional coordination.
[i] European Commission,” 2026 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen”, 16 September 2026,https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_26_1868, (Date Accessed: 21.09.2026).
