Chinese President Xi Jinping exceptionally received a third term from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, which took place between October 16-22, 2022.[1] Xi Jinping abolished the two-term mandate limitation imposed by Deng Xiaoping in 2018. This allowed Xi to serve more than two terms. This situation is of great importance in terms of both regional and global developments.
In this context, Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) presents the views of New Delhi China and Asian Studies Organization Research and Operations Director Eerishika Pankaj to evaluate the regional and global developments that may occur in the third term of the President of China.
- Xi was re-elected as the CCP General Secretary, becoming the first person after Mao Zedong to hold the party leadership for more than two terms. How would you interpret the position of Xi? What brought Xi to the third period?
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s term in power as Party Secretary-General has been secured by several factors. Firstly, because Xi has spent the last five years exerting full control over the functions of the government, the key centres of the party are extremely dependent on him personally. Second, Xi organized a systematic campaign to strengthen his position in the leadership, both by eliminating the opposition with his anti-corruption campaign called “tigers and flies”, and by placing loyal people in strong and key positions to protect his power. Xi has restructured the government’s decision-making environment. On this occasion, he succeeded in drawing an advantageous route for his political aims. The CCP Constitution, the party’s official rulebook, contains only a few rules. Still, Xi made significant changes to the procedure for selecting delegates and senior leaders. Xi’s statement on centralization and “high-level design” is underscored by these reforms, in contrast to his past rhetoric aimed at promoting greater balance and openness. Xi’s success sets a very clear and dangerous precedent for discussions on Chinese politics and future leadership. Since no successor has been identified, Xi can remain in power as long as his health allows.
- What foreign policy do you think China will follow in Xi’s third term? What approach will the Beijing administration adopt, especially in terms of the global security system? Can China plan to build a new global security architecture?
Due to Yang Jiechi’s retirement, a new name will be appointed as Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission. The fact that Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who is 69 years old and has reached retirement age, is included in the Politburo makes one think that he can replace Jiechi. In addition, the validity of the retirement age can be thrown into the background to meet the expectations of Xi. Wang, who is seen as one of China’s most experienced “wolf warrior” diplomats, is called the “silver fox” by nationalist Chinese and many foreign media. His many years of experience as Foreign Minister of China have made Wang adept at managing the global challenges China has faced recently. It can be argued that in the coming years, “wolf warrior” diplomacy will continue to maintain its current orientation with the participation of other powerful diplomats such as Qin Gang, who is the United States (US) Ambassador of China and is expected to replace Wang as Foreign Minister.
Regarding a new global security architecture, Xi’s focus on the Global Security Initiative can be expected to grow. The initiative, the details of which are little known to the public, has the potential to become an important geopolitical inflexion tool. The initiative points to “indivisible security,” which Beijing hopes to show actions taken in defence of its national interests are more justified. A mix of a hard-line foreign ministry with the Global Security Initiative spells trouble for democratic like-minded states in protecting the rules-based international order.
3- What kind of a period awaits us in the context of Xi’s place in China’s global supply chain and its economic relations with the West? Can relations with the West be expected to be restored, especially within the scope of trade wars with the US?
It can be said that China will focus on its bilateral trade relations and maintaining its economic growth/stability in this new period. However, during this period, Xi will work with a Standing Committee largely devoid of strong economists. Therefore, Li Keqiang’s policies can be expected to continue for the next two years. “Supply chain diversification away from China”, which Western states are focusing on building after Covid-19, is still under development, although it has had limited success. However, there is no significant change in the US-China trade war, at least on the tariff front.
4- Will Cinping maintain its stance on Taiwan policy? Will there be any surprise developments regarding Taiwan in the new period?
Xi plans to play a long-term game in Taiwan. China’s military stance can be expected to continue in Taiwan’s Airspace Identification and Security Zone (ADIZ) and Taiwan Strait. However, it cannot be said that Xi is planning an attack on the island shortly. Still, Xi’s goal is to be the leader that unifies China and Taiwan. Therefore, Beijing will continue to focus on Taipei in the upcoming period.
- Do you think the US will continue to support Taiwan? How will China respond to this?
US support for Taiwan goes beyond the protection of democratic values and is based on various reasons. Because the Taiwan Strait has enormous geostrategic value for the US. Contrary to the Ukraine example, the Taiwan Issue is of critical importance to the Washington administration, especially since Beijing’s full control over Taipei will significantly increase China’s power. Taiwan is also important for international supply chains, especially for semiconductors. Therefore, it can be expected that the US will continue to support Taiwan in terms of both security and the global market economy. The Taiwan Relations Act of the US legally guides this by requiring the US “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and “to maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” Whether or not the US comes to actual military aid Taiwan in the case of war remains to be seen. China’s response to US meddling in what it considers to be ‘internal’ affairs will continue to be blunt and negative, especially as Beijing recognizes that it is US policy to Taiwan that also shapes the policies of many other states like Japan and Australia in their engagements with Taipei.
Eerishika Pankaj
Eerishika Pankaj is the Director of the New Delhi-based think-tank, the Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA), which focuses on decoding domestic Chinese politics and its impact on Beijing’s foreign policymaking. She is also an Editorial and Research Assistant to the Series Editor for Routledge Series on Think Asia; a Young Leader in the 2020 cohort of the Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program; a Commissioning Editor with E-International Relations for their Political Economy section; a Member of the Indo-Pacific Circle and a Council Member of the WICCI’s India-EU Business Council. Primarily a China and East Asia scholar, her research focuses on Chinese elite/party politics, the India-China border, water and power politics in the Himalayas, Tibet, the Indo-Pacific and India’s bilateral ties with Europe and Asia.
[1] “China’s Xi Jinping Wins Third Term As Leader of Ruling Communist Party”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/23/chinas-xi-jinping-wins-third-term-as-leader-of-ruling-communist-party, (Date of Accesion: 08.11.2022).
