The presidential elections held in Cameroon on 12 October 2025 have plunged the country into an unexpected but dangerous political impasse.[i] The current picture shows a country caught between the promise of continuity from 92-year-old President Paul Biya and the claim of change from 76-year-old former minister Issa Tchiroma Bakary. Tchiroma’s declaration of victory on 14 October, before the official results were announced, and the government’s ruling that this was illegal, brought the country’s long-standing crisis to a boiling point.
According to the results announced by the electoral commission on 21 October, Biya was re-elected with 52 per cent of the vote.[ii] Paul Biya will therefore begin his eighth term. Considering that many of the people occupying important positions in the country are aged 70 and over, the average age is 18, and the population is 29 million, it is clear that something is not right in the country. This explains the protests that have begun in cities such as the capital Yaounde and Garoua. Although the current post-election crisis is a repeat of 2018, it may signal more serious instability for Cameroon’s future in a context of deepening Anglophone crisis, economic stagnation and cracks within the regime.
The events in Cameroon are a typical example of a post-election crisis, similar to the events of 2018. Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who adopted the strategy implemented by Maurice Kamto that year, demonstrated his lack of confidence in state institutions with his statement on 14 October that ‘our victory is clear’. This initiative aims to undermine the legitimacy of the results from the outset and draw the international community’s attention to allegations of fraud when the official results are announced in favour of Paul Biya. The government, through Regional Administration Minister Paul Atanga Nji, has described this statement as a red line and a destructive initiative. This can be seen as a call by the government to protect the regime’s monopoly on legitimacy through the Constitutional Council. Given that the vast majority of the Council’s members are loyal to Biya, it is almost impossible for the numerous requests submitted to the Council to annul the elections to be successful in favour of the opposition.
The most significant factor distinguishing the 2018 crisis from this one has been the profile of the actors involved. Paul Biya, 92, known by the nickname ‘Sphinx,’ wields more power than the state-integrated party structure (CPDM) and loyal security apparatus. Biya is awaiting the Constitutional Council to legally certify his victory. One of the most interesting dynamics of this election has been the transformation of Tchiroma, who until recently (June 2025) was one of the government’s most important spokespeople, into the main opposition figure.
Tchiroma’s profile as an insider within the regime could signal a split among Biya’s elite. His promise of a 3-5 year transition period could be seen as a tactic to appeal to groups seeking controlled change rather than the regime’s complete collapse. However, the opposition’s fragmentation in an election with eleven candidates has been Biya’s greatest advantage. The uncertainty surrounding the extent of support from Maurice Kamto’s base for Tchiroma, following the blocking of Kamto’s candidacy in the 2018 elections, may further reinforce this situation.
The election was held in the shadow of numerous crises in which the term ‘election’ had lost its meaning in the country in question. Elections in the English-speaking North-West and South-West regions of the country were either not held at all or had very low voter turnout due to separatist conflict (the Anglophone crisis), which had a major impact on the election’s national representativeness. Furthermore, the even lower voter turnout than in 2018 indicates that a significant portion of the populace has lost interest in the political process when combined with the threat posed by Boko Haram and ISIS-affiliated groups in the Far North region and the economic crisis that has caused a severe cost-of-living crisis. At this point, the protests that began in the capital, Yaoundé and Garoua may be the result of economic and social disappointment as well as political disagreement.
As of 21 October 2025, Cameroon is in a precarious situation, and this situation may escalate further until the official results are announced. The Constitutional Council may declare Paul Biya the winner of the election, rejecting all objections. In this case, the regime is expected to respond to protests against what are being called stolen elections with harsh security measures, arrests and restrictions on internet access. Unlike in 2018, the fact that the opposition leader is a former member of the regime this time around reduces the likelihood of a split within the regime. Current data suggests that the security apparatus remains loyal to Biya. However, an increase in protests and Tchiroma finding unexpected support from those in power could challenge the regime’s crisis management.
In conclusion, the Cameroonian presidential elections are less a democratic vote than a political ritual confirming the intractability of structural problems paralysing the country. The fact that a key opposition figure such as Issa Tchiroma comes from within the regime demonstrates that the struggle is more about a shift in power within the system than a change of regime. Tchiroma’s early declaration of victory and the subsequent street protests show how weak the legitimacy of Paul Biya’s expected eighth-term victory will be in reality, despite its legal validation by the Constitutional Council. This situation reveals that Cameroon’s political governance has become impossible and that the country may have entered a spiral of perpetual instability.
[i] “Cameroon: Paul Biya declared as provisional winner of presidential election”, Africa News, 21 Ekim 2025, https://www.africanews.com/2025/10/21/cameroon-paul-biya-declared-as-provisional-winner-of-presidential-election/, (Access Date: 21.10.2025).
[ii] Ibid.
