Is “Sabotage” Another Name for “Bargaining” in the Grain Corridor?

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The energy and food crises are the two most pressing issues that the globe has faced since the Russia-Ukraine War began on February 24, 2022. The fact that two of the world’s leading suppliers of grain are at war has put African countries, who are already struggling to acquire basic foodstuff, in a tough position. At the same time, the conflict exacerbated the disruption in supply chains caused by Covid-19. As a result, on July 22, 2022, Turkiye and the United Nations (UN) signed the “Grain Corridor Deal” in Istanbul to focus on crisis prevention diplomacy in the face of the aforementioned dilemma.

The fact that Russia and Ukraine could sit down at the same table at that time was also critical to diplomacy channels. In this sense, the “Grain Corridor” paved the way to peace and was also described as the “Peace Corridor.” However, while the Russia-Ukraine War is primarily a Moscow-Kyiv conflict, it manifests as a Russia-West competition. However, it is also impossible to talk about a monolithic West. While it is seen that Continental Europe wants the war to end as soon as possible due to its energy dependence, countries such as the United States (USA) and England are trying to prolong the war and bring Russia to its knees.

As is to be expected, parties that want the war to continue may attempt to undermine the peacekeeping structures. Two key developments might be discussed in this perspective. The first of these is the sabotage on the Nord Stream-I and Nord Stream-II Natural Gas Pipelines on September 26, 2022. Undoubtedly, the target of this provocation was the termination of energy cooperation between Russia and Continental Europe.[1] As a matter of fact, after the leaks in the pipelines, the Moscow administration blamed the UK.[2]

The second development is the fact that Russia announced that it had suspended the “Grain Corridor Agreement” on October 30, 2022. The Russian Ministry of Defense issued a statement on the matter, claiming that Ukraine carried out an attack on Russian combat and civilian ships in Sevastopol.[3] In this context, Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said, “…Such a deal is unlikely to be implemented. Ukraine’s actions have harmed the deal. It is … much more risky, dangerous and non-guaranteed.”[4] In addition, Moscow has blamed the London administration for the aforementioned attacks.[5] In response, British Secretary of State for Foreign James Cleverly stated on his Twitter account, “Russia should allow grain exports to reach the world’s hungry.” Thus, in a sense, he denied the accusations against England.[6]

Undoubtedly, it can be said that actors such as England and the USA who wish to prolong the war may participate in sabotages. Similarly, Russia may also engage in such activities in order to exploit the food crisis as a weapon and reach a more beneficial accord for itself. In other words, the Kremlin may have suspended the “Grain Corridor” in order to secure an agreement in which sanctions pressure is reduced as a result of the attacks in Crimea.

While the worsening of the energy crisis primarily affects Europe’s natural gas demands and hence Continental Europe, the deepening of the food crisis indicates a perilous trend for the entire world. As a result, it is critical to focus on the need to generate the most acceptable solution rather than point fingers regarding the sabotage.

Despite this, it is also possible to see that the parties also share a similar thought process. Because Turkiye and the United Nations, as guarantors of the “Grain Corridor Deal,” and quickly started diplomatic activity. Accordingly, on 31 October 2022, Turkiye, the UN, and Ukraine reached an agreement on the route of 14 ships and the inspections to be performed on 40 ships. Russia was also notified.[7] Furthermore, despite suspending the deal, the Moscow government has taken a reasonable stance. For example, Russia’s Minister of Agriculture of Dmitry Patrushev stated the following:[8]

“Given that Russia has always been and remains a reliable partner and is ready to provide the world with the necessary amount of food. Our country is ready to supply up to 500,000 tonnes of grain to the poorest countries free of charge in the next four months.”

Although Russia intends to use grain as a weapon in the “Grain Corridor” issue, as it did in the energy crisis, it does not want conflict/crisis regions to expand and deepen, but rather a return to diplomacy with conditions more suitable for its own interests.

In fact, the clearest message on this issue was given by the Russian Defense Ministry. Because the Ministry said, “Russia is not pulling out of the Initiative, only temporarily suspending its implementation activities.”[9] With his statement, the Ministry made it clear that Russia has not closed its doors to diplomacy.

Based on all of these ideas, it is possible to conclude that Russia is concerned about its reputation and, as a result, how it is regarded by other actors. Because, despite gaining the reputation of “occupying country” at the start of the war, the Moscow government has developed a favorable reputation through the “Grain Corridor.” At this point, it does not seem rational for the Kremlin turn this opportunity down.

In conclusion, Russia’s decision to withdraw from the Grain Corridor may be a reaction to provocations by forces seeking to prolong the war, or it may represent the Moscow administration’s aim to maximize gains from the diplomatic table by turning food into a weapon. Because Russia may try to negotiate better terms with the West through exploiting the food crisis. The Moscow government has already made it clear that it has not withdrawn from the deal, but rather suspended it, and that it has not shut its doors to diplomatic channels. This, despite everything, provides the idea that the “Grain/Peace Corridor” can function again in a healthy manner.


[1] Sabir Askeroğlu, “End of Russia-Germany Energy Cooperation”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/end-of-russia-germany-energy-cooperation/?lang=en, (Date of Accession: 02.11.2022).

[2] “Russia Accuses UK of ‘Directing’ Nord Stream Blasts”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/1/russia-accuses-uk-of-directing-nord-stream-blasts, (Date of Accession: 02.11.2022).

[3] “Russia Suspends Grain Corridor Agreement: Diplomacy Continues Traffic”, Turkish News, https://www.haberturk.com/rusya-tahil-koridoru-anlasmasini-askiya-aldi-diplomasi-trafigi-suruyor-3534753, (Date of Accession: 02.11.2022).

[4] Ibid.

[5] “Russia’s Withdrawal from the Grain Corridor Agreement Deeply Worries the UN”, Şarkül Avsat, https://turkish.aawsat.com/home/article/3961151/rusyan%C4%B1n-tah%C4%B1l-koridoru-anla%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1%E2%80%99ndan-%C3%A7ekilmesi-bm%E2%80%99yi-derinden, (Date of Accession: 02.11.2022).

[6] @JamesCleverly, “The UN Black Sea Grain Initiative is instrumental to global food security. Russia should allow grain exports to reach the world’s hungry.”, Twitter, https://twitter.com/JamesCleverly/status/1586424952642801665, (Date of Accession: 02.11.2022).

[7] “Important Development in the ‘Grain Corridor’: Turkey, Ukraine and the UN Have Agreed”, Star, https://www.star.com.tr/dunya/tahil-koridorunda-onemli-gelisme-turkiye-ukrayna-ve-bm-anlasti-haber-1746212/, (Date of Accession: 02.11.2022).

[8] “Free Grain from Russia to Poor Countries: ‘It Shows What the Multipolar World Promises’”, Bright, https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/haber/rusyadan-yoksul-ulkelere-ucretsiz-tahil-cok-kutuplu-dunyanin-ne-vaat-ettigini-gosteriyor-348456, (Date of Accession: 02.11.2022).

[9] “Russian Defense Ministry: ‘(Grain agreement) Russia Does Not Withdraw from This Agreement, Suspends Its Implementation’”, Ihlas News Agency, https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-rusya-savunma-bakanligi-tahil-anlasmasi-rusya-bu-anlasmadan-cikmiyor-uygulanmasini-askiya-aliyor-1115991/, (Date of Accession: 02.11.2022).

Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN
Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN
Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN, 2014 yılında Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü’nden mezun olmuştur. Yüksek lisans derecesini, 2017 yılında Giresun Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı’nda sunduğu ‘’Uluslararası Güç İlişkileri Bağlamında İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Hegemonik Mücadelelerin İncelenmesi’’ başlıklı teziyle almıştır. Doktora derecesini ise 2021 yılında Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı‘nda hazırladığı “İmparatorluk Düşüncesinin İran Dış Politikasına Yansımaları ve Milliyetçilik” başlıklı teziyle alan Başaran’ın başlıca çalışma alanları Uluslararası ilişkiler kuramları, Amerikan dış politikası, İran araştırmaları ve Afganistan çalışmalarıdır. Başaran iyi derecede İngilizce ve temel düzeyde Farsça bilmektedir.

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