On September 30, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees approving the annexation of the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions belonging to Ukraine. Following this development, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky stated that Kyiv would apply to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through an accelerated procedure.
On October 2, 2022, the heads of state of the nine countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which are members of NATO, issued a statement declaring that they would never recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory and would support Kyiv’s NATO membership. It was seen that states such as Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovenia did not sign the declaration. Therefore, it has begun to be wondered what kind of stance the countries in Central and Eastern Europe will follow regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership.
In this context, Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) presents the views of Dr. Hans Mouritzen, a senior research fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), evaluating the perspectives of countries in Central and Eastern Europe on Ukraine’s NATO membership.
- 1. What kind of consequences could Ukraine’s membership in NATO have in the geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe?
Such membership would create an even more tense situation in Central and Eastern Europe than we witness today, also after the termination of war events in Ukraine. A much longer border than today between Russia and NATO would result (also counting the Fenno-Russian border). We would see an iron curtain from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. The absence of more or less neutral buffer states would increase the risk of “war by mistake.” According to the “security dilemma”, Ukrainian membership would be perceived as a Western escalation only to provoke a Russian escalation, and so on. The situation would resemble the pre-World War I escalation in the Balkans.
- What role can the Central and Eastern European countries that are members of NATO play in Ukraine’s membership in the alliance?
Especially Poland would play a facilitating role for Ukraine in such a process, as a natural extension of Poland’s role during the current war. This can be compared to Denmark and Norway playing such a role in possible Swedish and Finnish membership.
- On October 2, 2022, the heads of state of the nine countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which are members of NATO, issued a statement declaring that they would never recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory and would support Kyiv’s NATO membership. How would you interpret the heads of state of Hungary, Croatia, and Bulgaria not signing the declaration?
These states still support the view that Russia’s annexations are illegitimate from the standpoint of international law. But just like Western European members of NATO, they do not support Ukrainian membership. This approach will probably also apply to the US. A state with disputed borders cannot join NATO according to its criteria for new memberships; NATO does not, so to speak, ‘import trouble’. Furthermore, the adoption of new members requires unanimity.
- What do you think about the observed lack of harmony between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership?
As illustrated by the previous question, such harmony does not exist between the states. Especially Poland and Hungary are on different pages. Poland strongly supports Ukraine’s war effort and future NATO membership, whereas Hungary is on a good footing with Moscow and does not support Ukraine. Meanwhile, in Prague, as in Berlin, we have seen mass demonstrations against higher energy prices and living costs and further support for Ukraine.
Hans Mouritzen
Dr. scient. pol. Hans Mouritzen is a senior research fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), where he is an editor of “The Danish Foreign Policy Review.” Mouritzen has developed a theory on the autonomy of international organizations, small-state foreign policy, and how historical memory impacts contemporary foreign policy decisions.
