Analysis

US Shoots Three Venezuelan Boats in the Caribbean

The US shooting of three Venezuelan boats threatens regional security and maritime trade
Operations conducted without Congressional approval create controversy regarding the US Constitution and international law.
China and Russia may see the increasing US military presence as an opportunity to improve their regional influence.

Paylaş

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On September 16, 2025, the United States (US) administration confirmed that it had struck three boats alleged to have originated from Venezuela in the Caribbean. President Donald Trump, who had previously mentioned two attacks, clarified that in reality three boats were targeted, expanding the scope of the operation. The first attack took place on September 2 and resulted in the deaths of 11 people; at least three people lost their lives in the third attack.

The US claims that these boats belong to “narco-terrorist” groups and were carrying drugs into the country. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, however, described the operations as a “military attack” and accused Washington of seeking regime change.[i] This sudden escalation in the Caribbean could profoundly affect bilateral relations and regional security balances.

The Caracas government has described the operations as a “military provocation” and called for an urgent meeting at the United Nations (UN). The Maduro administration views the US’s “war on drugs” rhetoric as a pretext used for regime change. This stance can potentially strengthen nationalist sentiments within Venezuela and increase the ruling party’s internal legitimacy.[ii]

The reactions of Caribbean and Latin American countries have been noteworthy. Cuba and Nicaragua accused the US of “endangering regional peace.” Countries like Colombia and Brazil, while supporting cooperation against drug trafficking, have pointed out that unilateral US military actions could increase regional instability. The small island states that are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are concerned about fishing activities and disruptions to maritime trade routes.

According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a state can use force outside its territorial waters only in cases of self-defense or with a decision from the UN Security Council.[iii] The statements from the US indicate that the boats were engaged in “drug-terror” activities on the open sea; however, this claim has not yet been independently verified. If the attacks occurred within Venezuela’s territorial waters, this could constitute a clear violation of international law. Although it is known that the US Coast Guard, which fights drug trafficking, occasionally conducts joint operations with other countries, attacks of this scale and resulting in deaths bring the debate on “preventive legitimate defense” back to the forefront.[iv]

The Caribbean is a strategic region both for energy transportation and global trade. The U.S.’s increasing military presence is being closely monitored by China and Russia. Beijing is known for its energy and infrastructure investments in Venezuela, while Moscow provides military advisory activities to Caracas. Washington’s unilateral operations could give these two actors diplomatic leverage to increase their regional influence. Additionally, the rising military activity in the maritime trade routes could raise insurance costs, negatively impacting Caribbean economies.

It’s known that at least 14 people died in the attacks.[v] These deaths have been brought to attention by international human rights organizations with allegations of “excessive use of force” and “extrajudicial executions.” The U.S. administration has not yet responded positively to calls for an independent investigation into the operations. This situation may lead to increased pressure, especially from civil society organizations in Latin America and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The sudden increase in military activity in the Caribbean is putting pressure on the region’s most critical sources of income, maritime transport and energy logistics. Since most oil and natural gas tanker routes pass through these waters, insurance companies have started raising risk premiums. This situation could drive up energy prices not only for the U.S. but also for European and Asian markets. For Venezuela, fishing and small-scale coastal trade could come to a near stop. The Caracas administration, already struggling with foreign currency shortages due to sanctions, may face additional costs in both export revenues and basic food imports, thereby increasing economic pressure on the population.

The response of regional organizations is becoming a key factor in determining how the crisis will unfold. CARICOM is concerned about damaging its member countries’ fishing and tourism revenues. Within the organization, Jamaica and Barbados are maintaining open channels of dialogue by reaching out to both Washington and Caracas. Similarly, the Organization of American States (OAS) Secretariat has called for an extraordinary meeting. Latin America’s heavyweights like Brazil and Mexico have not yet taken on official mediation roles, but their diplomatic involvement could be critical in reducing regional tensions. The effectiveness of these organizations will also test the Caribbean’s future crisis management capacity.

The tone of Trump’s “war on narco-terrorism” rhetoric is aimed at domestic politics ahead of the 2026 midterm elections, which are growing stronger. Harsh measures against drug trafficking could consolidate voter bases in states sensitive to immigration and security issues, such as Florida and Texas. On the other hand, this tension risks accelerating the influx of migrants from Latin America. In recent years, millions have already migrated from Venezuela to Colombia, Peru, and Chile; this new crisis in the Caribbean could increase irregular migration toward the U.S. by land and sea. This would create additional pressure on Washington’s border security and humanitarian aid policies.

The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has long held exercises in the Caribbean, but these operations indicate a new phase of power projection in the region. Attacks on three vessels are being viewed not merely as “coast guard” activities but as full-scale naval operations. This may cause Venezuela to reconsider its defense doctrine. Caracas might accelerate plans to relocate Russian-made S-300 air defense systems to coastal areas and strengthen the Caribbean maritime surveillance network. Such steps could further destabilize the military balance in the region and increase the risk of miscalculation.

In the short term, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Venezuela will likely worsen, with Caracas deepening its military and economic ties with Russia or China. Washington’s increased military presence in the Caribbean could raise concerns about a regional naval blockade. Mediation efforts might be initiated in the medium term through the UN Security Council or the OAS. In the long term, sustained tensions between the two countries carry the risk of turning the Caribbean into a “new Cold War arena.”

For a diplomatic solution, it is critically important that both the U.S. and Venezuela agree to joint investigations under international observers, establish a new regional security mechanism to secure maritime traffic, and develop multilateral cooperation models to combat drug trafficking. Otherwise, unilateral military actions will continue undermining international law and laying the groundwork for new and unpredictable crises in the Caribbean.


[i] Fernández, Sleither. “U.S. Confirms Three Vessels Attacked in the Caribbean: What Do We Know So Far?” Guacamaya, 16 Sept. 2025, https://guacamayave.com/en/u-s-confirms-three-vessels-attacked-in-the-caribbean-what-do-we-know-so-far, (Date Accessed: 21.09.2025).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982, arts. 88 and 301. United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en, (Date Accessed: 21.09.2025).

[iv] Fernández, opcit.

[v] Ibid.

Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İncesu graduated from Anadolu University Faculty of Business Administration in 2012. He continued his education with Cappadocia University Tourist Guidance associate degree program and graduated in 2017. In 2022, he successfully completed his master's degrees in International Relations at Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University and in Travel Management and Tourism Guidance at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. In 2024, he graduated from the United States University of Maryland Global Campus (UMGC) Political Science undergraduate program. As of 2023, he continues his doctoral studies at Cappadocia University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. In 2022, Mr. İncesu worked as a special advisor at the Embassy of the Republic of Paraguay in Ankara. He is fluent in Spanish and English and is a sworn translator in English and Spanish. His research interests include Latin America, International Law and Tourism.

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