As of 2025, a period has begun in which Middle East-centered tensions have not only affected regional actors but also directly impacted global transportation and security systems. In particular, the long-accumulated strategic tension along the Israel-Iran axis escalated into a direct conflict on the morning of June 13, 2025, with Israel launching a large-scale air operation targeting nuclear and military facilities in Iran. This development has deeply shaken not only military balances but also airspace security, international aviation, and the regional geopolitical structure. With the simultaneous closure of airspaces, many regions –especially the Gulf and the Middle East– have been shut to air traffic. This situation has brought the South Caucasus to the forefront not as an alternative, but as a compulsory geostrategic route.
On the morning of June 13, 2025, within the scope of the operation launched by Israel and named “Rising Lion,”[1] nuclear facilities, missile bases, and the command centers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran were targeted; the attacks resulted in heavy losses among the upper command echelon of the Iranian Army. At least 20 senior military officials, including the Chief of the General Staff of Iran, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, and the Commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Hossein Salami, as well as six nuclear scientists, lost their lives. The total number of casualties was reported to be approximately 80, while the number of injured exceeded 320.[2] This development has been interpreted as a “decapitation strategy” reminiscent of Israel’s operations against Hezbollah’s leadership in 2024. On the same night, Iran launched retaliatory attacks targeting Jerusalem and Tel Aviv; although fewer than 100 missiles were launched, the majority were neutralized, with 44 people injured in Tel Aviv.
The United States (US) provided air defense support to Israel; meanwhile, the United Nations (UN) announced that Iran had violated its nuclear obligations, and U.S. President Donald Trump explicitly stated that the U.S. had contributed information and technological support to the attack. These statements reinforced concerns within the international public sphere that the tension would escalate further.
Immediately after the attack, extraordinary restrictions were implemented in the airspaces of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. The airspaces of Iran and Iraq were completely closed, while Jordan temporarily halted all flights and later allowed only pre-approved flights to pass through specific corridors. Syria’s airspace was also entirely closed, with only a limited number of air corridors subsequently opened. Israel, on the other hand, kept its airspace open only for westbound flights. According to Flightradar24 data, approximately 3,000 flights were either canceled or rerouted; the first flights to change direction began to move away from Tehran at 00:06 GMT, and the airspaces of Iran and Iraq were entirely evacuated within two hours.[3]
With civil aviation directly affected by this situation, air traffic in the region effectively came to a standstill. Following Israel’s attacks on over 100 military and nuclear targets in Iran, the closure of the eastern Iraq air corridor –one of the main transit points on the Europe–Southeast Asia route– directly impacted many airline companies such as Emirates, Sun D’Or, and Qatar Airways. Emirates announced the cancellation of a total of 16 flights to Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon between June 13–15, 2025, while EL AL and Sun D’Or suspended all reservations until June 30. Air India canceled 16 flights using Iranian airspace, and Qatar Airways temporarily suspended all flights to Iran, Iraq, and Syria.[4] As a result of such measures by numerous companies, critical air corridors between Europe, South Asia, and Gulf countries were rendered inoperable; flights were either canceled or redirected through longer and more costly routes.
In response to Israeli attacks, Iran launched the “True Word III”[5] operation between June 13 and 16, sending between 150 and 200 missiles[6] and more than 100 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to various locations across Israel, particularly Tel Aviv and Haifa.[7] In the attacks, between 8 and 14 civilians were killed in Israel, while in Iran, according to official data, 224 people lost their lives; civil society sources, however, reported 406 deaths and 654 injuries. Following the attack, 1,481 individuals were hospitalized, with over 90% reported as civilians, and 522 patients were discharged.[8]
These developments have brought two regions into geopolitical focus: the Arabian Peninsula, including Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and Oman, and the South Caucasus. With the closure of Iranian airspace and the rerouting of air traffic away from the Gulf and the broader Middle East, evacuations conducted primarily via Azerbaijan and the intensifying diplomatic traffic between Turkey and Azerbaijan have reinforced the region’s role as a secure air corridor. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov issued a condolence message for Iranian General Bagheri, affirmed that Azerbaijani territory had not been used in Israeli attacks, and rejected allegations of espionage on behalf of Israel.[9] The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an official statement, expressed concern over the situation and called for a diplomatic resolution.[10]
Within this atmosphere, Iranian officials explicitly declared their determination to block the passage of the Zangezur Corridor, describing it as a direct threat to national security. However, beyond the traditional Iran-Armenia cooperation, developments on June 22, 2025, indicating that the United States, in coordination with Israel,[11] had struck Iran’s nuclear facilities, possess the potential to raise questions regarding Tehran’s strategic influence in the region. Conversely, the recent visit of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Turkey, after a long hiatus, has been interpreted as a notable geopolitical maneuver; the visit suggests that Armenia is shifting away from conjunctural blocs toward a regional cooperation axis. In light of all these developments, strategic sensitivities in the South Caucasus have transformed the region into a “geopolitical necessity zone” not only in terms of land-based concerns but also regarding aviation and secure transportation corridors.
The war’s impact on airspace has also been felt on a global scale. Europe-based carriers, facing the closure of Iranian and Russian airspaces, have been forced to use longer routes to Asia, leading to increased operational costs. The crash of an Air India flight en route to London has heightened public concerns over flight safety; meanwhile, the price of Brent crude oil rose by 8%, reaching $70.8, thereby adding to the burden on airline companies. According to experts, such crises are no longer perceived as “exceptional deviations” but as systemic threats.[12]
The fact that over 1,800 flights had to be rerouted on Friday, June 13, 2025, alone demonstrates that the conflicts are impacting not only land-based dynamics but also the global transportation network in the skies. In this context, the Middle Corridor routes –particularly those through the South Caucasus and beyond the Caspian– long overlooked, are now emerging not merely as alternatives but as geopolitical necessities.
The simultaneous closure of Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian airspaces, combined with the continued inaccessibility of Eastern Europe and the western section of Russian airspace due to the Russia–Ukraine War since 2022, has redirected the only remaining secure aviation route between Europe and Asia toward the South Caucasus. In this context, the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey triangle has become indispensable not only in terms of air transportation but also with respect to energy routes, digital corridors, and logistical chains. Azerbaijan, under increasing pressure from Tehran due to its military cooperation with Israel, has attempted to maintain a rhetoric of neutrality in its diplomatic discourse; however, Israel’s targeting of northern Iran –referred to as “Southern Azerbaijan,” including Tabriz and surrounding areas– regardless of whether it is framed as a strategic or military objective, has revealed that Baku does not welcome such attacks and is compelled to pursue a policy of balance. Iran’s designation of the Zangezur Corridor as a direct national security threat and its intensified military-political coordination with Armenia may transform the corridor competition in the region into a geopolitical confrontation. However, Armenia’s recent orientation –especially in light of the Israel–Iran War– away from taking sides and instead toward a more realistic, region-focused perspective, as previously noted, may increase the likelihood of reinforcing the South Caucasus’s geostrategic significance.
In the medium term, the most likely scenario is that the South Caucasus will no longer be a “geopolitical transit zone,” but rather evolve into a kind of “inter-bloc security line.” Azerbaijan’s efforts to strengthen security ties with the West while simultaneously managing security-based tensions with Iran indicate that regional actors prioritize multidimensional balancing strategies over bilateral alliances. Moreover, Iran’s covert support to Armenia via the Zangezur route may reignite not only disputes over transit pathways but also ethnic-political fault lines. The increasing intensity in airspace usage and growing competition over land transport routes contribute to the fragility of stability in the South Caucasus.
In conclusion, the Israel–Iran conflict that began on June 13, 2025, has elevated the South Caucasus from a regional passageway to a key component in the global strategic equation. With the Caspian-crossing Middle Corridor now becoming a “necessity” rather than an “alternative,” the cost of diplomatic miscalculations in this geography has risen significantly. As such, for regional countries –particularly Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia– civil aviation and logistical security have become just as critical to national strategy as military alliances. In the period ahead, air traffic over the South Caucasus will redraw not only the map of flights but also the map of great power competition and regional alliances.
[1] Tom Stevenson, “Operation Rising Lion”, London Review, https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2025/june/operation-rising-lion, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[2] Kylie Maclellan vd. “Israel hit Iran’s Nuclear Sites and Killed its Top Military Commanders, Iran Retaliated – as it Happened”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/live-updates-israel-hits-iran-nuclear-facilities-missile-factories-2025-06-13/, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[3] Ian Petchenik, “Airspace closures following Israeli strikes on Iran”, FlightRadar24, https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/flight-tracking-news/airspace-closures-following-israeli-strikes-on-iran/, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[4] Goda Labanauskaite, “Airlines Halt Flights Over Israel-Iran-Iraq-Jordan Airspace After Israel Strikes”, AeroTime, https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/airlines-halt-flights-in-middle-east-after-israel-strikes, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[5] “IRGC launches fifteenth wave of Operation True Promise III”, Tehran Times, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/514649/IRGC-launches-fifteenth-wave-of-Operation-True-Promise-III, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[6] “SMI Soobshchili o Zapuske Iranom Okolo 150–200 Raket po Izrailyu”, Izvestiya, https://iz.ru/1903587/2025-06-13/iran-vypustil-okolo-150-200-raket-po-izrailiu, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[7] “Iran Zapustil po Izrailyu Boleye sta Bespilotnikov, Zayavil TSAKHAL”, RIA Novosti, https://ria.ru/20250613/tsakhal-2022595039.html, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[8] “Minzdrav Irana: V Rezultate İzrailskikh Atak Pogibli 224 Cheloveka”, Report, https://report.az/ru/v-regione/smi-v-rezultate-izrailskih-udarov-v-irane-pogibli-ne-menee-128-chelovek/, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[9] “Pomoshchnik Prezidenta: Azerbaydzhan ne Zanimayetsya Shpionazhem v Irane”, Media.Az, https://media.az/politika/pomoshnik-prezidenta-azerbajdzhan-ne-zanimaetsya-shpionazhem-v-irane, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[10] MFA of Georgia, “We are deeply concerned by the rising tensions in the Middle East …”, X, https://x.com/mfagovge/status/1933596222561898533?s=46, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[11] David Rising, Jon Gambrell ve Aamer Madhani, “US strikes 3 Iranian Nuclear Sites, Inserting itself into Israel’s War with Iran”, Eyewitness Newss, https://abc7chicago.com/post/us-has-struck-iranian-nuclear-sites-trump-says-joining-israeli-air-campaign/16811258/, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
[12] Mari Novik ve Chloe Cornish, “Airlines Forced to Skirt War Zones as Problems Mount”, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/3c28ad5a-cffe-407f-b311-d9de5cdac1a6, (Access Date: 22.06.2025).
