Israel’s strategic planning toward the Eastern Mediterranean is not limited to energy security and defense cooperation, but is rather the product of a broader geopolitical and ideological vision. This vision represents a fundamental strategic transformation, shifting Israel from its traditionally threat-oriented environment toward a new strategic sphere that offers geo-economic opportunities. Within this framework, the approach that could be described as a “Second Gaza Plan” reflects Israel’s objective to reshape the regional security architecture and to ensure the permanence of both its energy supply security and its geopolitical influence.
Unlike the strategy of direct control and isolation employed against asymmetric threats in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s Eastern Mediterranean strategy is based on constructing security through cooperation, partnership, and economic interdependence. In this context, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCA) serves not merely as a military or energy partner for Israel, but as a strategic foothold, an “advanced outpost,” and the center of Israel’s power projection in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel’s growing rapprochement with the GCA has particularly intensified over the past decade in areas such as natural gas exploration activities, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreements, joint military exercises, defense industry cooperation, and intelligence sharing. This bilateral cooperation has naturally expanded to include Greece, giving rise to a strategic alliance in which Zionist and Greek–Cypriot common interests intersect, often referred to as the “Athens–Nicosia–Jerusalem Triangle.” This configuration provides Israel not only with a broader military maneuvering space, but also with a vital bridge for integration into the European energy markets and the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The fundamental dynamics that determine the geopolitical significance of the GCA for Israel are shaped along the axes of energy security and strategic defense cooperation. The discovery of major natural gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean basin—such as Leviathan, Tamar, Aphrodite, and Karish—has elevated Israel to the position of a key actor in international energy markets, while the geography of Cyprus has assumed a critical role in the transportation of these resources to global markets. GCA is now an integral part of Israel’s energy policy because to infrastructure developments like LNG terminals and underwater pipelines, which are critical to Israel’s ability to deliver these energy resources to Europe. This circumstance positions the GCA as a crucial link in Israel’s transition into a regional energy hub, elevating it above the status of a simple energy corridor.
The strategic stance of the GCA effectively meets Israel’s various security issues. To the north, in light of Turkey’s expanding maritime capabilities and regional strategies, the GCA emerges as an essential maritime protector and balancing platform for Israel. Likewise, the island acts as a barrier and initial response location to potential asymmetric dangers—like terrorism and arms trafficking—that could come from the Horn of Africa or North Africa through the Mediterranean.
Additionally, the area controlled by the GCA can act as a key intelligence hub for carrying out intelligence-gathering missions aimed at Iran, Hezbollah, and various other regional players in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a result, this multifaceted collaboration between Israel and the GCA reimagines Israel’s national security model, merging energy supply security and military strategy within a cohesive geopolitical context. In this regard, the GCA occupies the position of a privileged ally at the core of Israel’s regional integration, security-building, and energy geopolitics strategies.
Israel’s Cyprus policy possesses a nature that transcends mere strategic and material interests, rooted instead in deep-seated ideological frameworks. The “Eretz Yisrael (Greater Israel)” or “Promised Land” doctrine has historically constituted a fundamental parameter shaping Israel’s security culture and regional imaginaries. Although the modern State of Israel rarely articulates this discourse explicitly within its official foreign policy rhetoric, the underlying ideological framework continues to shape the mental background of policies driven by peripheral expansion and the pursuit of strategic depth. From this perspective, while the island of Cyprus is not perceived as a direct component of the “Promised Land” vision, it is positioned as a geostrategic peripheral element aligned with the logic of ensuring the “security of the sacred geography” within Israel’s broader effort to construct a regional sphere of influence. In other words, the deep strategic partnership established with the GCA is grounded not only in tangible military or energy imperatives, but also in a “security encirclement” reflex nourished by historical and religious motifs. Through this dynamic, Israel seeks to counterbalance the spheres of influence of actors it perceives as threats, thereby consolidating its material security while simultaneously legitimizing that security through an ideological vision.
The qualitative shift recently observed in Israel’s discourse regarding Cyprus, along with the accompanying strategic maneuvers, has exerted a direct and transformative influence on the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel’s expansionist settlement policies and brutal military operations in the Palestinian territories have led to growing regional isolation. Consequently, although diplomatic normalization efforts have been initiated between Turkey and Israel, these developments have hindered the establishment of lasting strategic trust between the two countries. This structural trust deficit has driven Israel to deepen its cooperation with Greece and the GCA in order to secure its regional position and energy interests. This trilateral alignment is perceived by Turkey as a source of multidimensional strategic risk. It carries the potential to undermine Turkey’s negotiating position in disputes over maritime jurisdiction areas and continental shelf boundaries, while also directly affecting the country’s defense and energy security parameters. Certainly, the dominant geopolitical view in Ankara sees Israel’s approach to Cyprus as going beyond just an energy partnership. It is perceived as an attempt by Israel to use the island as a strategic tool to limit Turkey’s regional power, reduce its geopolitical flexibility, and unify Western players in an anti-Turkish coalition.
Consequently, Israel’s policy towards Cyprus also serves as a reflection of its strategic alignment with the Western world. By endorsing a Greece- and Cyprus-focused path as an alternative to the Turkish corridor for delivering Eastern Mediterranean energy resources to Europe, Israel bolsters its reputation as a trustworthy energy ally for the European Union and the larger Western alliance. This preference simultaneously aims to strategically weaken Ankara’s central position and geopolitical leverage within the regional energy equation. In particular, the European Union’s ongoing or potential sanctions and policy pressures on Turkey provide Israel with an additional opportunity space to further deepen this strategic maneuver. From Turkey’s perspective, this geopolitical environment is interpreted as an extension of Israel’s containment policy toward Ankara. Viewed from this angle, the energy-focused partnership that Israel has formed with the GCA and Greece can be seen as a subtle effort to align Western powers against Turkey and to drive Ankara into strategic seclusion
Still, the military drills, intelligence partnerships, and defense system transactions between Israel, the GCA, and Greece signify a growing “risk of isolation” from Turkey’s viewpoint. These types of collaboration have the ability to upset the equilibrium along the Turkey–Greece axis in case of a possible crisis. It might be an exaggeration to assert that Israel seeks to incite a direct confrontation between Turkey and Greece; nonetheless, the ongoing nature of these tensions could initiate a gradual weakening of Turkey’s diplomatic and economic strength. Thus, Israel’s regional approach can be viewed not as a push for direct conflict, but as a “balance policy” aimed at maintaining a state of ongoing tension and strategic diversion for Ankara
In conclusion, the strategic cooperation between Israel and the GCA possesses a multi-layered structure. While this partnership is grounded in a rational framework aimed at ensuring energy security and expanding Israel’s regional alliance network, it also entails significant geopolitical repercussions for Turkey. The geostrategic position of Cyprus has thus become, for Israel, both a means of controlling the energy arteries of the Eastern Mediterranean and a tool for reinforcing its surrounding security belt. The historical and ideological influence of the “Promised Land” notion forms the intellectual foundation of these policies; when merged with contemporary security dialogue, it adds a sacred aspect to Israel’s efforts for regional involvement. On the other hand, for Turkey, these changes represent both a sidelining from important energy routes and a rise in security threats. Israel’s approach towards Cyprus can therefore be understood not as a direct aggression tactic, but as a sustained containment strategy aimed at restraining Turkey’s influence in the region and maintaining its constant defensive stance.
In light of this situation, it would be a prudent strategy for Turkey to pursue an intelligent balancing policy rather than direct confrontation. Within this framework, it is of utmost importance to strengthen energy diplomacy, highlight alternative routes connecting Europe through Turkey, and utilize projects such as TANAP and TurkStream as strategic instruments. Furthermore, it is essential to emphasize the rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in all international platforms, and to intensify legal and diplomatic initiatives aimed at ensuring that Turkish Cypriots receive an equitable share of the island’s energy resources. Simultaneously, embracing a multilateral regional diplomatic strategy and enhancing collaboration with essential players like Egypt, Qatar, and Jordan would prove advantageous. Moreover, preserving defense deterrence while preventing escalation and reinforcing this position via proactive diplomacy should be a core principle.
For Turkey to maintain its status as a lasting power in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is essential to embrace a forward-looking strategic approach that encompasses energy, diplomacy, and security elements.
