The Russian-Ukrainian War, which began on February 24, 2022, was based on the Kremlin’s assumption that a regime change in Kiev would be achieved within a week and was described as a “special operation” by Russian authorities. In the first stage, the Russian Army, seeking to dominate the entire Ukraine, targeted the country’s strategic facilities and kept Kiev under siege. However, it became clear during this process that Russia would be unable to achieve its objectives, and in April 2022, Moscow announced that they would be moving on to the second phase of the “special operation.” Since then, the conflict has been centered in Ukraine’s east. In September 2022, the Ukrainian Army went on the offensive in various regions, while Russian forces withdrew from others. As a result, from the Kremlin’s perspective, things are not looking good.
While all of this is going on, it should not be forgotten that Russia is under a lot of sanctions. The Moscow administration, which has not achieved the expected military successes, is also feeling the economic consequences of the sanctions more and more. Moreover, Russia did not receive the support it expected from its main allies, including China, India, and members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This has revealed the reality of an increasingly isolated Russia.
President Vladimir Putin declared a “partial mobilization” on September 21, 2022. This decision, without a doubt, serves as an admission by Moscow that it is suffering from a severe personnel shortage in the Ukrainian War. Despite this, Russian authorities, by threatening nuclear weapons, imply that a war in which Russia is defeated will escalate into a process in which the entire world loses. However, whether he will implement this rhetoric is still in doubt. In fact, Moscow has been working hard in recent days to change this attitude and discourse. This is a very extreme scenario. However, there are serious allegations that Russia will want to divert Western attention from Ukraine by creating different conflicts in various regions. This possibility is much more reasonable compared to nuclear war. So, the question that needs to be asked is whether Russia want to activate the frozen conflicts?
Indeed, leaving the West to cope with problems in various geographies, and being provided respite in Ukraine is quite a possible scenario. However, whether Moscow has the capacity to do this is debatable. Because it is difficult to argue that the Moscow government, which is dealing with manpower shortages and economic challenges as a result of sanctions, has the energy to focus on new conflict areas. Furthermore, if frozen conflict areas are activated, it is also likely that the status quo in the areas may shift to Russia’s disadvantage.
At this point, it is important to note the Kremlin’s overall attitude to frozen conflict areas. Russia is pursuing a strategy targeted at maintaining the ceasefire while avoiding the signing of a permanent peace treaty, particularly in the contested regions of post-Soviet geography. Thus, it keeps soldiers in crucial regions under the guise of peacekeeping and consolidates its power by inciting controlled conflicts when required and then mediating. As a result, Moscow may be reluctant to convert the existing frozen conflict areas into heated war zones. Because, in the case of a war, Russia will need to boost the number of peacekeeping forces and perform mediation diplomacy in these areas. This will deflect not just the West’s focus, but also Russia’s attention away from Ukraine.
Proceeding with the above-mentioned information, the status of the frozen conflict areas, where Russia is supposedly trying to activate, should be discussed. First of all, it should be noted that the Moscow government made no remarks during the border confrontations between Azerbaijan and Armenia on September 13-14, 2022. Following the conflicts, it was observed that the address of the negotiations between the parties shifted to the United States of America (US) and France. This means that Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus is dwindling. As a result, Moscow has revealed that it would prefer the region’s post-Second Karabakh War status quo to the escalation of larger wars.
On the other hand, the situation in the Transnistrian issue, which came to the forefront with the Ukrainian War, is not much different. Transnistria is part of Moldova’s territory, but it is an area with a tendency to join Russia. This is due to the presence of separatist groups, much like Ukraine’s east. Currently, Russian Peacekeepers are on duty in Transnistria. As a result, if conflicts begin here, the balance of power may shift against Moscow.
Furthermore, in order for Russia to ignite the Transnistrian issue, it must seize the city of Odessa, which is located on Ukraine’s border with Moldova. However, because to the Grain Corridor Deal, Odessa has become a focal point in attempts to alleviate the food crisis. In other words, Russia has implicitly assured the West that it would not seize Odessa, at least not in the immediate term. Therefore, it will not intervene in Transnistria. Furthermore, if the Transnistria issue is activated, it is likely that the Chisinau government, which will get Western backing depending on the outcome of the Ukrainian war, may resolve the matter in line with its own national interests. Therefore, Moscow will want the Transnistrian issue to remain frozen.
Another issue similar to Transnistria is the situation in Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. Separatist administrations exist in both territories, and Moscow recognizes these so-called states. It is well known that both areas have a strong desire to be reunited with Russia. It was also reported that a referendum would be conducted in South Ossetia in April 2022 with the goal of joining Russia; however, this referendum was ultimately canceled. Of course, this development may be seen as the Kremlin’s desire to avoid a new conflict area.
Looking back at the events in Karakalpakstan and Badakhshan Mountainous Autonomous Region during the Russia-Ukraine War, it is clear that Moscow wanted to monitor the process and avoided making remarks that would elicit a reaction from the nations in the region. It is possible to argue that the activating of Badakhshan would boost the influence of England in particular and the West in general.
On the other hand, it is suggested that the Moscow administration may cause some confusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina by launching pan-Slavic actions against the Serbs. Given that the Balkans are actually in Southeastern Europe, it seems reasonable for Russia to make a move that will destabilize Europe in order to exacerbate the fragility of transatlantic relations. However, it is unclear to what extent Serbia will support the Bosnian Serbs in a conflict. Because, like any nation-state, Serbia prioritizes its own national interests. As a matter of fact, despite its close relations with Moscow, Belgrade continues to pursue its goal of joining the European Union (EU). Furthermore, the process was concluded with the EU’s mediation in the tensions on the Serbia-Kosovo border.
To summarize briefly, due to the Ukraine War, the Kremlin has largely lost its power to create and manipulate crises in line with its own interests. Therefore, Moscow activating frozen conflict areas is not a rational option. It should be mentioned, however, that Russia’s military activity in Ukraine did not appear to be rational prior to February 24, 2022. In this respect, Russia’s success in the 2000s might be attributed to its unpredictability. However, the same unpredictability is also at the root of Ukraine’s problems.
Moreover, Russia is also sending messages that it can activate frozen conflict areas. Indeed, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s words that any attack on Russian Peacekeeping Forces in Transnistria will be deemed an attack on Russian land are still fresh in people’s minds.[1] Similarly, Russia has stated in several films that there is a “Nazi presence” in Bosnia. This reminds one of the rhetoric used to justify the Ukrainian War: the country will be “De-Nazified.” All of these are interpreted as Russia trying to activate frozen conflict areas. However, given that such a move is unrealistic, it is reasonable to conclude that Moscow exploits the frozen conflict areas as a kind of coercion and leverage against the West.
In conclusion, it could be claimed that the Moscow administration is attempting to draw the attention of the West to various geographies instead of the Russia-Ukraine War. Within this framework, frozen conflict areas became has become a trending issue. However, the Moscow administration will not want to create different crisis zones due to the pressure of sanctions and the difficulties it faces in meeting the number of personnel it requires in the war.
[1] “Лавров заявил, что действия против миротворцев в Приднестровье будут считаться нападением на РФ”, TASS, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/860242, (Date of Accession: 05.10.2022).
