The Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) presents to your attention its interview with Takeo Harada, CEO of the International Institute for Strategy and Information Analysis (IISIA), conducted to assess the operation carried out by the United States (U.S.) against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.
1. How do you assess the recent developments in Venezuela in terms of both domestic dynamics and their international dimensions?
On the surface, the episode appears to constitute a regime-change operation. However, I am paying particular attention to a report carried by The Telegraph in early December last year. In other words, while the situation has been framed publicly as an “arrest,” it is more plausible that the matter was substantively settled in advance, with the outcome amounting in effect to negotiated exile.
That said, such a development would not have been feasible for the United States absent a prior understanding with Russia. Accordingly, I believe this was embedded within a broader package deal between the two countries. The primary question, therefore, is what Russia extracted in return.
2. How might the Venezuelan case resonate in the context of East Asia and North Korea?
The second critical issue concerns Russia’s assessment of North Korea. President Trump has stated that more countries will experience regime change in 2026. With U.S. midterm elections approaching and the real economy likely to deteriorate, there is a strong incentive to manufacture external tension through foreign policy—making East Asia a highly probable arena. Scott Bessent has already suggested that Trump may visit China as many as four times in 2026. Any attempt to “move” on North Korea, however, would require prior coordination with China.
Consequently, the key variable may well be how North Korea positions itself while being effectively encircled by the United States, China, and Russia. While Pyongyang is likely to align fundamentally with Russia, it may also seek to extract maximum concessions—particularly with respect to its nuclear capabilities—before ultimately pursuing, under U.S. acquiescence, a de facto exile to the United States or a third country along the lines of the present “Maduro model.” Since this would be presented outwardly as a regime transition, it would necessarily constitute a crisis situation. In parallel, I would not rule out simultaneous pressure being applied to Taiwan.
3. Within this broader framework, how do you think the possible timing and regional implications might take shape?
This context may explain why the Takaichi administration appears hesitant to immediately declare unequivocal support for Washington. Moreover, the invocation of the Monroe Doctrine in South America—once again justified on the grounds of narcotics, an area in which the United Kingdom had already begun to ease its stance—suggests that underlying U.S.–UK rivalry may form part of the deeper backdrop. This remains my fundamental reading of the situation.
In my view, the question is not if but when. If the United States is to move in Asia within this year, the most likely window would be the APEC season between September and November. Alternatively, it could occur between late January and March, when Japan is in regular Diet session. These two timeframes are precisely the windows that U.S. intelligence agencies have long indicated to me as the most probable periods for heightened activity in Asia. I offer this for your reference.
