The fate of Central Asia is shaped around the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these rivers ceased to be elements of regional integration and instead turned into a geopolitical fault line and the center of struggles for national sovereignty. The main issue is that the water crisis in the region stems not from a simple problem of resource scarcity, but from a structural dilemma imposed by geography and exacerbated by the Soviet legacy. At the heart of the issue is a significant divide that separates the nations in the region into two conflicting groups with interests that are directly opposed to each other.
On one side are the mountainous upstream states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are “energy-poor but water-rich.” For these countries, the rivers serve as a key to national sovereignty, enabling electricity generation during the winter months in the absence of hydrocarbon resources, and projects such as Tajikistan’s massive Rogun Dam are regarded as strategic assets. Conversely, the downstream nations of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are “energy-rich but water-scarce.” For these countries, the same rivers symbolize a significant reliance especially in the summer months on the agricultural industry that is foundational to their economies. Each cubic meter of water held upstream represents a possible threat of food scarcity for them. This equation of “one river, two destinies” has resulted in the securitization of water changing it from a technical resource management matter into a question of national survival.
The origins of the water crisis in Central Asia stem from the contradictory chaos brought about by the Soviet Union’s ambition for total dominion over nature. This legacy can be analyzed through two perspectives: the ecological devastation resulting from the hubris of dominating nature, and the political and institutional void that arose with the collapse of this control system. At the core of Stalinist ideology was the vision of transforming nature, which resulted in drastic alterations to the hydrological equilibrium of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. The “pipe dreams,” as described by Maya Peterson, signify this illusion that has irrevocably burdened the ecological and political future of the area. The tangible result of these ambitions was the rerouting of water to arid regions via extensive irrigation canals, predominantly built from unsealed and inadequately maintained soil.
Because of leaks and evaporation in the basic infrastructure, around 40 to 60 percent of the water channeled into the canals was lost prior to reaching the fields.[i] The outcome was the near-complete drying up of the Aral Sea, which was once the world’s fourth-largest lake, transforming it into essentially a waste site. What is left now is a new desert, referred to as Aralkum, where winds transport over 43 million tons of harmful salts and farm chemicals from the parched lakebed annually.[ii]
More importantly, the dissolution of the Union in 1991 also marked the end of the integrated central management system that had enabled the exchange of energy in winter for irrigation water in summer. Institutions such as the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), established to fill the institutional vacuum left by the collapse of central authority, proved ineffective amid emerging concerns over national sovereignty and a pervasive atmosphere of mistrust. This lack of trust caused the republics to repeatedly blame each other for going over their designated quotas and “taking” water.[iii] Consequently, the Soviet Union departed from this area, leaving behind an ecological disaster that permanently disturbed the natural balance, as well as a political void lacking any collaboration frameworks to address that disaster. The current hydro-political conflicts are rooted in this twofold legacy.
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the water crisis evolved into a complex structural crisis influenced by the inescapable effects of climate change, geopolitical conflicts over water dominance, and persistent agricultural ineffectiveness. The primary and enduring aspect of the crisis is how global climate change is affecting the mountain glaciers that are essential to the area’s water supply. While rising regional temperatures hasten the melting of glaciers in the near term, which may give a false impression of plentiful water, this phenomenon will ultimately result in the exhaustion of the area’s essential “water towers.”
Experts warn that the rapid loss of glaciers could lead to a significant reduction in future water flow and create unpredictable flow patterns. Furthermore, the collapse of the centralized Soviet framework disrupted the delicate balance dependent on water sharing. The focus of upstream countries on large hydroelectric initiatives to achieve their own energy independence threatens the water supply needed by downstream nations during the summer irrigation period. The water-energy exchange agreements formed after gaining independence broke down due to the persistent unreliability of energy supplies; this lack of trust initiated a perilous cycle of “retaliation.”
The upstream countries, facing problems in energy supply, responded by releasing more water through their hydroelectric plants during the winter months. This action caused devastating winter floods in the downstream regions while critically reducing the amount of water available for summer irrigation. This circumstance has initiated a cycle where water flow is utilized as a tool for diplomacy and, in essence, as a “weapon.”[iv] S Finally, the most fundamental yet least recognized aspect of the crisis is the massive ongoing water wastage in the agricultural sector. Irrigated agriculture the main consumer of water in Central Asia uses about 90% of all water withdrawn in the region, and due to outdated irrigation canals and inefficient techniques, 40 to 60% of the water taken from the rivers is lost before it even reaches the fields.[v]This ongoing shortage has merged water scarcity with insufficient technology and administrative oversight.
The delicate hydro-political equilibrium in Central Asia is at risk of being destabilized by a new and unforeseen geopolitical disturbance arising from the south. This imminent danger is the Qosh Tepa Irrigation Canal project an ongoing construction of 285 kilometers that is being swiftly developed by the Taliban administration.[vi] This massive project aims to unilaterally divert an estimated 20 to 30 percent of the Amu Darya River’s total flow. For its downstream neighbors, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan countries that already use most of their water for agriculture this move could spell a potential catastrophe. Expert projections indicate that once the canal is completed, Turkmenistan’s intake from the Amu Darya could decrease by as much as 80 percent.[vii] Afghanistan’s lack of involvement in current water-sharing agreements poses significant challenges to the international framework for discussions regarding the project.[viii]
The internal dynamics in the region are intertwined with a geopolitical situation involving both global and regional powers. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has significantly increased its economic influence in the area and has emerged as a crucial player in the hydro-political landscape. As Russia’s focus has shifted due to the conflict in Ukraine, a power vacuum has emerged, while Western entities such as the United States, the European Union, and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have intensified their involvement in the region to counterbalance the influence of Russia and China. While IFIs have poured resources into modernizing water distribution infrastructure, a critical analysis highlights that their strong emphasis on technical solutions, like repairing infrastructure, presents a notable limitation. Experts caution that these technical measures will yield minimal benefits unless accompanied by political reforms that enhance transparency, accountability, and effective enforcement mechanisms.
Central Asia is at a pivotal moment in its history. The nations in this area must decide whether to stay mired in the legacy of zero-sum conflicts from the Soviet era risking a collective water crisis or to create a cohesive regional system. The origins of the crisis stem from a complex conflict between the energy security of upstream states and the food security of downstream countries, rather than merely a lack of resources. Geopolitical disturbances, like the Qosh Tepa Canal, which irrevocably alter this tenuous equilibrium, underscore the critical necessity for an immediate strategic approach.
Addressing this crisis by leveraging it into an opportunity necessitates a comprehensive strategy that emphasizes hydro-diplomacy. First and foremost, it is crucial to mitigate immediate threats and foster trust. Given the current weakness of regional institutions, bilateral agreements like those established between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which include references to “independent international assessments” for significant projects, should be considered models. In tackling the Qosh Tepa crisis, rather than excluding Afghanistan, a channel for “resource-for-diplomacy” should be established, offering the country energy and food assistance in exchange for cooperative water management and data sharing. Furthermore, the fundamental conflict at the heart of the crisis needs to be addressed; resolving this can only be accomplished by shifting the dynamics between water and energy from a state of “rivalry” to one of “partnership.”
Instead of insecurity-based barter agreements, a transparent and reliable regional integrated energy network grounded in market principles should be established. This strategy would eliminate the structural need that compels upstream countries to retain water in winter for energy production. Additionally, this should be supported by initiatives aimed at tackling another structural aspect of the crisis agricultural waste. The answer involves not just updating infrastructure but also implementing a thorough agricultural reform that incorporates suitable pricing strategies. Indeed, improving efficiency in agriculture which consumes 90% of the region’s water has the potential to create more “new” water resources than any dam project could provide.
Ultimately, a sustainable institutional framework needs to be created to guarantee ongoing stability. Inefficient organizations like the ICWC should be revamped into multi-disciplinary entities that incorporate not just water specialists, but also professionals from the energy, agriculture, finance, and environmental fields. External actors must also play a critical role in this transformation. International donors such as the United States and the European Union should move beyond providing mere technical assistance and link portions of their aid funds to tangible progress in institutional areas such as ICWC reform, transparency, and accountability. To summarize, the water crisis in Central Asia is more about political vision and the willingness to collaborate than about resource scarcity. The region stands at a crucial crossroads: either succumb to the turmoil stemming from the Soviet legacy or create a unified basin for a collective future.
[i] Dukhovny, Viktor A., Joop L.G. de Schutter ve Viktor Abramovich. Water in Central Asia: Past, Present, Future. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2011, p.9.
[ii] “Acting on an environmental health disaster: the case of the Aral Sea.”, Environmental Health Perspectives, https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/pdf/10.1289/ehp.01109547, (Erişim Tarihi: 22.10.2025).
[iii] International Crisis Group. “Central Asia: Water and Conflict”. Europe & Central Asia Report, No. 034, 2002.
[iv] International Crisis Group. “Central Asia: Water and Conflict”. Europe & Central Asia Report, No. 034, 2002.
[v] Dukhovny, a.g.e, p.9.
[vi]“The Qosh Tepa Canal: Source of Possible Regional Tension”, NUS Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/the-qosh-tepa-canal-source-of-possible-regional-tension/, (Erişim Tarihi: 22.10.2025).
[vii]“Qosh Tepa Canal Sparks Concerns in Central Asia”, The Times Of Central Asia, https://timesca.com/afghanistans-qosh-tepa-canal-sparks-water-security-concerns-in-central-asia/, (Erişim Tarihi: 22.10.2025).
[viii]“Central Asia’s complex water-security diplomacy with the Taliban”, The Strategist, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/central-asias-complex-water-security-diplomacy-with-the-taliban/, (Erişim Tarihi: 22.10.2025).
