The protests that intensified throughout October in various European countries have brought to light the problems accumulating within the continent’s economic, social, and political structures. In France, rising living costs and dissatisfaction with public services have brought hundreds of thousands of people onto the streets, while in Italy, economic demands have converged with opposition to defence policies. Demonstrations focusing on the housing crisis in Portugal, pension rights in Spain, and educational conditions in Belgium have taken on a different dimension in Albania and Serbia, where debates over political accountability and democratic representation have come to the fore.[i] Although each country has its own distinct political circumstances, these developments indicate that the relationship between citizens’ economic expectations and states’ capacity to formulate and implement policies is increasingly being called into question across Europe. It would therefore be inaccurate to regard these protests merely as temporary crises concerning public order.
In France, one of the countries most affected by the protests, approximately 410,000 people participated in demonstrations held on 24 October 2026, according to data from the Ministry of the Interior. Trade unions, however, argued that the turnout was higher. In Paris and several other cities, clashes broke out between security forces and certain groups following marches that had begun largely peacefully. The government’s deployment of approximately 70,000 police officers and gendarmes highlights the growing importance of security measures in managing social movements.[ii] At the same time, it is noteworthy that demands concerning educational conditions and the cost of living, which had initially dominated the demonstrations, evolved into broader expressions of economic discontent. Developments in France demonstrate how social unrest can expand from objections to specific public policies into a broader questioning of the government’s overall political and economic approach.
A similar wave of mobilisation has been observed in Italy, although the foreign policy and security dimensions of the protests are more pronounced. Demonstrations held in cities such as Rome, Milan, Turin, and Bologna have brought together demands concerning the cost of living, low wages, and public services with opposition to increased military spending and war policies. The Meloni government’s expansion of security measures, the deployment of an additional 500 soldiers to Milan, and extensive security checks conducted ahead of the demonstrations indicate a strengthening of the approach to maintaining public order. While clashes between security forces and demonstrators occurred in some cities, marches in Milan remained largely peaceful.[iii] However, the principal significance of the Italian case for international relations lies in the debate over the social and economic costs of defence policies. As strengthening military capabilities becomes a priority in Europe’s security environment, citizens’ expectations regarding social expenditure are emerging as a factor that could affect the political legitimacy of defence budgets. This situation demonstrates that European security cannot be assessed solely in terms of military capabilities.
Developments in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, meanwhile, highlight the social welfare dimension of the protests. In Lisbon, the police dismantling of a tent encampment established following demonstrations against rising housing prices and rents has intensified the debate over the right to housing and public order. The fact that housing prices in Portugal have more than doubled since 2017, with young people particularly affected by housing costs, helps explain the economic background to the protests.[iv] In Spain, mass demonstrations over pension rights have brought demands concerning the sustainability of the social security system and income distribution to the forefront.[v] In Belgium, clashes with the police occurred during demonstrations by young people calling for increased education funding.[vi] These examples demonstrate that not all social movements in Europe are shaped by violence or demands for a change of government. Economic insecurity and access to public services constitute common areas of concern capable of mobilising different social groups within democratic systems.
The fact that these developments have resonated particularly strongly among younger generations is important for understanding the long-term dimension of social discontent in Europe. Student movements in France, Italy, Belgium, and Albania, alongside protests over housing problems in Portugal, demonstrate how uncertainty about young people’s economic futures can fuel social mobilisation across different countries. The fact that protests in some countries have been initiated by students and subsequently spread to other social groups illustrates how demands initially directed at a particular sector can evolve into broader political movements.[vii] Nevertheless, it is not possible to claim that a common protest organisation or a single political programme shared by all demonstrators exists across Europe. The fact that similar economic conditions are intensifying social mobilisation in different countries does not mean that these movements pursue the same political objectives.
Developments in Albania and Serbia add the dimensions of democratic representation and European integration to this debate. In Albania, protests against Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government have expanded around allegations of corruption, insufficient employment opportunities, education policies, and demands for political accountability. Clashes in Tirana on 24 October, during which demonstrators attacked public buildings and police used tear gas and water cannon, revealed the extent of political tensions.[viii] In Serbia, the student movement that gained momentum following the fatal collapse at the Novi Sad railway station has turned towards electoral politics, demonstrating that social mobilisation can develop into institutional political participation.[ix] The EU membership prospects of both countries mean that domestic political developments are closely linked to the European Union’s enlargement policy. In this context, the significance of the protests stems from the fact that the functioning of democratic institutions in candidate countries and governments’ responses to societal demands are among the key areas assessed during the accession process.
Developments across Europe have also revived a broader debate over consistency in the EU’s approach to democratic norms. Under the Copenhagen Criteria, candidate countries are required to uphold democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights, while compliance with democratic obligations in existing member states is monitored through different institutional mechanisms. In its statement on the protests in Albania on 18 October 2026, the European Commission condemned violence and emphasised the need for security forces to respond proportionately, illustrating the Union’s approach to democratic standards.[x] At the same time, restrictions on demonstrations in France and other member states raise the question of how the same principles are upheld after accession. Differences in legal status between member states and candidate countries do not automatically constitute a double standard. However, variations in the effectiveness of the implementation of democratic values have the potential to affect the EU’s normative credibility and the legitimacy of its enlargement policy.
Another important dimension of the protests is the increasingly visible security-oriented responses adopted by governments to address societal demands. Expanded police operations in France and Italy, security interventions in Albania, and clashes in Belgium illustrate the political implications of treating social movements primarily as matters of public order. This process can be examined through the concept of securitisation in international relations. Defining economic or political demands as security threats may create the conditions for governments to introduce measures that go beyond conventional instruments of political negotiation. Nevertheless, intervening in incidents of violence and restricting peaceful protests are not the same legal issue. Nor does every security intervention, in itself, demonstrate the existence of a securitisation process.
The significance of this wave of mobilisation across Europe for international security lies in the relationship between domestic political stability and foreign policy capacity. Intensifying economic discontent may narrow governments’ room for manoeuvre in making budgetary choices and implementing reform programmes. Tensions may emerge between foreign policy priorities and societal expectations, particularly in areas such as defence spending, energy security, and public finances. Indeed, the convergence of debates over the cost of living in Europe with concerns about energy prices and economic growth demonstrates that domestic political developments cannot be assessed independently of international economic conditions.[xi] At the same time, political developments in the Western Balkans have the potential to affect the EU’s objectives concerning regional stability and enlargement. Nevertheless, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the current protests have directly altered Europe’s security architecture. The key issue to watch is the long-term impact of domestic political legitimacy on the sustainability of foreign policy decisions.
In conclusion, the protests in Europe point to a period in which the relationship between economic welfare, democratic representation, and security policies is being reassessed, extending beyond a series of seemingly unrelated national crises. The decisive question is not simply whether governments can manage social unrest through security measures alone, but also the extent to which they can incorporate economic and political demands into democratic decision-making mechanisms. Europe’s political stability and its capacity to act as an international actor will be shaped by the nature of the relationship that can be established between societal expectations and institutional policies.
[i] “Protests sweep across Europe from France to Albania, Italy, Spain and Portugal”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/24/protests-sweep-across-europe-from-france-to-albania-italy-spain-and-portugal, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[ii] “Violence flares in Paris after largely peaceful protests across France”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-mounts-huge-security-operation-protesters-prepare-march-2026-10-24/, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[iii] “Italy: Thousands take to the streets as protests turn violent in several cities”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/24/italy-deploys-hundreds-of-soldiers-as-nationwide-protests-raise-fears-of-fresh-violence, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[iv] “Portuguese police clear Lisbon housing protest camp, arresting 25”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/portuguese-police-clear-lisbon-housing-protest-camp-make-arrests-2026-10-25/, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[v] “25,000 rally in Madrid demanding state pension guarantees”, AFP, https://www.afp.com/en/25000-rally-madrid-demanding-state-pension-guarantees, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[vi] “Belgian protesters and police skirmish at anti-government demonstrations in Brussels”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/belgian-protesters-police-skirmish-anti-government-demonstrations-brussels-2026-10-24/, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[vii] Fernando Albero, “A generation takes to the streets: Young Europeans refuse to accept a future stacked against them”, El País, https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-10-19/a-generation-takes-to-the-streets-young-europeans-refuse-to-accept-a-future-stacked-against-them.html, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[viii] “Albanian police fire tear gas as anti-government student protests turn violent”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/albanian-police-fire-tear-gas-anti-government-student-protests-turn-violent-2026-10-24/, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[ix] “Serbia votes in historic election as students seek to end Vucic’s long grip on power”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbia-votes-students-seek-unseat-vucic-snap-election-2026-10-25/, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[x] “Commission statement on the protests in Albania”, European Commission, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-statement-protests-albania-2026-10-18_en, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
[xi] “As France erupts, Europe’s far right gains from fuel-price anger ahead of elections”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-erupts-europes-far-right-gains-fuel-price-anger-ahead-elections-2026-10-20/, (Accessed: 25.10.2026).
