Analysis

The US’s Sixth Caribbean Attack

The US’s attacks on the Caribbean are evolving from war on drugs to regional force.
Venezuela sees the CIA activity as an open threat to their sovereignty.
The increasing military tensions in the Caribbean are redefining the alliance balance in Latin America.

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On October 17 2025, the Donald Trump administration has launched a sixth attack on a ship on the Caribbean Sea due to concerns on “narco-terror” and this has been reported for the first time by survivors.[i] This event is the continuation on five separate attacks where 27 people in total have died. The White House claims these actions are targeted toward Venezuela-connected drug networks while the international public are putting out different statements on the legitimacy and accordance with sea law of the actions. From this angle, the attack is important in relation to understanding the US’s changes in its Caribbean policies and the arguments caused in international law.

The operations the Trump administration has been taking on the Caribbean have transcended the traditional “War on Drugs” by using a new deterrence policy which relies on the military. Since August, the US has placed destroyers with missiles, F-35 fighter jets, a nuclear submarine and around 6,500 soldiers in the area.[ii] This concentrated military presence does not only prevent smuggling but also a way to create strategic balance around Venezuela.

The new approach can be seen as an updated version of the “War on Drugs” paradigm which was shaped in the 1980’s. However, the focus on the current operations are not restricted to non-government actors; the ruling governments have indirectly become a target. The CIA being granted access to work on Venezuela on October 2025 points to the policy being part of a broader strategic cause.[iii]

Therefore, the sixth attack is not only an “anti-narcotic operation but simultaneously a symbolic attempt by the US to become a power over the Caribbean again. This approach reminds one of the “backyard” approach used in the Cold War and could be considered a modern take on the Monroe Doctrine.

The point of most argument in international law about the topic is that the attacks happened on international waters and fatal force has been used. The Washington administration have defended that the operations are connected to “self-defense” and “maritime security”. According to United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), armed intervention on water is rarely justified. Between these conditions the flag state’s approval and the authority of an international organization is needed.[iv] However the current situation does not meet the above standards.

This situation brings forward the discussion of whether the attacks are considered to be “use of one-sided force”. The Charter of the UN’s 2(4)th clause clearly restricts a state’s use of force on other states.[v] The situation can now be considered a humanitarian problem rather than solely a military one due to the loss of lives on the sixth attack. The status and identities of survivors have not been clarified yet. So, the legal categories they fit in can cause new discussions in international law.

US internal policy have raised different views on the operation as well. Some senators have voiced the attacks go against the “War Authorities Law” framework since they did not go through Congress approval. This situation can cause the executive’s authority on leading military operations to be discussed again.

The Venezuelan administration, on the other hand, has regarded the military operations as a threat to its sovereignty. The Caracas administration has considered especially the activity of the CIA in the state to be “intervention on sovereignty”. These developments have caused echoes on the local scale; while some Latin American countries support these operations, some have found them to be external interventions. Cuba, Nicaragua and Bolivia administrations have found the actions to be concerning to the regional security, while countries such as Colombia and The Dominican Republic want to increase collaboration with the US on security.

For the Trump administration, these operations are not only for security but because of larger geopolitical anxieties. The economic crisis in Venezuela and mass migration carries importance for the US both about border security and internal politics. The military presence in the Caribbean is aimed at controlling the waves of migration. Additionally, the strategic importance of the region’s energy corridors adds an economic dimension to the operations. China and Russia’s increased activity on Venezuelan Petrol over the last few years are a factor for Washington’s regional policies.

These attacks have brought the long-argued “regional security” to talks again in Latin America. One sided military intervention carry a possibility of weakening the ways of finding a diplomatic solution in the Americas. The struggle of institutions such as the Lima Group and the Organization of American States on finding a diplomatic solution to the Venezuela crisis show that such military operations restrict the political sphere.

The sixth attack shows the changed military policies of the US on Latin America. The operations led on the “War on Narco-terrorism” framing have put international law in a tough spot. The developments may have different conclusions in the legal, regional and global spheres. The international public may not see the operations as self-defense and this may cause the International Justice Court to use precedents on future similar situations. In the regional sphere the republican reflexes may strengthen and a new support between Latin American countries may be seen. On the global scale, new security structures may come forth that enforce legitimacy of actors such as China and Russia legitimacy in Latin America.

In conclusion, the attack on October 17 2025 was not only a sea operation but a breaking point as a test of the US to see the limits of its international force. The development in the Caribbean has the potential to shape military and diplomacy in Latin America. Within this frame, the future of the regional security structure will be determined not only by military capabilities but also with international law and the balances between diplomacy.


[i] “The U.S. Attacked a Sixth Vessel in the Caribbean and Survivors Are Reported for the First Time”, Guacamaya, 17 Oct. 2025, guacamayave.com/en/the-u-s-attacked-a-sixth-vessel-in-the-caribbean-and-survivors-are-reported-for-the-first-time/, (Date of Access: 19.10.2025).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations, treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=21&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=XXI-6, (Date Accessed:19.10.2025).

[v] United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. 26 June 1945. Article 2, Paragraph 4. United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text, (Date Accessed:19.10.2025).

Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İncesu graduated from Anadolu University Faculty of Business Administration in 2012. He continued his education with Cappadocia University Tourist Guidance associate degree program and graduated in 2017. In 2022, he successfully completed his master's degrees in International Relations at Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University and in Travel Management and Tourism Guidance at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. In 2024, he graduated from the United States University of Maryland Global Campus (UMGC) Political Science undergraduate program. As of 2023, he continues his doctoral studies at Cappadocia University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. In 2022, Mr. İncesu worked as a special advisor at the Embassy of the Republic of Paraguay in Ankara. He is fluent in Spanish and English and is a sworn translator in English and Spanish. His research interests include Latin America, International Law and Tourism.

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