The European Union faces the challenge of structurally advancing its internal security to a higher stage in the face of evolving threat environments. In this context, Europol, the European Union’s agency responsible for cooperation between law enforcement authorities, is increasingly becoming the focus of political reform debates. Since 2024, the European Commission has been pursuing plans to significantly expand Europol’s mandate and personnel capacity. Within this scope, it is envisioned to double the number of personnel and include new task areas such as sabotage, disinformation, and hybrid threats into the agency’s jurisdiction. While these initiatives point to a new phase in Europol’s institutional development process, they also bring about fundamental questions regarding the agency’s concrete added value, institutional boundaries, and strategic alignment within the European internal security architecture.
The development of Europol is closely linked to the European Union’s unique approach to the field of internal security. This approach envisions the gradual strengthening of operational support and coordination structures at the European level while maintaining that the authority to conduct investigations and take coercive measures always remains within the sovereign domain of member states. Although Europol’s institutional origins date back to informal counter-terrorism cooperation in the 1970s, the agency was officially established as the Europol Drugs Unit in the early 1990s and began its activities as an independent EU agency in 1999. Since then, Europol has undergone several reforms, and its mandate has been gradually expanded. Security policy ruptures, particularly over the last two decades, have been decisive in this process. Terrorist attacks since 2015, along with the digitalization and increasing transnational nature of organized crime, led to comprehensive mandate revisions in 2016 and 2022. As a result of these reforms, Europol gained expanded powers in counter-terrorism, cybercrime, and data processing. Today, these areas, along with the fight against international drug trafficking, are among the primary tasks of the agency.
Despite significant expansions in its field of duty, Europol is institutionally structured clearly as a support and analysis agency. Under Article 88 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Europol is prohibited from independently initiating investigations or applying coercive measures. Operational responsibility continues to reside with national law enforcement authorities who voluntarily request support from Europol. The support offered by Europol covers activities such as crime analysis, coordination of cross-border investigations, and the operation of secure communication and information-sharing platforms. In recent years, the scope of these support activities has increased remarkably. Parallel to this, various specialized centers have been established within Europol to concentrate expertise in specific crime areas. These include centers focusing on organized crime, cybercrime, terrorism, and financial and economic crimes. Furthermore, Europol’s mandate has expanded to include numerous other crime types such as human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and violations of EU sanctions.
The recent reform initiatives of the European Commission can be evaluated within the context of political power and governance dynamics. Statements regarding the transformation of Europol into a truly effective police force came to the fore during Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s re-election process in 2024. In her programmatic statements, von der Leyen emphasized the need for a more effective fight against new forms of threats, particularly sabotage, hybrid attacks, and disinformation. However, what this institutional transformation concretely implies remains largely uncertain. Strategy and mission documents published by the Commission point toward an intensification of the existing supportive role rather than a radical break from the previous model. Nevertheless, the intention to significantly increase Europol’s personnel capacity and officially expand its mandate is being pursued alongside the strengthening of oversight over the agency.
The reactions of member states to these reform plans are generally cautious. There is no clear political demand for granting a new mandate to Europol. On the contrary, the majority of national actors and police chiefs of member states emphasize that Europol should remain a supportive coordination center. The transformation of the agency into an operational police force with its own intervention powers is largely rejected, especially due to concerns regarding the protection of national sovereignty. However, a wide range of views exists within the Council of the European Union. While some small member states see an enhanced role for Europol as a relief for national capacities, Central and Eastern European countries, in particular, approach the transfer of authority with more distance. Germany, traditionally adopting a mediating stance, supports mandate adaptations aimed at improving analysis, coordination, and data sharing, but opposes the creation of a “European FBI.”
The question of whether new threat areas should be included in Europol’s mandate can be addressed through different dimensions. Including sabotage actions within Europol’s scope appears reasonable in principle, especially when they involve cross-border structures or target critical infrastructures. In such cases, Europol can provide significant added value for member states through comprehensive threat and situation analyses. Conversely, the official inclusion of disinformation and hybrid threats into Europol’s mandate carries a more problematic nature. These phenomena are not sufficiently clearly defined from a legal perspective and overlap with the jurisdictions of other EU actors, such as the European External Action Service or special task forces. Additionally, due to its mandate based on criminal law, Europol can only operate in cases where concrete crime types are involved. Therefore, an expansion toward areas of political and normative uncertainty brings the risk of institutional conflicts and waste of resources.
Even within its current mandate framework, Europol operates within a multi-actor European security structure. There are task overlaps with Frontex, Eurojust, ENISA, the newly established EU Customs Agency, and the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA). An additional expansion of mandate will further increase the need for clearer governance and distribution of tasks within the European internal security architecture. In this framework, the question arises as to whether the current reform plans are driven by budgetary and administrative logic rather than security policy requirements. In practice, mandate expansions often serve as a prerequisite for significant budget increases, even if they are not necessary in terms of content. This situation brings the risk of dispersing strategic focus.
Even without a formal change in mandate, it is observed that Europol already operates under serious financial and structural pressures. The intensive use of secure communication systems and the increasing number of analytical products have significantly increased the workload. In contrast, significant potential remains untapped in areas such as environmental crimes, violent crimes, and the systematic use of existing cooperation tools. Europol’s international reputation is based on the successful support services it provides, especially in high-complexity investigations in the digital field. Cases involving the dismantling of encrypted communication networks or the analysis of terrorist structures clearly demonstrate the added value the agency can provide even within the current mandate framework. Sustaining this depends on consistent investments in innovation, technological sovereignty, and qualified human resources.
One of the key tools in strengthening Europol is the systematic promotion of innovation. The agency needs to be positioned as a Europe-wide criminal technologies center, particularly in the fields of big data analytics, artificial intelligence, and digital forensics. In this context, it is important to establish closer cooperation with the European private sector and develop the necessary infrastructures in line with data protection principles. On the other hand, there are significant deficiencies in the transfer of information between Europol and national authorities. Many of the existing tools and platforms are not sufficiently well-known even among experienced investigators. Systematic training, temporary secondment of Europol personnel to national centers, and more effective use of the agency’s early warning mechanisms could contribute to addressing these deficiencies.
The debate regarding the future of Europol is essentially part of a broader discussion on the strategic orientation of European internal security. A hasty expansion of mandate carries the risk of creating institutional uncertainties and political tensions. In contrast, a targeted strengthening of Europol’s existing competencies, the promotion of operational innovation, and the deepening of the agency’s integration into national investigations appear to be a more rational approach. In the long run, there is a need for a holistic European security strategy that addresses internal and external threats together and allows member states sufficient financial space for security investments. Therefore, rather than defining new mandate areas regarding the strengthening of Europol, there is a need for a targeted deepening of the existing analytical and technological capacity.
