Analysis

The India-Uzbekistan Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

India’s approach to Central Asia rests on a two-track strategy that advances simultaneously at the bilateral and regional levels.
India-Uzbekistan relations, and India-Central Asia cooperation more broadly, have acquired a multidimensional character over the years.
For Central Asia, developing relations with India presents important opportunities for diversifying external partnerships.

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On 29-30 August 2026, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with Uzbekistan’s President Şevket Mirziyoyev, raising relations between the two countries to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. During the talks, the parties set a target of raising the annual bilateral trade volume to five billion dollars by 2030, while also agreeing to deepen cooperation in various fields, including defense and critical minerals. It was further decided to establish a new mechanism at the level of Foreign Ministers to coordinate bilateral cooperation at a high level and to monitor the implementation of the agreements reached.[i] This mechanism reflects the parties’ determination to translate their political will into an institutional framework, to put planned projects and cooperation initiatives into practice, and to develop a more lasting and sustainable partnership.

The process of institutionalizing and deepening India-Uzbekistan relations dates back to 2011. Indeed, that same year, during President İslam Kerimov’s state visit to New Delhi, relations between the two countries were elevated to the level of a Strategic Partnership. Several documents were also signed during the visit, envisaging the expansion of economic and investment cooperation in various fields, including fuel and energy, information technology, textiles, pharmaceuticals, banking, and trade.[ii]

During this period, India’s relations with Central Asia began to acquire a more comprehensive and institutional character at the regional level, going beyond the bilateral framework established with Uzbekistan. Indeed, on 12 June 2012, India launched its “Connect Central Asia Policy,” based on a vision of proactively developing political, economic, and people-to-people relations with Central Asian countries at both the bilateral and regional levels.[iii] Another important step in the institutionalization of this process was the holding of the first India-Central Asia Dialogue in Samarkand in 2019. The first India-Central Asia Summit in 2022, in turn, elevated contacts between the parties to the leaders’ level and demonstrated the will to develop a comprehensive and lasting partnership.[iv]

All these developments show that India’s approach to Central Asia rests on a two-track strategy that advances simultaneously at the bilateral and regional levels. Within this framework, New Delhi is, on the one hand, developing its bilateral relations and partnerships with the countries of the region, while on the other hand deepening cooperation through regional mechanisms encompassing Central Asia as a whole. The steady and gradual nature of this approach makes it possible to view the elevation of India-Uzbekistan relations to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership as part of a broader and longer-term process of rapprochement.

Another element that stands out in this process is the continuity of dialogue. High-level visits, regular dialogue mechanisms, and summits demonstrate the importance India attaches to making communication and cooperation with Central Asia sustainable.

At this point, it becomes important to examine the main factors underlying India’s pursuit of deepening relations with Central Asia.

First of all, in addition to serving as a bridge to Eurasia, Central Asia occupies an important position as a geo-economic hub thanks to its rich oil, natural gas, uranium, and hydroelectric resources. These resources can contribute to New Delhi’s diversification of its energy supply. The region also holds strategic significance due to security threats emanating from Afghanistan, the lack of direct overland access to Central Asia, and the need for alternative connectivity routes. In addition, increasing its influence in the region enables India to develop its regional partnerships through multilateral platforms such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).[v]

Within India’s multidimensional approach to Central Asia, why Uzbekistan occupies a more prominent position is also a matter that warrants separate consideration.

First, Uzbekistan’s central location in Central Asia, its large population, and its importance in terms of inter-regional connectivity routes make the country a significant partner for India’s regional connectivity objectives. In addition, Tashkent’s adoption, since 2016, of a more open foreign policy focused on regional cooperation has created favorable ground for developing relations with India. Indeed, the two countries’ shared interests in connectivity, counterterrorism, energy, and trade further heighten the importance of the relationship, particularly in the context of regional security concerns stemming from Afghanistan.[vi]

However, it is not sufficient to assess this rapprochement solely through the lens of India’s regional interests. The approach of the regional countries, and particularly of Uzbekistan, toward cooperation with New Delhi also plays a significant role in the development of India-Central Asia relations.

From Central Asia’s perspective, developing relations with India presents important opportunities for diversifying external partnerships. In addition, India’s capacity in fields such as healthcare, higher education, information technology, and engineering aligns with the growing needs of Central Asian countries. Cultural and people-to-people ties developed through initiatives such as Bollywood, educational opportunities, and the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme also contribute to India being perceived as a more familiar and accessible partner in the region.[vii] Taken together, these elements suggest that India stands out for Central Asia not only in terms of diversifying external partnerships, but also as a complementary partner capable of contributing to national development and capacity-building.

From Uzbekistan’s perspective, India is regarded as a reliable and promising strategic partner. Indeed, the fact that India’s achievements in digital technologies, software development, and entrepreneurship in particular were highlighted during Narendra Modi’s visit to Uzbekistan on 30 August 2026 shows the importance Tashkent attaches to developing mutually beneficial cooperation in these fields. The aim of expanding cooperation in various fields such as energy, critical minerals, health, and agriculture, together with the fact that four Indian universities are already operating in Uzbekistan,[viii] demonstrates the multidimensional structure of relations between the two countries, spanning different fields. Viewed from this angle, the elevation of relations to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership can be characterized not merely as a change in diplomatic status, but as the transfer of already wide-ranging cooperation into a more comprehensive and institutional framework.

The progress and success of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership will depend on the extent to which the agreements reached are implemented and on how far the parties can overcome existing structural constraints. In this context, the current level of bilateral trade and the connectivity problem stand out as two limitations. The fact that India-Uzbekistan trade volume stood at 598.1 million dollars in the first half of 2026,[ix] 2 shows that significant progress will need to be made in the coming period to reach the five-billion-dollar target set for 2030. One of the main factors that could make achieving this target difficult is the connectivity problem. While the absence of direct overland access from India to Central Asia constitutes a fundamental structural constraint, and while Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) offer alternatives, India’s dependence on Iran’s transit infrastructure creates vulnerabilities in the face of sanctions and regional instability.[x]

In conclusion, India-Uzbekistan relations, and India-Central Asia cooperation more broadly, have acquired a multidimensional character over the years. Given the parties’ determination to further develop their relations, it can be said that Uzbekistan may play a significant role in shaping the future of India-Central Asia relations in this process. Should the existing structural constraints be overcome and dialogue be sustained, the progress that India-Central Asia cooperation achieves could also open the way for new opportunities in terms of broader regional engagement.


[i] “India-Uzbekistan ties go comprehensive as Modi, Mirziyoyev set $5 billion trade goal”, The Economic Times, https://shorturl.at/tAlbH, (Accessed: 12.09.2026).

[ii] Anvar Umarov, “Uzbekistan and India establish strategic partnership”, Uz Daily, https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/uzbekistan-and-india-establish-strategic-partnership/, (Accessed: 12.09.2026).

[iii] “Keynote address by MOS Shri E. Ahamed at First India-Central Asia Dialogue”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/19791/, (Accessed: 12.09.2026).

[iv] Ayusha Saini, “Decadal Review of India-Central Asia Relations: Assessing Strategic Intent and Structural Constraints”, Chintan Research Foundation, https://www.crfindia.org/publications/research-article/decadal-review-of-india-central-asia-relations-assessing-strategic-intent-and-structural-constraints, (Accessed: 12.09.2026).

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Rajershi Dharmendra, “Strategic Pivot Westward: The Importance of Uzbekistan From The Lens of Indian Foreign Policy”, EPRA International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research, https://eprapublishing.org/IJMR/strategic-pivot-westward-the-importance-of-uzbekistan-from-the-lens-of-indian-foreign-policy/20285, (Accessed: 13.09.2026).

[vii] Ayusha Saini, op. cit.

[viii] “Leaders of Uzbekistan and India outline outcomes of talks”, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, https://president.uz/en/lists/view/9553, (Accessed: 13.09.2026).

[ix] “Uzbekistan-India Cooperation in Figures”, National Statistics Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, https://stat.uz/en/press-center/news-of-committee/69973-zbekiston-va-indiston-amkorligi-ra-amlarda-4, (Accessed: 13.09.2026).

[x] Ayusha Saini, op. cit.

Banu YAKUBOVA
Banu YAKUBOVA
Banu Yakubova is a senior undergraduate student in the Department of International Relations at Kadir Has University, where she is also pursuing a minor in Social Justice and Policy Studies. As part of the Erasmus+ Exchange Programme, she studied for one semester at Sciences Po Lille in France. Her main research interests include Central Asia, foreign policy analysis, security studies, international law, and human rights. She is fluent in English, Turkish, Russian, and Turkmen, and is currently studying French.

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