The Sahel Area has become a critical point in global security agenda due to the influence of political instability and terrorist activities. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is prominent as one of the most dangerous jihadist organizations operating in the Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger triangle. Established with the integration of four El-Qaida associated groups (Ansar Dine, AQIM Sahara Emirate, Al-Murabitun and Macina Liberation Front) it persistantly fills the power gaps in the area and undermines the stability. The Leader of the organization Iyad Ag Ghali, emerged as a key actor during the 2012 Mali Rebellion and solidified JNIM’s ideological foundation by pledging allegiance to Al-Qaeda. Ghali’s Tuareg identity and leadership helps the group to gain support among local communities.
JNIM’s operations deepen the security crisis in the Sahel. The group organizes coordinated attacks against military bases, UN peacekeeping missions, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Between 2019 and 2021 violence linked to JNIM increased significantly, in 2021 alone over 1,300 attacks were recorded in Burkina Faso[1]. A 2018 attack in Ouagadougou that killed eight security personnel demonstrated the group’s ability to pose a threat even in major urban centers. The organization exploits the weaknesses in local security forces, fueling widespread chaos.
At the core of JNIM’s operational strength lies its financial structure. The group generates income through kidnappings for ransom, extortion, and various smuggling operations. In October 2020, it was alleged that the Malian government paid around 10 million euros for the release of French hostage Sophie Pétronin and others[i]. Gold smuggling is also one of JNIM’s most significant sources of income. According to SWISSAID’s 2024 report, although Mali’s official annual gold production is reported as 6 tons, the actual output is estimated between 30 and 57 tons [ii]. In 2023, the United Arab Emirates importing $4.83 billion worth of gold from Mali, while official Malian records indicate much lower figures demonstrates the scale of unregistered trade and the potential of groups like JNIM extracting from this trade. This financial power enhances the group’s ability to procure weapons and recruit militants.
JNIM’s economic resources also support its strategy of radicalizing local communities. The group particularly targets the Fulani population in Mali’s Mopti region. Discriminatory policies by state forces push Fulani youth toward JNIM’s propaganda networks. The Macina Liberation Front capitalizes on the historical grievances and cultural links to the Macina Empire to intensify radicalization. This strategy deepens ethnic tensions and weakns the social fabric. According to the UNHCR, the number of internally displaced people in the region quadrupled between 2019 and 2021, exceeding 2.5 million[iii]. These activities both fuel the humanitarian crisis in the Sahel and allow the group to expand its grassroots support base.
In territories under its control, JNIM acts not only as a terrorist group but also as a socio-political actor. In areas where state authority is weak, it attempts to establish “alternative governance” models to meet the basic needs of local populations, effectively functioning as a parallel structure. For instance, in some rural parts of Mali, JNIM has set up makeshift justice systems to resolve disputes and provides social services funded through extortion disguised as zakat[iv]. This approach helps the group gain a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of local communities, while further eroding state credibility. However, JNIM’s governance model often relies on coercion and fear, making local support fragile. This dynamic strengthens the group’s radicalization strategies while highlighting the urgent need to improve local governance capacities.
JNIM’s interactions with other jihadist groups further complicate the regional chaos. Between 2019 and 2020, clashes with rival terrorist group Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) resulted in 125 confrontations and 731 militant deaths[v]. This rivalry increases the overall damage inflicted on the region. On the other hand, JNIM’s alignment with Al-Qaeda affiliates significantly boosts its ideological influence. The withdrawal of French forces and the rising presence of the Russian Wagner Group have further expanded JNIM’s operational space. This growing power vacuum facilitates the group’s ability to pose threats on both local and regional scales.
Understanding the role of international actors in the Sahel is crucial to grasping JNIM’s rise. The departure of French troops has disrupted certain security balances in the region, while Wagner Group operations in Mali have introduced a complex new layer. While Wagner’s collaboration with local governments may provide short-term security, its involvement in human rights violations and public backlash serves as effective propaganda material for JNIM.
Military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso reflect the governments’ failures in countering JNIM, yet regional cooperation can help prevent such crises. The Alliance of Sahel States — formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — has initiated efforts on a joint currency, passport, and collaborative economic and security policies. These moves may lay the groundwork for new regional strategies against terrorist organizations like JNIM. It is essential for these governments to implement inclusive measures aimed at uplifting local populations and involving them in regional governance, emphasizing “living together in peace.” Such steps can significantly reduce the group’s influence and operational reach. Furthermore, improving access to education, healthcare, and food across these nations — and promoting these efforts through the lens of Pan-Africanism — could be another critical front in countering JNIM’s expansion.
The future threat level posed by JNIM will depend on power vacuums in the Sahel and declining international engagement. The group has the potential to expand into new areas amid ongoing instability — for example, the political unrest in Niger or continued conflict in Burkina Faso could accelerate its spread. These scenarios will test both the military capacities of regional governments and the coordination of the international community. To limit JNIM’s long-term impact, it is essential to implement counter-radicalization programs and transnational security collaborations. Otherwise, the risk of the group expanding beyond the Sahel could trigger a new wave of global security threats.
In conclusion, JNIM continues to exist as a complex threat undermining the stability of the Sahel region. The group’s use of religious ideology to draw local populations to its side, its exploitation of economic resources, and its ability to manipulate ethnic tensions present a long-term security challenge. To neutralize this threat, military strategies must be supported by policies promoting social justice and economic development. Regional and international cooperation is key to establishing lasting stability in the Sahel. Otherwise, JNIM will continue to exploit power vacuums and spread its influence further — casting a shadow over the region’s future.
1 Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2022: Burkina Faso”. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/burkina-faso, (Date of Access: 24.04.2025).
2 Rida Lyammouri, “Kidnapping Remains a Big Deal in the Sahel”, Policy Brief. Rabat Policy Center for the New South,2020. https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/PB%20-%2020-78%20%28Lyammouri%29%285%29.pdf, (Date of Access: 24.04.2025); Center for Strategic and International Studies. Examining Extremism: Jama”at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2021. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin, (Erişim Tarihi: 24.04.2025); Caleb Weiss, “Analysis: CNIM Celebrates Prisoner Swap in Mali.” Long War Journal, Ekim 2020. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/10/analysis-CNIM-celebrates-prisoner-swap-in-mali.php, (Date of Access: 24.04.2025).
3 SWISSAID. On the Trail of African Gold: Mali’s Hidden Gold Trade. SWISSAID, 2024. https://www.swissaid.ch/en/articles/on-the-trail-of-african-gold/, (Date of Access: 24.04.2025).
4 UNHCR. “Decade of Sahel Conflict Leaves 2.5 Million People Displaced.” UNHCR, 14 Ocak 2022. https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/briefing-notes/decade-sahel-conflict-leaves-2-5-million-people-displaced, (Date of Access: 24.04.2025).
5 Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2024: Mali.” 2024. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/mali (Date of Access: 24.04.2025).
6 Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin”, 2021. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin, (Date of Access: 24.04.2025).
